"All you can heat? Welfare implications of high fixed charge tariffs for electricity" by Stephenson, John
All you can heat? Welfare
implications of high fixed charge
tariffs for electricity.
John McEwen Stephenson
a thesis submitted for the degree of
Master of Science




This research investigates the implications of residential electricity tariffs
with high daily fixed charge or fixed-like components, like ‘all you can
eat’ or ‘uncapped’ tariffs which are common for access to internet services.
The objective and contributions of the research are: to improve the state
of knowledge about household electricity demand in New Zealand; esti-
mate household expenditure systems using methods that are novel in New
Zealand; and to provide evidence on tariffs that are likely to be welfare
improving. Models of household expenditure are estimated and they show
household electricity demand to be highly responsive to changes in average
electricity prices, in contradiction of conventional wisdom that electricity
demand is price inelastic. A counterfactual price experiment shows a sub-
stantial gain in efficiency and an improvement in social welfare from elec-
tricity tariffs with high fixed charge components as opposed to the status
quo where high variable charges act as a tax on electricity consumption.
High fixed charges are shown to be progressive, contradicting concerns that
high fixed charges would exacerbate inequality. Smaller households, typi-
cally older households, would likely be worse off from high fixed charges,
but not substantially or universally so.
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The primary objective of this research is to test the hypothesis that high fixed charges
for electricity would reduce social welfare or increase inequality.
Residential electricity pricing in New Zealand fails basic economic tests of efficiency.
Households’ electricity bills are dominated by charges based on the amount of electric-
ity consumed. Yet a large proportion of the costs of electricity systems do not vary
according to energy consumption. This means that prices are signalling costs that
cannot be avoided and people are needlessly economising on electricity use.
This issue arises because of the way that electricity network costs are recovered.
Electricity prices consist of three general components: energy generation costs, energy
transportation and network costs, and retail or customer-service costs. Transportation
and network costs are large and generally fixed and sunk.
Networks are regulated by the Commerce Commission precisely because their large
fixed costs, or increasing returns to scale, constrain competition. Yet a large proportion
of these fixed network costs are recovered using variable prices based on amounts of
electricity consumed so that consumers’ are encouraged to reduce their use of networks
even when reduced use has no effect on the costs to be recovered.
A simple solution to this problem would be for retail electricity tariffs to include
1
higher fixed charges, to recover fixed network costs, and lower variable (cents per kWh)
prices so as not to discourage electricity consumption. High fixed charges are not
uncommon in other network industries such as telecommunications where consumers
can choose price options with single fixed price for any level of use.
‘All you can heat’ tariffs for residential electricity use would need to include some
degree of variable pricing, given comparatively high variable costs in electricity supply
relative to other network industries. However fixed charges could be multiples of current
levels without compromising the efficiency criteria that prices should reflect marginal
costs.
However, this sort of change to electricity pricing would be met with resistance
from those who benefit from low fixed charges. In 2019 the New Zealand Government
considered a review of low fixed charge regulations. In response the lobby group Grey
Power submitted that “the low fixed charge tariff if phased out will exacerbate energy
hardship”.1
The focus here is on welfare broadly defined in terms of market incomes and expen-
diture, rather than energy use. This view of welfare admits logically consistent analysis
of distributional consequences, to see if higher fixed charges will cause an increase in
inequality.
The scope is restricted household electricity consumption, ignoring industrial and
commercial use of electricity. Household demand accounts for 32 percent of electricity
consumption2 in New Zealand and 40 percent of expenditure on electricity.3
1Grey Power submission to the 2019 Electricity Price Review, available at
https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/4863-grey-power-nz-federation-inc-submission-electricity-
price-review-options-paper-pdf, accessed 11 December 2020
2MBIE electricity statistics, 2019. Household shares of electricity consumption have been very
stable in the past decade and half, averaging 32 percent with a standard deviation of 0.6 percent
3Households have a higher expenditure share than consumption share because households consume
the full range of electricity and electricity-related services - from wholesale energy and transmission
services to distribution network, and retail and risk management services - and are more likely to
consume when electricity capacity costs are highest (when demand is at its peak). The estimate of
household expenditure share presented here is a March year 2018 estimate based on an estimated total
market size of 7.7 billion dollars, inclusive of network costs and wholesale electricity costs. The total
market size is the sum of networks revenues disclosed to the Commerce Commission plus wholesale
market energy costs published by the Electricity Authority and retail market margins based on MBIE’s
quarterly survey of domestic electricity prices. Household expenditure is estimated to be 3.1 billion
2
The focus on households allows for a single framework for evaluating welfare effects
and helps to fill a gap in analyses of electricity pricing in New Zealand which, to date,
have not included rigorous analysis of the welfare or distributional implications of high
fixed charges.
The framework used for evaluating welfare effects does not address questions of
dynamic efficiency or investment effects. While this is a short coming, those issues are
much larger than could be taken up here.
A subsidiary objective of this research is to improve the state of knowledge of de-
mand analysis, both in terms of electricity demand and estimation of demand systems.
With respect to electricity demand, there is relatively little publicly available research
that investigates household-level responses to changes in electricity demand in New
Zealand.
1.2 Context
At an aggregate level, residential demand for electricity has grown very little over
recent years and rising network costs and increasing prices are leading candidates for
explaining why demand has not increased.
Electricity is much more expensive now that it was fifteen years ago. Between 2006
and 2015 average unit costs for residential electricity increased 24 percent; a compound
annual average growth rate of 2.4 percent growth each year over and above general
consumer price inflation. Since 2015 average unit costs have been flat to declining but
they remain 18 percent higher in 2020 than in 2006.
Over the same period, average annual household consumption of electricity has
declined from 7,630 kWh in 2006 to 7099 in 2020, a 6 percent decline (see Figure 1.1).4
Total residential electricity consumption increased by only 0.2 percent between 2006
and the end of 2019 while the number of residential electricity network connections
increasing by 9.3 percent5 and average real household disposable income increased by
dollars based on MBIE’s quarterly sales-based electricity costs.
4MBIE quarterly sales-based electricity costs.
5Data is for calendar years 2006 to 2019, from MBIE’s electricity statistics.
3
33 percent between June 2006 and June 2019.6
Figure 1.1: Average residential electricity consumption and inflation-adjusted costs
(2020), MBIE quarterly residential sales-based electricity cost.
The leading cause of increased electricity prices has been increases in transmission
and distribution charges (see lines costs in Figure 1.2). Between 2006 and 2020 62 per-
cent of the increase in average inflation-adjusted electricity prices was due to increased
lines costs.
Electricity prices have declined in the past three years (from 2018 to 2020), largely
because of a reduction in the regulated rate of return on network companies’ assets.
However, the rise in lines charges that occurred prior to 2018 will persist for some time
because it reflects a substantial increase in the size of the regulated asset base upon
which lines charges are set.
There is no way to recover the costs of fixed network costs without distorting use
of electricity and of electricity networks(Borenstein, 2016). Numerous methods have
been proposed over the years, including funding networks’ capital costs through general
6Stats NZ Household income and housing-cost statistics, February 2020, income figures deflated
by the CPI
4
Figure 1.2: Contributions to inflation-adjusted energy cost increases, MBIE quarterly
residential sales-based electricity cost.
taxation (Hotelling, 1938) and using two-part tariffs that include a fixed charge per
network user to recover network’s sunk capital costs (Coase, 1946; Feldstein, 1972).
The one thing that proposed solutions have in common is that costs should be
recovered in a least distortionary way. The main area of disagreement is over what
least distortionary means. For example, funding capital costs through general taxation
removes distortions to electricity use but replaces them with distortions to production
or labour supply and incentivises inefficient investment by removing the feedback loops
that user-pays provides between levels of fixed costs and consumer willingness to pay
(Coase, 1970). Similarly, concern for long-run efficiency of investment, over short-run
consumer demand distortions, give rise to the view that, in practice, least distortive
electricity tariffs should signal future investment costs (long-run marginal costs) (Kahn,
1988, p. 108).7
This problem of recovering sunk costs is analagous to questions of optimal taxation,
where the objective is to raise revenue while minimising dead-weight losses from dis-
7Setting aside the overall efficiency of these sorts of prices, which is questionable (Borenstein,
2016), long-run marginal cost pricing is only a partial solution to the question of least distortionary
cost recovery because such charges will not fully recover a network’s capital costs.
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torting labour supply or consumption decisions. Indeed, a frequently cited method for
sunk cost recovery from network industries relies on a famous result from the optimal
taxation literature which suggests recovering costs from consumers using a mark-up,
over variable costs, that is inversely proportional to distortions created by the mark-up;
known as Ramsey-Boiteux pricing after Frank Ramsey who formulated conditions un-
der which revenue collection is least distortive, in the context of taxation, and Marcel
Boiteux who used the same reasoning to formulate efficient pricing for revenue recovery
for natural monopolies subject to a budget constraint (Ramsey, 1927; Boiteux, 1956;
Wilson, 1993, p. 98).
Like many tax theories, Ramsey-Boiteux pricing suffers from information and political-
economy problems (Laffont and Tirole, 1993, p. 32). It is difficult and costly to collect
the information needed to identify how consumers will respond to price mark-ups.
Even if the necessary information can be obtained, or an approximation to it, differ-
entiated prices raise incentives on people to lobby government, firms or regulators for
alternative allocations or for transfers. Ramsey-Boiteux pricing also has political and
socially unpalatable distributional implications because, when it comes to necessities,
the least well-off consumers are likely to have highly inelastic demand and thus face
above average charges.
Distributional consequences ought not to matter if transfers can be provided to meet
distributional objectives. Wilson (1993) provides a useful summary of arguments in
favour of choosing allocatively efficient prices rather than trying to pursue distributional
objectives:
...each customer is affected by utilities in several industries and by an assort-
ment of public programs, as well as taxes, subsidies and welfare programs
with substantial distributive effects. Absent a coherent scheme to coordi-
nate all these programs to achieve distributive objectives, if each program
maximizes total benefits then in aggregate the greatest potential benefit is
available for redistribution via taxation and other programs with explicit
welfare or distributional objectives. (p.101)
But distributional objectives and other factors unrelated to efficiency are important
considerations in political and policy decision-making. For example, the scope of the
New Zealand Government’s electricity price review, concluded in 2019, included equity
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and fairness.8 This suggests that analyses of the efficiency of pricing regimes needs to
be accompanied by an assessment of distributional consequences much as they are in
tax analysis.
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in network pricing, prompted by
emerging technologies that are changing the ways that energy and electricity networks
are used. There is concern that problems with conventional pricing will be magnified
by new technologies. For example, studies here and overseas have shown that conven-
tional electricity pricing practices can cause people to over-invest in solar photovoltaics
(Electricity Authority, 2018; Borenstein, 2017) in the sense that reductions in electricity
bills of households with solar are out-of-proportion to economic cost reductions. This
risks a situation of aggregate inefficiency where increased investment in solar causes an
increase in total system costs of supply but electricity consumption is unchanged.
Furthermore, under consumption-based cost-recovery, if consumption of electricity
on regulated networks declines then firms’ revenues decline. If this decline in revenue is
not matched by declining costs, profitability comes under pressure and with it incentives
to invest in or maintain networks and service quality. If networks raise their prices this
only further increases incentives to invest in solar (Brown and Sappington, 2018).
These dynamics could have regressive distributional consequences. If only higher
income households can afford to install solar systems, then lower income households
could face increasing electricity costs as increasing numbers of higher income households
install solar systems.
Electricity pricing can also undermine other policy objectives by inhibiting uptake of
new technologies. For example, electricity prices that are largely based on consumption
of electricity will tend to overstate the costs of charging electric vehicles outside of
demand peaks and hence discourage the uptake of a potentially important means of
mitigating emissions of carbon dioxide.
At the same time, charging of electric vehicle batteries during peak demand periods
could cause a significant increase in electricity networks’ capital costs, to augment their
networks to accommodate this demand. 9 This too introduces equity concerns in so
8https://www.mbie.govt.nz/dmsdocument/3762-terms-of-reference-electricity-price-review-pdf
9A large amount of the literature on utility pricing focusses on the problem of peak-load pricing
and efficiency of investment. This is the problem associated with pricing system capacity that is used
only infrequently, during periods of peak demand (Crew, Fernando, and Kleindorfer, 1995). This an
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far as any network costs creating from electric-vehicle charging will be shared by all
network users while, at least in the short term, the benefits of electric vehicle charging
are more likely to accrue to higher income households.
In New Zealand, network owners have been engaging with these issues (ENA, 2017).
However the focus of price reform has been on creating price signals that will assist with
cost control by incentivising consumption of electricity outside peak demand periods.
Comparatively little attention has been paid to reducing reliance on consumption based
charges for recovery of sunk costs.
Borenstein (2016) has argued that higher fixed charges are the most promising
option for avoiding some of these problems while ensuring that network owners recover
the costs of their investments. He notes, however, the problem that higher fixed charges
are often considered inequitable. This presents a barrier to reform.
In New Zealand, Government policy has been a direct barrier to higher fixed charges
in electricity tariffs. New Zealand’s low fixed charge regulations limit the size of fixed
charges in residential electricity tariffs.10 Under the regulations retail tariffs must
include a low fixed charge (LFC) option which is a tariff with a fixed fee no higher
than 30 cents per day excluding GST.11 Tariffs with higher fixed fees must have a
counterpart LFC option that is equivalent in the sense that a household consuming
8,000 kWh per year would face the same annual electricity bill under either tariff.12
The regulations “were introduced in 2004 to provide low-use consumers with a
tariff option that is more equitable for low energy usage and compatible with the
Government’s energy-efficiency objectives”.13
The presumption was that low fixed tariff options would promote energy efficiency,
because they had the effect of reducing prices for people who reduced their consumption
below a certain level. It is unclear if government considered the effect that lower average
issue that is closely related to the question of fixed cost recovery, however peak-load pricing is not the
focus here and the intricacies of these issues are not discussed further.
10Electricity (Low Fixed Charge Tariff Option for Domestic Consumers) Regulations 2004.
11The 30 cent price limit was established with the regulations in 2004 and has not been revised
since
12For households south of Arthur’s Pass the basis for establishing tariff equivalence is 9,000 kWh
13Hansard, Hon Darren Hughes Deputy Leader of the House on behalf of the Minister of Energy (19
March 2008), available at: http://www.parliament.nz/en-nz/pb/debates/debates/speeches/
48HansS_20080319_00001656/hughes-darren-electricity-disconnection-and-low-fixed
8
prices for small households might have on increasing their energy consumption. It also
unclear whether the Government considered that any reduction in consumption would
be an efficiency gain regardless of the associated costs incurred or if the Government
had specific forms of energy efficiency in mind when enacting the low fixed charge
regulations.
The effects of the LFC regulations have been to raise the average bills of house-
holds that use a comparatively large amount of electricity and reduce the average
bills of households that use comparatively small amounts of electricity. These effects
are similar to those of increasing block tariffs used elsewhere in the world to try and
improve the affordability of electricity for low income households. However the link
between household consumption of electricity and household income is tenuous and
consequently regulations that raise prices for higher levels of consumption can have
negative consequences for consumer welfare and potentially for inequality (Feldstein,
1972; Borenstein and Davis, 2012; Borenstein, 2016). Of course, higher fixed charges
have the reverse effect on prices, such that average electricity costs are highest for those
that consume comparatively little. This then raises questions about whether higher
fixed charges would be worse than the status quo.
The extent to which high, or at least higher, fixed charges are efficient or welfare
improving depends on how consumers respond to electricity prices. This is, at least
partly, an empirical matter. Thus the main contribution of this research is to investi-
gate, empirically, whether higher fixed charges might be a beneficial alternative to the
status quo of high variable consumption (kWh) prices. That is, to test the hypothesis
that high fixed charges would reduce consumer welfare or increase inequality.
Empirical research from elsewhere in the world points to potentially positive effects
from higher fixed charges, but emphasises that there will be winners and losers and
potentially negative distributional consequences. For example, Gomez-Lobo (1996)
found that a change in tariff structures in the retail residential gas market in the United
Kingdom, towards more cost reflective tariffs and a higher fixed charge, would result
in overall welfare gains but welfare losses amongst households in the lowest quintile of
income.
Borenstein (2012) finds, with simulation analysis, that increasing block tariffs in
California caused dead-weight (efficiency) losses, from reduced electricity consumption,
that are out of proportion to the modest amount of redistribution provided by tariffs
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predicated on a positive relationship between electricity consumption and income or
wealth. The article concludes that targeted subsidies are more cost-effective. It also
notes that analysis of the redistributive effects of tariffs requires data that can account
for the significant heterogeneity in electricity use by low income households, while
limitations on access to such data means that analysis is often based on averages over
geographical areas such as census blocks.
Borenstein and Davis (2012) analyse the efficiency and distributional effects of
increasing the fixed component of gas tariffs in the United States. They find that
cost reflective two-part tariffs with high fixed charges are regressive, relative to the
status quo. But they also find that the status quo is not a cost-effective redistributive
mechanism. Under an assumption that consumers respond to marginal prices, when
choosing consumption levels, they find that efficiency (consumer surplus) losses from
tariffs with low fixed charges and high volume charges are 20 percent larger than the
amount of wealth redistributed to lower income households. They consider the extent
to which increased fixed charges could cause a welfare loss due to a net reduction in the
number of gas connections (increase in people disconnecting or decrease in connections)
and conclude that this is unlikely but that that their finding of efficiency gains relies
on their being no significant net change in connections.
Price and Hancock (1998) considered the cumulative effect that changes to tariff
structures of for gas, electricity, water and telecommunications would have on low-
income and elderly households in the United Kingdom. During the 1990s many coun-
tries, including the United Kingdom, embarked on substantial reform of their utility
industries with an expectation that exposing parts of these industries to the disci-
pline of competition would reduce prices to consumers. However, reforms also led
to a widespread rebalancing of tariffs towards volume discounts that promoted con-
sumption. This had the effect that costs increased for households with low levels of
expenditure and those households included large numbers of low income households
and retirees.
There is no equivalent research in New Zealand considering changes in energy prices.
However, there is research into the effects of indirect taxation on household welfare that
is comparable to research in other countries on the effects of changes to energy prices.
For example Creedy and Sleeman (2005b) found that elimination of excise taxes would
both improve the efficiency of the tax system and reduce income inequality, though
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there would be winners and losers with the largest gains accruing to smoking households
because of the high excise taxes on tobacco products. Creedy (2004) simulated the
effects of a petrol excise increase on welfare and on inequality and found that an excise
increase would increase inequality, by a small amount.
Ball, Creedy, and Ryan (2016) is the New Zealand study most similar to interna-
tional research into the rebalancing of energy prices. The article examined the efficiency
and distributional consequences of exempting food from goods and services tax (GST),
with and without revenue neutral changes to GST rates. They found that, with revenue
neutrality enforced, lower income households benefit because of their higher average
expenditure shares on food while higher income households bear the balance of costs
from higher GST rates. However, they also find substantial redistribution from smaller
households, with lower expenditure shares on food, to larger households and house-
holds with children who have higher expenditure shares on food. They also find that
targeted transfers would be a more efficient way to achieve redistributive objectives
that underpin interest in exempting food from GST.
International empirical research on the consequences of tariff reform emphasises
the interaction between conceptually optimal pricing and consumer behaviour which
deviates from theoretically optimal behaviour. Ito (2014) investigated the welfare con-
sequences of flat rate (cents per kWh) tariffs against tiered tariffs where the marginal
price increases with higher consumption, similar in effect to the LFC regulations in
New Zealand except that the price changes increase in discrete steps. He finds that,
in general, a flat rate tariff is welfare improving. However he also finds that demand
does not cluster around the discrete price steps as one might expect if households are
responding to marginal price changes. Thus he concludes that that households in Cal-
ifornia respond to average rather than marginal electricity prices and notes that this
has implications for the efficiency of marginal cost pricing in practice. The study is
based on a robust quasi-experimental methodology and detailed unit-record data set.
This supports some degree of departure from strict adherence to models of consumer
optimisation at the margin, or at least a redefinition of the relevant margin of decision
making in the context of rational inattention.
A similarly robust quasi-experimental analysis by Shaffer (2020), analysing effects
of network pricing reforms in British Columbia, found evidence that consumers made
decisions based on average prices. The study also found evidence that some households
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misunderstood marginal prices and acted as if marginal prices were average prices.
This created significant welfare costs for this portion of households that misunderstood
prices.
Findings from other countries may not transfer perfectly to New Zealand because,
for example, New Zealand electricity prices are less complicated than the increasing-
block tariffs studied by Ito. However, the observation that consumers often respond to
average instead of marginal prices is a phenomenon with strong empirical support in
other contexts such as tax rates (Rees-Jones and Taubinsky, 2020).
A further issue of behavioural complexity that is canvassed in the literature is
the role of framing in affecting the political or social acceptability of tariff reform.
This issue is not taken up in this thesis, but it is an important limiting factor in
the usefulness of empirical analysis. Changes to tariffs can appear, to the analyst, to
be welfare improving yet cultural norms and people’s perceptions affect how people
react to tariffs and people’s preferences over tariffs. This adds an additional layer of
complexity when considering tariff reform.
For example, an experimental survey in Australia has suggested that consumers
there generally favour simple flat-rate or consumption-based tariffs and dislike tariffs
that reflect higher costs of energy at times of peak demand (Stenner, Frederiks, Hob-
man, and Meikle, 2015), even if cost-reflective charges are more efficient. Notably, the
Australian study did not investigate reactions to high fixed charges.
Policy interventions can also shape consumer behaviour by altering in the context
in which consumers make decisions, causing consumer decision making to depart sig-
nificantly from conventional models of marginal decision-making. For example, Beatty,
Blow, Crossley, and O’Dea (2014) found that a winter energy payment in the United
Kingdom led to an increase in spending on energy that was substantially higher than
would be predicted by marginal expenditure on energy. The payment was a cash
transfer provided to people aged over sixty-five. Nearly half of this cash transfer was
spent on energy - more than ten-times larger than energy expenditure elasticities would
have suggested. The authors suggest that this is strong evidence of a labelling effect,
whereby consumer spending decisions are influenced by the name given to the transfer
payment.14
14New Zealand introduced a similar scheme in 2019 with cash transfers available to all people over
sixty-five and all other recipients of government income support.
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1.3 Methodology
This research is primarily empirical and relies heavily on modelling of almost ideal
demand systems (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1997)
fitted to micro-data on household expenditure and incomes from the New Zealand
Household Economic Survey. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical details of these models
and details of the estimation methods used. Chapter 3 discusses the data used to
estimate the models.
The focus is on establishing a baseline relationship between household consumption
decisions and electricity prices and then to evaluate counterfactual changes in household
demand and welfare from changes in prices.
Demand systems provide a logically and theoretically consistent way to establish
the responsiveness of households to changes in electricity prices, conditional on the
prices of other products and household incomes and household size.
Demand systems based on household level data suffer less from identification prob-
lems and simultaneity bias than do other analyses, especially aggregate estimation of
market price elasticities. Identification problems and simultaneity bias confound most
estimates of price elasticities of demand based on aggregated data. This is especially
so for electricity where, traditionally, declining average costs of production and adjust-
ment costs manifest in investment cycles. With fixed capacity in any given year, an
unanticipated increase in demand can cause prices to rise, leading to a downward bias
in estimated price elasticities or even positive price elasticities.
This choice of methodology is also based on the relative novelty of using demand
systems to analyse electricity demand, thus providing a complementary perspective to
other empirical analyses. Furthermore the choice has been made to use almost ideal
demand systems, including the quadratic form of the model, because these methods
are used much less frequently in New Zealand than other demand systems such as the
linear expenditure system (as discussed in section 2.1).
Publicly available research in New Zealand into residential electricity price elastici-
ties of demand are almost entirely aggregate demand elasticities. The only exception is
Thorsnes, Williams, and Lawson (2012), which is an experimental analysis of responses
to time of use pricing.
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New Zealand is not alone in its relative paucity of micro-level analyses of household
electricity demand. A recent meta-analysis of residential electricity demand elasticities
by Zhu, Li, Zhou, Zhang, and Yang (2018) illustrates the widespread use of high level,
typically time series, analysis of demand elasticities. While these types of analyses can
be useful descriptions of aggregate data generation processes, they have questionable
value in terms of structural analysis and for investigating welfare effects.
The decision to estimate theoretically consistent almost ideal demand systems does
impose a cost in terms of more demanding estimation techniques (such as with non-
linear system estimation) and higher resource costs in terms of data acquisition.
It is perhaps because of these costs that empirical applications of demand systems
typically fail to present sensitivity tests of their model specifications, or tests of theo-
retical restrictions used when estimating their models. In some cases they do not even
present model parameter estimates (see Thomas (2019) and discussion in section 2.1).
Here the methodology includes testing of alternative model specifications, both in
terms of high level form of the model to be estimated and in terms of the choice
of exogenous variables. The results of these alternative specifications are discussed in
Chapter 4 which presents the results of the empirical estimation of the baseline demand
system.
In the counterfactual analysis of changes to electricity prices, in Chapter 5, sen-
sitivity analysis is limited to high level model specification choices, purely because of
the computationally intensive nature of the analysis and the time taken to run coun-
terfactual analyses. However, the intention is that the more extensive sensitivity tests
presented in Chapter 4 at least provide a measure of the sensitivity of model results to
model specification decisions.
One observes that debates in economics about demand analysis and welfare analysis
typically have a highly theoretical basis. For example, with regard to the efficiency
of estimators and aggregation problems and the extent to which income effects can
be ignored. These are important, however they often provide little guidance as to the
practical implications of choosing theoretically ideal estimators over practically feasible
estimators or of including or excluding particularly explanatory variables.15
15The distinction between theoretically ideal models and practically feasible models has the same
conceptual character as distinguishing between in principle statistical and economic significance (Mc-
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One aspect the methodology which is not tested but perhaps should be in future
research, is the decision taken to model responses to average electricity prices faced by
households. Models that approximate two-part or multi-part tariffs as a single average
price introduce simultaneity bias, by measuring average expenditure per unit instead
of the actual menu of prices that consumers are facing (Reiss and White, 2005). In the
context of high fixed charges, if consumers make decisions based on marginal prices
then responses to a two-part tariff should be modelled sequentially with the fixed access
charge in one step and marginal consumption decisions in a subsequent step (Gomez-
Lobo, 1996). However if consumers respond to average prices, then it is reasonable to
model demand accordingly.16
Imperfections in consumer behaviour pose more general problems for model spec-
ification, particularly in the context of demand theoretic models based on consumer
utility maximisation, as the almost ideal demand systems are. For example, it is pos-
sible that some consumers exhibit rational inattention while others make mistakes and
still others act according to optimal responses to marginal prices. And these heteroge-
neous models of consumer decision making may also be perturbed by policy settings.
Thus, there is a case to be made that experimental or quasi-experimental analysis
should be preferred for analysing policy and welfare effects, rather than observational
studies as used here. The difficulty of course is that experimental analyses require
resources that are not always readily available, principally data and time, as was the
case here.
Welfare effects and distributional impacts of higher fixed charges are discussed in
Chapter 5. The basis for the evaluation follows directly from the demand system
analysis, using compensating variation to measure money metric changes in utility.
Changes in inequality are also assessed using the Atkinson index. Section 5.1 discusses
these metrics in more detail and explains the intuition behind the use of the Atkinson
index.
The methods used here, while ostensibly complex, only address a subset of the issues
surrounding efficient electricity pricing. The final chapter, Chapter 6, summarises the
results of the empirical analysis, provides some commentary on the implications of the
Closkey and Ziliak, 2008) but in the context of model selection.
16This issue is not unique to this research. Most demand system estimation relies on the represen-
tation of a single price for each product in the demand system.
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results for policy and pricing practice, and reflects upon limitations of the analysis and
related research that could be undertaken to address those limitations.
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Chapter 2
Almost ideal demand systems
This chapter describes the Almost Ideal Demand system (AIDS) and Quadratic Al-
most Ideal Demand system (QUAIDS) used to analyse impacts of prices on consumer
demand and welfare. The first section provides brief context behind the selection of
the almost ideal demand systems, over other demand systems. The second section sets
out the formal components of the model and the third section discusses estimation
methods.
2.1 Model selection
Two versions of almost ideal demand systems are used here to study household ex-
penditure and energy demand: the almost ideal demand system (AIDS)(Deaton and
Muellbauer, 1980) and the quadratic almost ideal demand system (QUAIDS)(Banks
et al., 1997).
The primary focus is on the QUAIDS model. Up until recently (Thomas, 2019) the
QUAIDS model had not been used in published research in New Zealand, although the
model has been widely used in demand analysis in other countries. A second reason
for the focus on the QUAIDS model is the novel implementation of the model in the
open-source statistical software R as discussed later in section 2.3.
The AIDS model is used as a comparator for the results from the QUAIDS model.
Typically, demand systems are estimated without any sensitivity tests as to model
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specification. Rather than testing model specifications, model choice is motivated
by discussion of in-principle or theoretical justification or practical tractability. This
means it is very difficult, if not impossible, to investigate the effect that model specifi-
cation has on results of applied analysis. Although research does exist that compares
models (Fisher, Fleissig, and Serletis, 2001).
A linear expenditure system has also been used, for comparison purposes, though
the basis of this model is not discussed in any detail. The linear expenditure system
(LES) has been widely used in New Zealand (Creedy, 2004; Creedy and Sleeman, 2005b,
2006; Ball and Ryan, 2014; Ball et al., 2016), ostensibly due to the influence of John
Creedy who has used the LES extensively for welfare analysis of tax changes, has a
well-regarded body of work in public economics, and has spent a substantial amount
of time researching on and in New Zealand.1
Of all the demand systems the LES is simplest to estimate and has the convenient
property that estimation can proceed from data on expenditure shares, without the
need for data on prices which are comparatively difficult to come by. Welfare analysis
can also be conducted using the LES and assumptions about constant marginal utility
of income.(Creedy, 1998) Not having to rely on price data is a significant strength
of the LES model because it avoids errors in estimation from price heterogeneity and
errors in measurement of prices. This comes at the cost of using an inflexible demand
system with restrictive assumptions on the form of expenditure functions (Deaton,
1974; Pollak and Wales, 1992) such as constant price-independent marginal budget
shares where demand for a product scales linearly with total expenditure.
Estimation of linear expenditure systems, in New Zealand, has typically been under-
taken using ordinary least squares estimation of budget shares on a product-by-product
basis (Creedy, 2004). The econometric validity of this sort of approach and, for exam-
ple, the comparatively greater efficiency of system estimation, is not discussed in any
detail in New Zealand research. Furthermore, researchers using LES models, in New
Zealand, typically do not report the estimated parameters of their models or summary
statistics such as elasticities. As a result it is not possible to compare differences across
these and other demand models.
The AIDS model, introduced by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), is less-restrictive
1See, for example, Professor Creedy’s NZIER Economics Award citation at
https://nzier.org.nz/about/economists-award/previous-economics-award-winners/.
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than predecessor models of demand including the LES model. It permits, for example,
non-linear relationships between demand and total expenditure and consistency with
theoretical models of consumer demand based on rational utility maximisation. The
less restrictive form of the model, compared to its predecessors, also better enables more
reliable testing of demand data for consistency with theoretical predictions of consumer
demand: homogeneous of degree zero in income and prices; symmetric changes in
demand with respect to relative price changes between two goods; strictly negative
compensated own-price elasticities of demand for all goods (a negative semi-definite
matrix of substitution elasticities).
Banks et al. (1997) proposed the QUAIDS as a response to the observation that
existing applied models of consumer demand were restrictive in not accommodating
empirically observed non-linear relationships between expenditure shares and total ex-
penditure (non-linear Engel curves). The QUAIDS model overcomes this by adding a
quadratic income term to the AIDS model. Much of the following presentation of the
theory behind the demand models draws directly from Banks et al. (1997).
2.2 Models
The QUAIDS model, for estimation in share form, is:





















where wi is the share of expenditure on a product, zs is a vector of demographic
variables, pj is a vector of prices for all products (including i = j), and m is total
expenditure.
The terms a(p) and b(p) are, respectively, translog and Cobb-Douglas price indices:





















Product specific parameters to be estimated are αi, βi, and λi. The latter two terms
determine expenditure elasticities. The γij parameters determine substitution between
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pairs of products. The δis parameters shift product demands in response to demo-
graphic characteristics.
Adding-up constraints, in the context of share equations in which all shares need
to add to one, imply that
∑
i βi = 0,
∑
i αi = 1,
∑
i δis = 0 ∀s, and
∑
i γij = 0 ∀j.
Ensuring that expenditure is homogeneous of degree zero in prices and income requires∑
j γij = 0 ∀i.
The
∑S
s=1 δiszs term in equation 2.1 reflects a choice about how to incorporate
demographic effects into the QUAIDS model (see section 2.2.1) and differs from the
original presentation of the model in Banks et al. (1997).
The term on the right-hand side of equation 2.1 distinguishes the QUAIDS model
from the AIDS model. That is, the AIDS model to be estimated is:





















The model of demand shares in equation 2.1 is obtained from equation 2.5 by
defining λ(p) =
∑N






The AIDS version of the model derives from a version of the QUAIDS indirect utility
function with λ(p) = 0.
The log expenditure function in the QUAIDS model, which is important for empiri-
cal welfare analysis, follows directly from rearrangement of the indirect utility function
(with lnV = lnu):







2.2.1 Demographic scaling methods
To account for heterogeneity in households, the model needs to accommodate measures
of household or demographic differences. This is not straightforward in the sense that
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there are a limited number of ways that demographic terms can enter demand systems
without undermining the relationship between the demand system, as estimated, and
underlying indirect utility functions and thus undermining the theoretical validity of
welfare analysis.
The general approach to introducing demographics is to posit a reference household
around which expenditure varies and in thus demographic differences can expenditure
can be expressed as deviations from the reference household - also referred to as equiv-
alence scales. The key choices to be made are whether these scales should be permitted
to vary according to total expenditure levels or prices (Blow, 2003).
Here the choice has been made to introduce demographics into equation 2.1 by way
of shifts in expenditure or costs that are independent of total expenditure or prices.
This is an approach known as demographic translation (Pollak and Wales, 1992) and
it is the simplest form if demographic scaling.
An appealing alternative is the price scaling method of Ray (1983) where equiva-
lence scales vary with relative prices and equivalence scales are estimated simultane-
ously with demand systems. This method addresses identification problems that arise
in trying to separate demographic differences in preferences from observed demographic
differences in living costs (Ray, 2018, pp. 12-18).
An example of this method, in the context of QUAIDS models, is given in Nicholas,
Ray, and Valenzuela (2010) which defines an equivalence scale moh (the ratio of a
household’s costs relative to a reference households costs, to meet a given level of
utility) as:











where a is the number of adults in a household, zgh is the number of children in the
household (h) by age group (g), ρg is an age-specific equivalence coefficient for children,
θ is a scale parameter, zh is the number of children in the household and the parameter
δ captures the sensitivity of the equivalence scale to changes in prices and
∑
k δk = 0.
This is similar to the equivalence scales estimated in section 4.1.2.
The price-scaled QUAIDS has the same general from as equation 2.1 but λ(p)




i and the price aggregator a(p) includes the additional
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household composition and scale terms. The model is (Nicholas et al., 2010):
wih = αi + δizh +
N∑
j=1















ln a(p) =α0 +
N∑
i=1



























The addition of price dependence substantially increases the number of non-linear
terms in the model and significantly complicates estimation procedures. In particular,
the household scale and child weight parameters, θ and ρ, inside a(p) do not have
counterparts elsewhere in the model, unlike the model with demographic translation
where all demographic terms can be found inside and outside a(p). This means that
model cannot be solved via iterated linear methods (see section 2.3). Nicholas et al.
(2010) estimate the model using commercial software with well-tested non-linear system
estimation.2 Building a reliable nonlinear system estimation algorithm proved too
complex for this study.3
2.2.2 Demand elasticities
The following documents the standard formulas for the expenditure and price elastici-
ties of demand for the AIDS and QUAIDS models. The elasticities for the AIDS model
2SAS and Stata non-linear Full Information Maximum Likelihood.
3There are no pre-established or reliable nonlinear system estimation procedures in R. Constructing
an estimation algorithm from scratch was investigated but considered unwise because of the amount
of time that would be required to test the algorithm and ensure its reliability. With a large non-linear
system estimation would likely be slow and success (convergence) not guaranteed. In principle, it
would have been possible to shift between software platforms in order to reliably estimate the price-
scaled QUAIDS. This was, however, inconsistent with the approach taken here to adapt open-source
software in order to fully understand the estimation procedures and assumptions in the analysis (see
section 2.3).
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follow the formulas presented in Green and Alston (1990) and the elasticities for the
QUAIDS model follow directly from those in Banks et al. (1997).
These elasticities depict proportional changes in demand based on the partial deriva-
tives of the expenditure systems, with respect to income and prices, and provide a useful
summary statistic of the properties of the demand system when they are evaluated for
a given set of initial prices and expenditure (typically mean values).
The elasticity formulae are provided here, and referred to in model results to follow,
to provide intuitively understandable summary statistics. Elasticities are commonly
used both summary statistics and as parameters for evaluating welfare effects. However
they are not primitives of the model. The use of elasticities to describe economic
relationships and to infer welfare effects can thus be misleading, such as when they
are used to consider the effects of large price changes rather than small ones (Chetty,
2009).
Expenditure elasticities
The expenditure elasticities for each good (ηi) of the AIDS and QUAIDS models,
denoted with superscripts a and q in equations 2.12 and 2.13 respectively, are:


















The uncompensated or Marshallian price elasticities of demand for each good (eij) of


































































where δkij = 1 when i = j and is otherwise equal to 0.
These uncompensated price elasticities of demand reflect changes in demand for
a product, inclusive of income effects, when either the price of that product changes
(i = j or own-price elasticity) or the price of another product changes (i 6= j, or cross-
price elasticity). These price elasticities reflect what one would expect to observe, in
terms of expenditure changes, when prices change.
Compensated price elasticities
The compensated or hicksian4 price elasticities of demand reflect welfare-theoretic
changes in demand, in response to prices. The term compensated is used to reflect
that the hicksian elasticities capture how demand would change if people were com-
pensated for any income effects from price changes.
The hicksian price elasticities of demand for each good (hij) are the sum of the
uncompensated demand elasticities and the expenditure elasticities weighted by the
expenditure share of the product that is changing in price.5 The relevant formulae are






















4So-named for John Hicks’ (1904-1989) whose work distinguishing substitution and income effects
was pioneering in the English-speaking world (Bliss, 2017)



































































Model estimation methods have been adapted from those in the R package MicE-
conAids (Henningsen, 2017). The package provides a useful starting point as it contains
a range of standard methods for estimating AIDS models.
Adaptation of open-source software provides for a greater understanding of assump-
tions and methods used during estimation and, in principle, provides a basis for future
extensions or adaptations not easily added to commercial software.
There are other more complete commercial software programmes available for es-
timating QUAIDS and AIDS models (Poi, 2012). However, estimation procedures in
commercial software are typically less transparent, less readily tested and less well-
understood than estimation methods based on open-source software where the under-
lying code can be interrogated in great detail.
Numerous adaptations and extensions were made to the MicEconAids component
programmes in order to estimate the AIDS and QUAIDS models as set out in section
2.2. This was necessary because the MicEconAids package does not provide for esti-
mation of QUAIDS models or calculation of elasticities for AIDS models that include
demographic variables.
Extending the MicEconAids package to be able to estimate QUAIDS models in-
cluded: addition of quadratic income terms and associated λ coefficients; addition of
a Cobb-Douglas price index b(p); extending system estimation set-up programmes to
include restrictions on the λ values; introducing a procedure for calculating standard
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errors of elasticity estimates, based on the delta method; extending calculations of
Jacobian matrices for estimating coefficient variance-covariance matrices (Henningsen,
2017, p. 10).6 Extensive changes were made to the package’s programmes to ensure
that additional coefficients would be accepted as function arguments in the various
component programmes.
In MicEconAids and the extended version for QUAIDS, the delta method is used
to estimate covariance matrices, and standard errors, for elasticity values (Henningsen,
2017, p. 17). This method provides an approximation of the variance of a transformed
random variable (in this case the elasticities) using the matrix of partial derivatives
(the Jacobian) of the transformed variable with respect to the model coefficients and
the covariance of the model coefficients.
Bootstrapping was considered as an alternative to the delta method and for com-
parison with the delta method. However, bootstrapping proved to be impractical, for
the QUAIDS model, because the iterative estimation methodology frequently failed to
converge when the model was estimated on sub-samples and because of the considerable
amount of time required to repeatedly estimate the model.
Extending the delta method to the QUAIDS model elasticities was non-trivial,
due to the number of additional terms in the QUAIDS model as compared to the
AIDS model and consequently more complicated partial derivatives of the elasticity
functions with respect to the model parameters. The calculated partial derivatives are
presented in appendix B, excluding the partial derivatives of the elasticity calculations
with respect to demographic variables as these are trivial.
The extensions of the AIDS model programmes focused solely on calculation of
elasticities, with adaptations made to include demographic variables in elasticity cal-
culations and also to extend the delta method for calculating elasticity standard errors
by adding partial derivatives for demographic variables.7
The estimation procedure used here and in the MicEconAids package is iterated
seemingly unrelated regressions. While AIDS models can be successfully estimated
6This latter extension involved calculating partial elasticities of share equations for the additional
parameter and extending the size of the Jacobian matrices accordingly.
7In addition, an omission was found in the function aidsCalc that calculates AIDS model fitted
shares and quantities. The function did not take account of demographic variables in calculating fitted
shares. This was corrected in the version of the programmes used here.
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using linearised versions of the model, using approximations to the translog price index
a(p), the QUAIDS model cannot be estimated with a linearised version.
Iterated seemingly unrelated regressions proceeds by positing starting values for
the non-linear components of the models, a(p) and b(p) in the case of the QUAIDS
model, estimating the models system of demand equations using seemingly unrelated
regression, using the estimated model parameters to estimate values for a(p) and b(p),
and then repeating the estimation procedure until the parameter values converge. Pa-
rameters are deemed to have converged to stable values once changes in parameter
values, between adjacent iterations, are smaller than exogenously determined level of
tolerance.8
Alternative approaches make use of non-linear system estimation procedures that
use gradient search to estimate coefficient values. Gradient search is similar to iterated
regressions in the sense that it is iterative, however it is slower and less likely to converge
because each step requires non-linear rather than linear calculations. Furthermore,
while non-linear estimation has the potential to be more robust, it also requires well-
developed and extensively tested search algorithms, which are not readily available or
adaptable in the case of the open-source software R.
8The measure of change is the square root of the ratio of the sum of squared coefficient changes to
the sum of squared coefficient values in the updated model.
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Chapter 3
Household expenditure and price
data
This chapter describes the expenditure and price data used to estimate the QUAIDS
and AIDS models. A novel data set has been constructed where household expendi-
ture data is extended with data on average electricity prices by electricity distribution
network area.
This data is not without its limitations, as discussed below, but it complements
alternative data and analyses that are either based on detailed commercial data on
electricity expenditure and prices combined with high level socio-demographic aggre-
gates or based on detailed household expenditure and socio-demographic data combined
with high level average price indices.
3.1 Household Economic Survey
The principle source of data is unit record survey data from the Household Economic
Survey (HES) expenditure survey conducted every three years by Stats NZ Tatauranga
Aotearoa (Stats NZ).1 The data includes surveys for the five years ended in June 2007,
1Access to confidentialised data was granted by Stats NZ under conditions of confidentiality in-
cluding limitations on the form of data that can be released. This limits the amount of descriptive
detail that can be presented here.
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2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019. Each survey has a sample size of approximately 5,500 and
is designed to achieve a response rate of approximately 3,000.2
The sample sizes used for this analysis are summarised in Table 3.2. Data-cleaning
has been undertaken to remove outliers with implausible survey responses. For exam-
ple, households with expenditure on electricity exceeding 40 percent of total household
expenditure were removed from the data, resulting in a small proportion of observa-
tions being removed. Survey responses that had missing location information were also
removed because of the need for information on territorial local authority of residence
to assign prices to a household (refer section 3.2). Inferences to the wider population
of households are based on population weights constructed by Stats NZ, adjusted for
reduced sample sizes through data-cleaning.
3.1.1 Household categories
Household types, used to help summarise data and results, are categorised according
to number of adults and number of children in the household. Single (one adult) and
couple (two adult) households are further categorised into households were the age of
the reference person in the household is 65 or older, denoted 65+, or under 65.3 This
follows the household categories used in Creedy (2004) and acknowledges that income
and expenditure patterns change in retirement (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013).
3.1.2 Product categories
Table 3.1 provides a summary of the product categories used including sample mean and
population-weighted mean expenditure shares over all household expenditure surveys.
Definitions of product groups are created to give the most geographical variation in
product prices possible, given publicly available price indices, to maximise observed
2Details of the surveys are available on Stats NZ’s metadata reposi-
tory DataInfo+, for example details of the June year 2019 was available at
http://datainfoplus.stats.govt.nz/Item/nz.govt.stats/c89bb0e9-0cfb-48e6-b338-59ed7c7ee31b (ac-
cessed 7 June 2020).
3The reference person, the primary representative of the household, is the person having primary
responsibility for tenancy or ownership of the dwelling and is typically acknowledged as such by the
other members of the household.
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price variation and reduce the amount of averaging across products.
Table 3.1: Mean expenditure shares by product group
Product group Sample mean Population mean
Accommodation 22.4% 22.2%










Mortgage interest 5.3% 5.5%
Other energy 0.6% 0.6%
Miscellaneous 7.0% 6.9%
Recreation 9.2% 9.1%
Eating out 4.1% 4.2%
Transport 7.5% 7.8%
Mean over HES surveys 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
The categories are: accommodation, including rental costs; air transport; alcohol
and tobacco; clothing and footwear; communications, including telecommunications
equipment and services; household contents, including appliances; takeaways and eat-
ing out, includes ready-to-eat meals; education; electricity; food, encompassing gro-
ceries and excluding ready-to-eat food; health spending, such as dental services and
pharmaceutical products; insurance, including contents and life; other or miscellaneous
spending such as jewellery and personal and professional services; mortgage interest;
other energy, gas and solid fuels; recreation and cultural services, including recreation
equipment; transport, including transport fuels and public transport.
In the analysis we include accommodation costs. This has been excluded in other
analyses, due to the problem that consumption of owner occupied accommodation
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is not observable (Thomas, 2019). However ignoring accommodation altogether, due
to unobserved imputed rental values, is not without its problems because changes in
accommodation costs can have a non-trivial effect on total expenditure over time. The
consumption choices of considerable numbers of households are affected by changes in,
for example, mortgage interest rates and accommodation costs over time. The intent
is to analyse changes in consumption decisions over time (see discussion in section 4.1)
so it was considered better to include measures of accommodation-related spending in
the analysis, despite measurement problems.
Two separate measures of housing-related costs are included. One is housing costs
based on rental payments and rates (labelled accommodation). The other is mortgage
interest payments, comprising that part of mortgage payments that represents a credit
service rather than savings.
A full list of the composition of products within each product group is in Table A.1
in Appendix A.
Table 3.2: Counts of households in sample
Year of survey:
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Single - no children 333 324 345 354 414
65+ single 258 264 345 369 375
Single - 1 child 96 99 90 63 90
Single - 2 children 45 45 60 48 72
Single - 3+ children 24 33 27 27 39
Couple - no children 615 681 627 654 741
65+ couple 252 315 336 384 375
Couple - 1 child 237 261 228 252 258
Couple - 2 children 279 297 252 267 303
Couple - 3+ children 138 141 120 141 150
3 adults - no children 132 183 147 174 192
3+ adults - 1+ children 156 150 141 150 204
4+ adults - no children 72 90 57 84 102
Total 2,637 2,883 2,775 2,967 3,315
31
3.1.3 Electricity expenditure
HES data on electricity expenditure has been seasonally adjusted to correct for bias
based on when households were surveyed (see appendix Table C.1 for estimated seasonal
adjustment factors).
HES estimates of electricity expenditure are based on the most recent bill received
by a household when surveyed and, as a result, estimates of annual expenditure vary
considerably by survey month. For example, Figure 3.1 shows estimated annual ex-
penditure on electricity is consistently higher for households surveyed in the coldest
months of the year; New Zealand being a country where demand peaks in the winter,
for heating.
Figure 3.1: Annualised electricity expenditure by survey month for HES surveys
2007, 2010, 2013, and 2016.
Electricity expenditure exhibits economies of scale and expenditure shares that de-
cline as income increases. Economies of scale can be seen in Table 3.3 where expenditure
shares tend to be smaller for larger households.
Expenditure shares consistently decline as income increases, with the only exception
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being the increase in expenditure shares from the first to the second quintile of income
for single-parent households with three or more children - an exception likely influenced
by variance in household sizes within this household type.
Table 3.3: Electricity expenditure, share of total expenditure
Real disposable income quintiles:
Household type 1 2 3 4 5
Single - no children 0.089 0.064 0.051 0.039 0.032
65+ single 0.093 0.088 0.084 0.065 0.056
Single - 1 child 0.071 0.066 0.055 0.053 0.034
Single - 2 children 0.079 0.069 0.058 0.054 0.033
Single - 3+ children 0.060 0.082 0.065 0.046 0.041
Couple - no children 0.063 0.046 0.039 0.034 0.028
65+ couple 0.073 0.072 0.056 0.050 0.043
Couple - 1 child 0.060 0.046 0.042 0.033 0.030
Couple - 2 children 0.056 0.041 0.040 0.032 0.026
Couple - 3+ children 0.061 0.056 0.042 0.037 0.033
3 adults - no children 0.057 0.047 0.038 0.034 0.028
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.066 0.048 0.048 0.038 0.029
4+ adults - no children 0.054 0.035 0.033 0.030 0.025
Values: Population weighted mean expenditure shares.
Quintiles: Lowest (1) to highest (5) household incomes.
Income quintiles are conditional on survey year and household type.
Sample: HES surveys 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Notably the sampled HES survey data includes May and June months in 2019 when
expenditure may have been influenced by the introduction of a winter energy payment.
In 2019 the New Zealand government introduced a winter energy payment for recipients
of benefits, including NZ Superannuation, of $20.46 a week for single people and $31.82
couples or people with dependent children. Payments were made for 22 weeks from 1
May and were not tied to energy expenditure. As a share of spending on electricity,
winter energy payments amount to 40 percent of annual expenditure for sole-occupant
and couple households in the lowest quintile of disposable incomes.
Although the winter energy payment was not tied to spending on energy, it is
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possible the payment increased spending on energy, including electricity, by more than
would otherwise be expected due to the fact that the payment was labelled as being
for energy costs. As discussed in section 1.2, an evaluation of a similar scheme in
the United Kingdom (Beatty et al., 2014) found that almost half of the money paid
was spent on energy and more than ten times the amount predicted from observed
expenditure elasticities.
Estimated kilowatt-hour consumption
Electricity consumption, in kilowatt-hours (kWh), has been estimated by deflating ex-
penditure by estimated average prices (refer section 3.2) as the HES does not include
measures of consumption volumes. These estimates, summarised in Table 3.4, are
imprecise because they assume a common set of average prices by local council area
(territorial local authority) but they are consistent with ranges of electricity consump-
tion volumes published in analysis of market data on residential electricity consumption
as part of the government’s 2018 Electricity Price Review (New Zealand Government,
2018). These estimates complement those based on market data because they are
combined with detailed information on household characteristics while analysis based
on market data can only infer household characteristics, such as household size and
income, from geographic aggregates.
Table 3.4 shows patterns of consumption that vary less consistently with household
size and income than do expenditure shares. This reflects the fact that the consumption
estimates shown in the table are affected by variation in prices, variation in incomes
over time4 and variation in expenditure. The data show that electricity consumption
increases with both household size and with income but that household size has a
larger effect on electricity consumption than does household income. That is, varia-
tion in electricity consumption within household types is smaller than variation across
across household types. Nonetheless the consumption estimates also support the ob-
servation that there are non-trivial economies of scale in electricity consumption. For
example, the addition of second household member in the lowest income quintile is
associated with a 32 percent increase in electricity consumption, on average. The addi-
tion of a third household member is associated with a 21 percent increase in electricity
consumption, on average.
4The disposable income quintiles are conditional on survey year.
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Table 3.4: Estimated mean kWh electricity consumption
Real disposable income quintiles:
Household 1 2 3 4 5
Single - no children 5,032 5,275 5,701 5,499 5,462
65+ single 5,727 5,079 5,471 5,227 6,076
Single - 1 child 6,347 6,618 7,280 7,103 7,408
Single - 2 children 8,219 7,599 7,492 8,779 8,693
Single - 3+ children 8,547 9,539 8,085 8,503 8,584
Couple - no children 7,197 7,673 7,948 8,195 9,747
65+ couple 7,542 7,245 7,561 8,276 9,563
Couple - 1 child 8,679 8,813 8,692 9,003 11,464
Couple - 2 children 10,100 9,165 10,232 10,675 11,442
Couple - 3+ children 9,725 10,682 10,588 11,596 13,596
3 adults - no children 8,987 9,324 9,960 9,605 11,029
3+ adults - 1+ children 10,269 11,311 12,357 11,608 12,499
4+ adults - no children 10,185 9,853 11,304 11,314 11,369
Values: Population weighted mean kWh.
Quintiles: Lowest (1) to highest (5) household incomes.
Income quintiles are conditional on survey year and household type.
Sample: HES surveys 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
3.2 Prices
Data on prices are from the Statistics New Zealand Consumers Price Index (CPI)
series and the Quarterly Survey of Domestic Electricity Prices (QSDEP) produced by
the New Zealand Ministry of Business Innovation and Employment (MBIE).
3.2.1 Consumers price indices
Price indices by product group have been constructed using two steps that produce
price indices that best approximate both product group prices and spatial variation in
prices.
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In the first step national CPI data by class is aggregated to product groups using
expenditure weights from Stats NZ (2018) and a June quarter 2017 base period. CPI
class is the third level of the consumer price index with detailed product categories
such as fruit, vegetables, beer and men’s footwear (see components of product groups
in Table A.1 in appendix A).
In the second step, price indices are adjusted for geographic variation where data
is publicly available. This involves estimating regional rates of inflation relative to
national rates of inflation and adjusting national indices up or down in accordance
with these relative differences. In the final analysis these adjustments are not large
except in the case of accommodation costs.5
CPI data has limited spatial variation due to the limited sample size in the HES,
which is used to construct expenditure weights, and limited coverage of surveyed prices.
This means that regional CPI indices, where available, are typically at high-level geo-
graphic groupings.
To infer spatial variations in prices we match households to regional CPI measures
based on the territorial local authority (TLA) in which the household resides and the
region in which the territorial authority is located. The main regional groupings in
the CPI are: Auckland, Wellington, rest of north island, Christchurch, rest of south
island. In addition, the food price index (FPI) includes prices by main centre of price
surveys: Whangarei, Auckland, Hamilton, Tauranga, Rotorua, Napier-Hastings, New
Plymouth, Whanganui, Palmerston North, Wellington, Nelson, Christchurch, Timaru,
Dunedin, Invercargill.6
Regional CPI data is typically aggregated at higher levels of product groups than
the product groups of interest here. The main regional indices consist of: food, alco-
holic beverages and tobacco, clothing and footwear, housing and household utilities,
household contents and services, health, transport, recreation and culture, and mis-
cellaneous goods and services. Thus, some of the product groups used in this study
have direct analogues in the regional CPI data (such as alcohol and tobacco) while for
others regional variation in prices must be inferred indirectly based on movements in
5For example, correlations in food price inflation across main centres is 0.90 or larger for all pairs
of main-centres.
6Indices for Rotorua and Timaru were discontinued in 2014, but have been extrapolated using
growth in nearest neighbour price indices.
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higher level product aggregations. The concordance between product categories and
regional indices is set out in Table 3.5.
Price indices for electricity and for groceries are constructed using more detailed
spatial variations in product group prices.
Table 3.5: Product groups matched to regional CPI groups
Product group Regional CPI match




Communications Miscellaneous goods and services
Contents Household contents and services
Education None - national CPI used
Electricity None - QSDEP used
Groceries FPI by main centre
Health Health
Insurance Miscellaneous goods and services
Mortage interest None - national CPI used
Other energy None - national CPI used
Miscellaneous Miscellaneous goods and services
Recreation Recreation and culture
Eating out Food
Transport Transport
This method of inferring regional price differences is sub-optimal but arguably bet-
ter than assuming a single average national price index. The main area of concern
in using regional price indices is that these high-level aggregations will not accurately
reflect wide-ranging differences in prices of non-tradable products due to local variation
in population density, competition and land prices.
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3.2.2 Electricity prices
Electricity price data from the QSDEP measures mean posted electricity prices by
electricity distribution network areas based on standardised household consumption
profiles and the lowest cost retail tariff available.
The standardised household consumption profiles are based on typical seasonal and
daily use and average annual consumption set at an approximate national average
of 8,000 kWh per year. The standardised consumption profile also assumes that the
household has a service that can be controlled by the distribution network operator
(prices for controlled connections are lower than prices for uncontrolled connections)
and that the household pays its bills on time.
A concordance is created to align QSDEP network areas with locations by territorial
local authority. This correspondence is imprecise in the sense that several network areas
span multiple local authorities as shown in Table A.2 in appendix A. However there
is a one-to-one correspondence between network areas and major population centres;
consequently the impact of this imprecision is immaterial in light of the concentration
of expenditure survey coverage in major population areas.
Unobserved variation in prices is a problem for this data, albeit a problem that is
true of all price indices. That is, in practice there is considerable variation in: prices
posted by retailers, prices paid by consumers, and prices observed by consumers. Only
a portion of this variation is captured in geographic differences.
Other sources of variation include consumer inertia, with many households com-
paring electricity prices only infrequently and remaining on the same tariff for several
years, household needs and knowledge7, and retail competition.
By way of illustration, Figure 3.2 shows the wide range in posted retail tariffs,
evaluated at two different levels of consumption and separated according to whether
or not tariffs are low fixed rate tariff options. The Figure excludes lines charges, which
vary consistently by geographic area. According to the study that this Figure is taken
7In recent years electricity retailers have begun to provide prices that pass wholesale energy prices
on to consumers and these prices are generally much cheaper than other prices but only where con-
sumers are sufficiently knowledgeable or adept as to be able to control their exposure to wholesale
market price spikes
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from (Sense Partners, 2018), all network areas experienced widening price dispersion
in the period 2013 to 2017 and this was due to increased retail competition.
Figure 3.2: Variation in posted retail prices by consumption level and high-level tariff
type. Grey dots are average revenue per user for each posted tariff. Blue lines are
arithmetic averages. Source: Sense Partners (2018)
In addition, in the past decade, as retail competition has increased, retailers have
been offering large discounts to retain customers that are considering switching retailer
or to acquire new customers. Some of these discounts are one-off cash payments or
fee-free periods while others consist of providing new customers with appliances such as
televisions. This sort of discounting behaviour is usually excluded from price indices,
which are intended to measure general rather than bespoke prices. However, where a
household has received a large discount this could affect consumption and expenditure
decisions but the relevant, implicit, price effect will not be observed in the price data
and consequently prices will be biased on the high side. That said, this is less of a
problem for analysis that analyses broad price trends over several years, as is the case
here, than for measuring short term price response.
These issues represent fundamental conceptual and practical difficulties for all price
measurement and demand analysis. The simplest example being that the construction
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of price indices based on expenditure weights which introduces endogeneity into price
measurement and creates bias, typical overstating consumer price inflation. Further-
more, in practice, observed prices that are approximated with a single price overlook
the effect that menus of prices have on demand. In demand analysis, ignoring menus
of prices in favour of a single price causes omitted variable bias (Chernozhukov, Haus-
man, and Newey, 2019). These issues are not resolved here but they are noted in so
far as they represent one of the several trade-offs or simplifications that must be made
in almost any analysis of consumer demand.
40
Chapter 4
Baseline empirical demand system
This chapter describes the baseline demand models that have been estimated. It in-
cludes discussion of decisions made about practical empirical and model specification
matters such as the range of demographic variables used in the estimation. Estimation
results are presented, principally in terms of estimated elasticities of demand. The
models produce elasticities that are atypical relative to overseas research, and this is
discussed. A final section discusses the sensitivity of the models to alternative specifi-
cations and variables.
4.1 Empirical models estimated
4.1.1 Demand systems
Table 4.1 summarises the number and nature of the demand system models that have
been estimated. The focus of this chapter is on the first two models. Models (3)-(10)
provide for tests of model specification and inference about the sensitivity of the model
to model specification.
As will become apparent, the choice of a QUAIDS model over an AIDS model has
a material effect on the results of the empirical model. And, in general, the functional
form of the model has a larger effect than choice over exogenous demographic variables.
41
Table 4.1: Models estimated
Model HES years N Restrictions Demographic variables
(1) QUAIDS 2007-2019 14577 Hom, sym Household size (equivalance scale),
reference person age,
square of reference person age,
log of 1 + share of income from benefits,
residual on first stage regression.
(2) AIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom, sym As in (1).
(3) QUAIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom As in (1).
(4) QUAIDS 2007-2019 14,577 None As in (1).
(5) AIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom, sym As in (1).
(6) AIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom As in (1).
(7) AIDS 2007-2019 14,577 None As in (1).
(8) QUAIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom, sym As in (1),
number of adults,
number of children.
(9) QUAIDS 2007-2019 14,577 Hom, sym As in (1),
location in upper north island,
location in upper south island,
location in lower south island.
(10) QUAIDS 2013, 2016, 9,057 Hom, sym As in (1).
2019
Restrictions: Homogeneity (Hom), symmetry (sym).
The main demographic variables chosen for the models and common to all models
are: household size as measured by an estimated equivalence scale (see section 4.1.2);
the age of the reference person in a household, to control for life cycle effects (Banks,
Blundell, and Preston, 1991); the square of the age of the reference to capture any
non-linearity in life-cycle effects (following the first empirical estimation of a QUAIDS
model in Banks et al. (1997)); the natural logarithm of one plus the share of household
income from benefits, to proxy for the extent of households’ connections to the labour
force (Aguiar and Hurst, 2013); the residuals from a first stage regression of the natural
logarithm of total expenditure on demographic variables and log real disposable income
(Banks et al., 1997)). A sample of the first stage regression, for the baseline QUAIDS
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model, is set out in appendix C.2.
Other examples of QUAIDS models in the literature include a larger number of de-
mographic variables. For example, Thomas (2019) includes: equivalence scale, number
of adults, number of children, age of reference person, a dummy variable for gender of
reference person, a dummy variable for households in Auckland, a dummy variable for
households with a reference person who identifies as New Zealand European (pakeha),
a dummy variable for households with a reference person with a tertiary qualification,
a dummy variable for households with a reference person whose highest qualification is
a secondary qualification, a dummy variable for any household with at least one adult
in full time employment, time dummies for each survey quarter.
The approach taken here is to prefer parsimonious specification of demographic
variables, keeping the number of variables to those with clear theoretical underpinnings
or empirical justification. Setting this approach at the outset also helps to avoid the
temptation to engage in data mining where variables are added or removed to achieve
intuitively appealing parameter values and thus confirming the bias of the modeller.
In contrast, most other studies1 add numerous demographic variables with lim-
ited or no theoretical justification, no model specification testing, and often without
reporting parameter estimates that might be used to test theories around influences
on household preferences or tastes (as is the case in Thomas (2019)). For example,
Thomas (2019) includes equivalence scales, which are a measure of household scale,
and also numbers of children and numbers of adults in household. This seems to apply
household scale measures twice and raises questions about collinearity and whether the
additional variables make sense. That said, a version of the QUAIDS model (model
(8) in Table 4.1) has been estimated with number of adults and number of children in
a household as explanatory variables, to test the sensitivity of the model specification
to the inclusion of these variables.
It is also common practice to make extensive use of the characteristics of survey
reference persons (notional heads of households) to infer demographics without es-
tablishing what is being measured with these characteristics, in terms of household
composition. For example, it is unclear, empirically, whether or to what extent ed-
1Exceptions include Blacklow, Nicholas, and Ray (2010), which relies exclusively on numbers of
children and numbers of adults to capture demographic variation, albeit in the context of a price-scaled
QUAIDS model.
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ucational achievement of the survey reference person is representative of educational
achievement in the household overall. While there is evidence of positive sorting of cou-
ples by skill or educational attainment (Fernández, Guner, and Knowles, 2005), which
would tend to imply that the reference person’s educational achievement might be a
sound proxy for household characteristics, it is also the case that there are large cohort
effects in educational participation and attainment and also gender differences amongst
cohorts. Broad categories of educational attainment are also apt to correlate strongly
with income, other things being equal. These observations all raise a question about
what precisely is being measured with educational attainment as a demographic vari-
able in demand system estimation. Similar questions can be raised about the inclusion
of the household reference person’s ethnicity.
Geographic effects have been excluded from the main model QUAIDS and AIDS
models in this study, largely because of limitations in the geographical coverage of
the HES survey data. Geographic variation might be expected to reflect households’
tastes or preferences and also product availability (that is, less eating out in rural areas
because of less choice). However, HES survey data is sparse in terms of observations
for rural areas and the survey size is too small to be able to employ economically
and socially meaningful geographies as explanatory variables such as the territorial
authority in which a household resides.
The absence of geographic variation in the main QUAIDS model is potentially prob-
lematic given our primary interest in electricity demand and geographical relationships
between temperature and energy demand for heating. That being so, a variation of
the QUAIDS model (model (9) in Table 4.1) has been estimated using high-level re-
gional groupings consistent with regions used for transmission price setting in New
Zealand: upper north island (from Huntly north), lower north island, upper south
island (Christchurch and north of Christchurch) and lower south island. This model
is used to test the sensitivity of our electricity demand elasticities to the inclusion of
regional effects. The reason this has not been included in the main model is that these
regional aggregations are too coarse to accurately capture climatic differences.
The QUAIDS and AIDS models estimated in this study do not include year or
other time fixed effects. Fixed effects are typically used in other studies (Banks et al.,
1997; Jansky, 2013; Thomas, 2019), justified as capturing exogenous preference shifts.
However, this comes at a cost because the estimated models cannot be used to infer
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impacts of changes in prices over time. It means that, in the case of electricity demand,
cannot infer changes in demand from investment to avoid higher energy costs. Such
changes are of interest to us as costly investment in energy saving technology may
increase the value of electricity per kWh used but it comes at an unobserved cost.
Inclusion of time-dummies for survey dates, such as monthly or quarterly dummies,
does help to control for seasonal effects in the data. However it also means that the
models may miss important changes to consumption decisions over time, in response
to price changes. This is particularly so for models estimated on data with large ag-
gregates of products such as a single aggregate for food. While it seems intuitively
reasonable to expect a household to make fruit and vegetable selections based on sea-
sonal price variation, it is another matter to assume that households are optimising
their budget allocations on all food at every visit to the supermarket. Research on men-
tal accounting suggests that households do not operate this way (Hastings and Shapiro,
2013). In the case of electricity demand, costs are only observed by households after
consumption decisions have been made, because people are billed for their electricity
only after they have used it. If households do make decisions based on average costs
instead of marginal prices, then there will be a material lag between price changes and
consumption changes. Including dummies for survey month or quarter severely limits
the ability of models to detect lagged consumption responses.
The decision not to include fixed time effects in the model means that all estimated
elasticities need to be interpreted as long-run or multi-period adjustment elasticities.
The exact interpretation of this is imprecise. However, given that the models are
estimated on data from surveys occurring every three years, the results are interpreted
as changes occurring over three or more years.
There is a risk that the estimated models are biased if there truly have been pref-
erence shifts during the study period (fifteen years from 2007 to 2019). In the case
of electricity demand it is possible that there have been underlying preference shifts
due, for example, to a large amount of spending on subsidies for home insulation
and installation of heat pumps between 2009 and 2013. These subsidies, available to
all houses built before the year 2000, while essentially reducing costs of energy con-
sumption, are akin to preference shifts from an empirical perspective. Grimes, Preval,
Young, Arnold, Denne, Howden-Chapman, and Telfar-Barnard (2016) showed that the
insulation subsidy reduced household energy consumption by two percent on average
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and heat pump subsidies increased electricity consumption and in some cases increased
total energy consumption. To test the sensitivity of the model to this programme or
other preference shifts we estimate a version of the QUAIDS model on a sub-sample of
the data (2013-2019, model (10) in Table 4.1) that post-dates the period in which the
government energy efficiency programmes was initially established and most active.
We do not control for censored observations (zero observed expenditure) though
some other studies do (Gomez-Lobo, 1996) by Heckman correction.2 This may intro-
duce some bias into our estimates.
Purchase of vehicles has been excluded from the data as this data was extremely
sparse and very volatile. Purchase of other durables have not been removed from the
data, though they tend to be in most other demand system estimations. Durables are
included in light of the longer-run perspective taken in our models, where durable ex-
penditure and trade-offs between short-run variable costs and longer-run durable costs
are an important consideration. Studies that include durables in estimated demand
systems typically have an objective of understanding these sorts of dynamics (Blanci-
forti and Green, 1983; Hummels and Lee, 2017; Rapson, 2014). Our models also do
not control for appliance ownership or housing condition as has been done in other
energy demand studies using micro-data (Reiss and White, 2005). This is because of
unavailability of reliable data.
The demand systems that have been estimated include all seventeen commodity
groups listed in Table 3.1. This significantly complicates estimation but has the ad-
vantage that substitution possibilities are more accurately specified. Most studies
constrain the number of commodity groups to less than ten which has the benefit
of simplifying estimation but imposes a cost in terms of excessive averaging of price
changes.
A linear expenditure system (LES) has also been estimated, for comparison with
the results of the almost ideal demand systems. This is discussed briefly in section
4.3.3.
2Estimating first stage choice models (probit models of non-zero expenditure) and using the inverse
mills ratio from the regressions as explanatory demographic variables in the demand system
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4.1.2 Equivalence scales
Rather than integrate the estimation of household equivalence scales into our model
we pre-estimate this using the methods of Creedy and Sleeman (2005a).3 The model
used is:
mi = (a+ γc)
θ (4.1)
The scales are summarised below in Table 4.2 alongside other equivalence scales
commonly used or referred to in New Zealand.
The equivalence scales estimated for this analysis suggests economies of scale larger
economies of scale in household operation (θ = 0.40) that are larger (smaller θ) than
are usually used in income analysis in New Zealand.
For many years the Jensen scale was used in official analysis of incomes in New
Zealand, but recently there was a change to using the modified OECD scale for ease in
making international comparisons.4 The modified OECD scale ”assigns the first adult
a value of 1.0, the second and subsequent household members aged 14 or older 0.5,
and 0.3 for those aged under 14 years”(Ministry of Social Development, 2019, p. 15).
Scales estimated by Michelini (2001) using New Zealand household expenditure data
have also long been a point of comparison for equivalence scales in New Zealand.
The weight on children in the equivalence scale estimated here is 0.59 and thus
larger than the weight on children in the OECD modified scale. The scale parameters
are small relative to those estimated elsewhere e.g. in (Michelini, 2001) who estimates
an AIDS model with demand shifters. The other equivalence scales do not have explicit
scale parameters.
The reason for estimating bespoke equivalence scales for this analysis is that it
ensures that the analysis is consistent with the data being used to analyse household
consumption demand. The other candidate equivalence scales, based on New Zealand
data (Jensen and Michelini) are dated - being based on expenditure data from the
1980s and 1990s. Substantial changes in expenditure have occurred since then, not
3We have also examined variations in the expenditure equivalence scales by product. This variation
tends to support the use of price scaling, given substantial variation in economies of scale by product.
4The Ministry of Social Development (2019) notes that the change in scales makes little difference
to analysis.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of equivalence scales
Other scales:
HH type Equivalence scale Jensen Modified OECD Michelini
(1,0) 0.72 0.65 0.67 0.57
(1,1) 0.89 0.91 0.87 0.83
(1,2) 1.05 1.14 1.07 1.06
(2,0) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
(2,1) 1.16 1.21 1.20 1.22
(2,2) 1.31 1.41 1.40 1.45
(2,3) 1.47 1.58 1.60 1.65
(3,0) 1.27 1.29 1.33 1.38
HH type is household type defined as (number of adults, number of children).
The data for other scales is from the Ministry of Social Development (2019).
Table 4.3: Equivalence scale regression
Dependent: Log of real expenditure
Parameter Estimate Std error T-statistic P value
Intercept 5.403 0.056 96.02 0
Log real disposable income 0.460 0.005 86.26 0
Log household size (adults + 0.59 x children) 0.405 0.009 42.71 0
Sample: HES expenditure survey 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
least because of the effects of economic liberalisation and reductions in price and va-
riety of tradable goods. Furthermore, income growth can cause changes in equivalised
household living costs, to the extent that necessities (products with income elasticities
less than one) become a decreasing share of household expenditure and to the extent
that necessities are subject to economies of scale.
Table 4.3 documents the results of the regression used to estimate the equivalence
scales. The weight on children was estimated using the method in Creedy and Sleeman
(2005a), using iterative estimation of the regression in Table 4.3 with varying weights
for children and selecting the weight that produces the highest r-squared value (see
Figure 4.1).
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Figure 4.1: R-squared from iterated household expenditure regression with varying
weights on children
4.2 Results of demand system estimation
Model parameter estimates for the baseline AIDS and QUAIDS models, with homo-
geneity and symmetry restrictions, are set out in full in appendix C.2. The models
contain several hundred parameters, hence they have been relegated to the appendix.
Here the focus is on the estimated demand elasticities for the main QUAIDS and
AIDS models. Model fit and parameter estimates are discussed further in section 4.3
in the context of tests of model restrictions and alternative model specifications.
4.2.1 Fitted expenditure and own-price elasticities of demand
Expenditure and own-price elasticities for the QUAIDS and AIDS models are sum-
marised in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5. These elasticities are evaluated at sample means
for expenditure shares, demographics and total expenditure.
All expenditure elasticities are significant and have magnitudes that accord with
intuition in terms of whether products are considered expenditures are necessities or
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luxuries. Accommodation, communications, electricity, groceries and transport are
all estimated to be necessities with expenditure shares declining as total expenditure
increases (expenditure elasticities less than one). Expenditure on all other product
groups rises at rates equal to or larger than growth in total expenditure. Electricity
is estimated to have the smallest expenditure elasticity at 0.37 in both the AIDS and
QUAIDS model.
The estimated uncompensated and compensated own-price elasticities have the ex-
pected signs, with three exceptions. Demand for alcohol and tobacco products and
demand for education have own-price elasticities that are positive in both the QUAIDS
model and the AIDS model. The AIDS model also has positive own-price elasticities for
transport but the estimates are very close to and not statistically significantly different
from zero.
The existence of a positive uncompensated or ordinary price elasticity of demand
could be interpreted as education and alcohol being status goods, where consumption
increases as prices increase, or as goods for which unobserved quality rises with price.
This is certainly intuitively reasonable in the case of education.
The presence of positive compensated price elasticities does, however, represent a
violation of underlying model theory.
In the case of education this is almost certainly due to empirical misspecification
such as a failure to control for unobserved variation in product quality. Furthermore for
large numbers of households consumption of education is unobserved in expenditure
data because education is heavily subsidised. Of course the same is true of other
expenditures, such as health. However, in the case of education these subsidies vary
considerably in size according to level of education, life cycle of households and by
income with substantial differences in prices for private versus public primary and
secondary education.5
In the case of demand for alcohol and tobacco there are two likely sources of
model misspecification. The first is that the model does not explicitly distinguish be-
5Transport is somewhat similar, on a smaller scale, in the sense that people aged sixty-five and
over, comprising fifteen percent of the population, have had fully subsidised public transport outside
peak travel hours since 2008. Hence some households will record very little spending on transport but
may well be consuming larger unobserved amounts of public transport. This invariably means that
consumer price indices for transport will be biased.
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Table 4.4: QUAIDS model fitted shares, own-price and expenditure elasticities
Mean expenditure shares: Elasticities (standard errors):
Product Observed Predicted Expenditure Uncompensated Compensated
Acommodation 0.222 0.222 0.79*** -1.33*** -1.15***
(0.09) (0.13) (0.15)
Air transport 0.017 0.018 2.08*** -0.98*** -0.94***
(0.33) (0.04) (0.03)
Alcohol 0.028 0.028 1.15*** 0.2*** 0.23***
(0.22) (0.04) (0.03)
Clothing 0.026 0.026 1.58*** -1.09*** -1.05***
(0.23) (0.04) (0.02)
Communications 0.039 0.038 0.52*** -1.03*** -1.01***
(0.11) (0.02) (0.03)
Contents 0.042 0.042 1.33*** -2.5*** -2.45***
(0.16) (0.04) (0.03)
Education 0.011 0.012 0.95* 4.35*** 4.36***
(0.44) (0.03) (0.04)
Electricity 0.049 0.049 0.37*** -1.97*** -1.95***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
Groceries 0.148 0.147 0.58*** -0.95*** -0.87***
(0.07) (0.02) (0.02)
Health 0.026 0.026 1.32*** -3.81*** -3.78***
(0.22) (0.05) (0.03)
Insurance 0.051 0.051 1.15*** -0.76*** -0.7***
(0.11) (0.02) (0.01)
Mortage interest 0.055 0.055 1.44*** -0.72*** -0.65***
(0.24) (0.02) (0.04)
Other energy 0.006 0.006 0.89* -0.5*** -0.5***
(0.35) (0.01) (0.01)
Miscellaneous 0.069 0.070 1.43*** -0.84*** -0.74***
(0.12) (0.05) (0.04)
Recreation 0.091 0.092 1.42*** -1.22*** -1.09***
(0.1) (0.06) (0.04)
Eating out 0.042 0.041 1.43*** -0.58*** -0.52***
(0.14) (0.04) (0.03)
Transport 0.078 0.076 0.77*** -0.17*** -0.12***
(0.11) (0.04) (0.03)
Elasticities evaluated at sample means. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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Table 4.5: AIDS model fitted shares, own-price and expenditure elasticities
Mean expenditure shares: Elasticities (standard errors):
Product Observed Predicted Expenditure Uncompensated Compensated
Acommodation 0.222 0.222 0.79*** -0.58* -0.4
(0.02) (0.24) (0.24)
Air transport 0.017 0.018 2.08*** -0.96 -0.92
(0.09) (0.58) (0.58)
Alcohol 0.028 0.028 1.14*** 0.29 0.32
(0.06) (0.77) (0.77)
Clothing 0.026 0.026 1.58*** -1.01 -0.97
(0.06) (0.92) (0.92)
Communications 0.039 0.038 0.52*** -0.96*** -0.94***
(0.03) (0.22) (0.22)
Contents 0.042 0.042 1.33*** -2.4*** -2.35***
(0.04) (0.41) (0.41)
Education 0.011 0.012 0.94*** 4.33* 4.34*
(0.12) (1.93) (1.93)
Electricity 0.049 0.049 0.37*** -1.21*** -1.19***
(0.02) (0.15) (0.15)
Groceries 0.148 0.148 0.58*** -0.82*** -0.74***
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
Health 0.026 0.026 1.32*** -3.62** -3.58**
(0.06) (1.26) (1.26)
Insurance 0.051 0.051 1.14*** -0.72 -0.66
(0.03) (0.43) (0.43)
Mortage interest 0.055 0.055 1.45*** -0.73* -0.65
(0.06) (0.35) (0.35)
Other energy 0.006 0.006 0.89*** -0.37 -0.37
(0.08) (1.06) (1.06)
Miscellaneous 0.069 0.070 1.43*** -0.66** -0.56*
(0.03) (0.23) (0.23)
Recreation 0.091 0.092 1.42*** -1.09* -0.96
(0.03) (0.5) (0.5)
Eating out 0.042 0.041 1.42*** -0.32 -0.26
(0.04) (1.04) (1.04)
Transport 0.078 0.076 0.77*** 0.02 0.07
(0.03) (0.12) (0.12)
Elasticities evaluated at sample means. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
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tween smoking and non-smoking households. The second is biased price measurement,
whereby expenditure weights used to reflect average spending across all consumers
substantially understate price changes for smoking households and substantially over-
state price changes for the majority of households that are non-smoking. On average,
alcohol prices grew by less than overall inflation between 2007 and 2019. Beer prices
grew by 1.9 percent each year, on average, and wine prices grew by 0.2 percent per
year. Over the same period excise taxes on tobacco products grew significantly and
consumer prices for tobacco products increased 8 percent per year on average, more
than four times the average annual rate of consumer price inflation. The QUAIDS
model produces own-price elasticities of demand that are on average 25 percent larger,
in absolute terms, than the AIDS model. The uncompensated own-price elasticity of
demand for electricity is, for example, -1.97 in the QUAIDS model and -1.21 in the
AIDS model. The only case where demand is more price sensitive in the AIDS model
is expenditure on mortgage interest.
The expenditure elasticities estimated with the QUAIDS and AIDS models are al-
most identical when evaluated at the mean of the model sample. However, evaluation
of the expenditure elasticities at the sample mean obscures the central difference be-
tween the two models: the fact that the QUAIDS model admits income effects that are
non-linear and thus expenditure elasticities that imply that products can be necessities
at one income level and luxuries at another.
Table 4.6 provides an illustration of the variation in expenditure elasticities by
total expenditure. This is based on analytical analysis using the coefficients in Ta-
ble C.3, evaluating expenditure elasticities at mean expenditure shares and holding
demographic differences constant.
Alcohol and tobacco is a luxury at most income levels, with an expenditure elasticity
of 1.4, but a necessity at high income levels with an expenditure elasticity of 0.86.
Education is a necessity at low income levels, with an expenditure elasticity of 0.50,
but on average has an expenditure elasticity close to 1.0 and at high income levels has
an expenditure elasticity close to 1.5. Transport is necessity at most income levels but
a luxury at very low income levels.
Electricity is a necessity at all income levels although expenditure elasticities are
an increasing function of income. That is, electricity expenditure is a declining share of
total expenditure for all households but the rate of decline slows as incomes increase,
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Table 4.6: Expenditure elasticities by total expenditure
Total expenditure:
Product Lower quintile Mean Upper quintile
Electricity 0.00 0.37 0.74
Communications 0.46 0.52 0.62
Groceries 0.71 0.58 0.50
Transport 1.06 0.77 0.53
Acommodation 0.52 0.79 0.97
Other energy 0.74 0.89 1.05
Education 0.45 0.95 1.46
Insurance 1.28 1.15 1.05
Alcohol 1.41 1.15 0.86
Health 1.52 1.32 1.11
Contents 1.48 1.33 1.18
Recreation 1.53 1.42 1.33
Eating out 1.62 1.43 1.26
Mortage interest 1.20 1.44 1.65
Clothing 1.60 1.58 1.44
Air transport 1.89 2.08 2.19
Evaluated at mean expenditure share and mean household size
as can be seen from the positive coefficient for λi for electricity, labelled elec, in Table
C.3.
Expenditure on other non-electricity energy products also rises with income and is
a necessity at low income levels but rises to being unit elastic at higher income levels.
In contrast food expenditure, which is a necessity at all income levels, has expen-
diture elasticities that decline as income increases.
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4.2.2 Cross-price and substitution elasticities
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present uncompensated own and cross-price elasticities for the
QUAIDS and AIDS models, evaluated at sample means.6 Many of the estimated
cross-price elasticities are imprecise, in the sense that they have large standard errors
and are not significantly different from zero. For example, only seven out of sixteen
cross-price elasticities for electricity are significantly different from zero at the five
percent level.
Interestingly the cross-price elasticity between electricity and other energy is small
negative in the QUAIDS model (-0.05), indicating these products are substitutes, but
small positive, indicating complements, in the AIDS model. The former makes more
sense intuitively, although in both cases the elasticity is not statistically significantly
different from zero.
6Tables of compensated cross-price elasticities are in Tables C.5 and C.6 in appendix C.4.
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Table 4.7: QUAIDS model uncompensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -1.33 0.22 0.31 -0.11 -0.23 0.29 -0.07 -0.28 -0.40 -0.07 -0.01 0.09 0.37 -0.27 0.23 0.33 -0.05
air 2.71 -0.98 1.94 -1.32 -1.44 1.31 -1.88 -1.97 0.35 -0.37 -1.46 -0.37 -1.47 1.02 -0.10 3.26 -0.24
alc 2.49 1.26 0.20 0.34 0.78 -1.53 -1.06 -0.90 0.06 0.57 1.96 0.08 -0.52 0.87 -1.07 -3.27 -1.27
cloth -0.95 -0.92 0.36 -1.09 0.83 0.22 -0.87 1.21 0.03 -0.01 3.35 0.25 0.12 0.72 0.34 -3.55 -1.05
comm -1.34 -0.67 0.55 0.55 -1.03 0.29 -0.84 -0.08 0.56 0.17 -0.61 -0.18 0.16 -0.43 0.36 0.93 0.60
cont 1.53 0.56 -1.02 0.14 0.27 -2.50 1.10 0.61 -0.55 0.27 -0.91 0.62 -0.89 0.88 -0.19 -0.90 -0.03
take -0.40 -0.83 -0.72 -0.55 -0.80 1.13 -0.58 -0.50 1.50 -0.04 -0.74 0.23 -0.28 0.44 -0.58 1.75 -0.03
educ -5.98 -3.35 -2.35 2.95 -0.27 2.40 -1.91 4.35 3.17 -0.24 -2.07 2.43 -0.63 1.07 0.73 -2.50 1.19
elec -1.80 0.13 0.03 0.01 0.44 -0.46 1.23 0.67 -1.97 0.25 0.67 0.01 0.58 -1.07 -0.05 -0.06 0.38
food -0.11 -0.05 0.11 0.00 0.04 0.08 -0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.95 -0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04
hlth -0.10 -0.97 2.01 3.19 -0.88 -1.40 -1.11 -0.81 1.24 -0.46 -3.81 -1.66 0.80 0.21 0.12 2.36 0.27
insur 0.38 -0.13 0.04 0.12 -0.13 0.49 0.18 0.49 0.00 -0.06 -0.86 -0.76 -0.57 0.17 -0.10 -0.16 -0.12
othr 1.19 -0.38 -0.21 0.05 0.09 -0.53 -0.16 -0.10 0.42 -0.11 0.31 -0.43 -0.84 0.14 0.11 -0.06 -0.47
mort -0.89 0.34 0.39 0.32 -0.29 0.62 0.26 0.24 -0.87 -0.19 0.04 0.11 0.07 -0.72 -0.29 -0.27 -0.31
nrg 8.27 -0.29 -4.85 1.44 2.25 -1.30 -3.87 1.26 -0.40 0.43 0.55 -0.85 1.19 -2.57 -0.50 -2.99 1.23
rec 0.80 0.64 -0.99 -1.00 0.39 -0.41 0.78 -0.29 -0.03 0.04 0.70 -0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.20 -1.22 0.01
trans -0.14 -0.06 -0.47 -0.36 0.31 -0.02 -0.02 0.17 0.26 -0.07 0.10 -0.08 -0.44 -0.11 0.10 0.01 -0.17
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table 4.8: AIDS model uncompensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -0.58 0.19 0.22 -0.17 -0.13 0.17 -0.20 -0.23 -0.06 -0.07 -0.11 0.03 0.18 -0.17 0.25 0.12 -0.21
air 2.01 -0.96 2.00 -1.31 -1.54 1.31 -1.86 -1.95 0.13 -0.64 -1.45 -0.36 -1.39 0.95 -0.10 3.36 -0.27
alc 1.67 1.31 0.29 0.42 0.64 -1.36 -0.84 -1.01 -0.38 0.59 2.12 0.13 -0.29 0.77 -1.11 -3.03 -1.06
cloth -1.63 -0.90 0.44 -1.01 0.70 0.33 -0.73 1.15 -0.38 -0.14 3.45 0.25 0.29 0.65 0.32 -3.41 -0.95
comm -0.71 -0.69 0.48 0.50 -0.96 0.23 -0.92 -0.07 0.81 0.27 -0.67 -0.18 0.02 -0.34 0.37 0.82 0.52
cont 0.81 0.58 -0.92 0.21 0.19 -2.40 1.24 0.58 -0.89 0.23 -0.81 0.63 -0.70 0.78 -0.21 -0.74 0.11
take -1.25 -0.81 -0.58 -0.46 -0.91 1.26 -0.32 -0.59 1.04 -0.12 -0.55 0.19 -0.05 0.32 -0.65 1.93 0.13
educ -4.95 -3.30 -2.63 2.81 -0.27 2.28 -2.24 4.33 3.58 -0.29 -2.28 2.56 -0.94 1.31 0.81 -2.63 0.91
elec -0.17 0.08 -0.19 -0.16 0.64 -0.70 0.89 0.77 -1.21 0.32 0.43 0.00 0.15 -0.84 0.01 -0.41 0.04
food -0.06 -0.05 0.13 0.00 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.02 0.10 -0.82 -0.07 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.05 0.03
hlth -1.02 -0.96 2.17 3.30 -0.99 -1.25 -0.83 -0.90 0.75 -0.50 -3.62 -1.70 1.06 0.06 0.06 2.56 0.48
insur 0.06 -0.11 0.07 0.13 -0.16 0.51 0.16 0.52 -0.04 -0.07 -0.87 -0.72 -0.51 0.13 -0.09 -0.08 -0.07
othr 0.43 -0.35 -0.12 0.11 -0.02 -0.43 -0.03 -0.15 0.06 -0.19 0.41 -0.40 -0.66 0.05 0.08 0.12 -0.34
mort -0.87 0.33 0.40 0.32 -0.29 0.61 0.24 0.26 -0.85 -0.21 0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.73 -0.29 -0.28 -0.32
nrg 8.88 -0.28 -5.02 1.37 2.30 -1.43 -4.27 1.40 0.01 0.43 0.27 -0.71 0.99 -2.42 -0.37 -3.12 1.07
rec 0.16 0.67 -0.93 -0.96 0.31 -0.34 0.86 -0.31 -0.28 -0.04 0.76 -0.06 0.09 -0.16 -0.21 -1.09 0.10
trans -0.64 -0.04 -0.38 -0.31 0.26 0.09 0.10 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.19 -0.03 -0.27 -0.19 0.09 0.18 0.02
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
57
4.2.3 Variance in electricity elasticities across households
The models show wide ranging price elasticities of demand for electricity and the range
of elasticities in the QUAIDS model is much wider than for the AIDS model. This
is illustrated in Figure 4.2 which depicts densities for estimated uncompensated price
elasticities of demand resulting from the AIDS and the QUAIDS models.7
Figure 4.2: Electricity, own-price uncompensated elasticities, sensitivity to model
specification. Kernel densities fitted to elasticities over a random sample of 3,000
households.
The result shown in Figure 4.2 is commodity-specific, rather than a general result
applying to all commodity groups. That is, the QUAIDS model does not consistently
produce a wider distribution of estimated price elasticities of demand. For example,
the QUAIDS model produces demand elasticities for groceries (mainly food) with a
narrower distribution than for the AIDS model (see Figure 4.3). For a majority of
commodity groups the distributions are very similar (see Figures in Appendix C.3).
7Densities have been fitted over a random sample of 3,000 households, because the iterative calcu-
lation of individual demand elasticities was computationally very time consuming. All fitted densities
shown in this thesis have been calculated using the same random sample.
58
Figure 4.3: Electricity, own-price uncompensated elasticities, sensitivity to model
specification. Kernel densities fitted to elasticities from a random sample of 3,000
households.
4.2.4 Comparison of elasticities with other research
Estimated sensitivity of households to changes in prices can have a significant effect on
estimates of the effects on households of changes in product prices. Generally speaking,
the larger the compensated price elasticity the larger the effect on welfare of a price
increase, other things being equal.
The estimated own-price uncompensated demand elasticities for electricity are large,
in absolute terms, relative to elasticities cited internationally. This is partly, but only
partly, because the model does not control for year fixed effects and thus the elasticities
must be interpreted as longer run effects. In a recent survey of residential electricity
price elasticities of demand Zhu et al. (2018) report mean short run elasticities of -0.2
and mean long-run elasticities -0.60.8 Long-run elasticities range from -4.2 to 0.60.
8This meta-analysis is a useful collation of prior studies but the observations in the paper are of
questionable quality, such as an observation that distribution of elasticity estimates are approximately
normally distributed, when visual inspection of these elasticities does not confirm this observation.
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There are no strictly comparable estimates for electricity demand in New Zealand,
however the elasticity estimates found here are not entirely out of line with approx-
imately comparable New Zealand estimates. For example, Thomas (2019) finds that
household demand for utilities, communication and education is highly price inelastic,
with an own-price elasticity of -1.6. Thomas used a QUAIDS model HES expenditure
data for the 2007, 2010, 2013 and 2016 surveys. However Thomas’s method included
only 9 product groups and included a larger number of demographic predictors than
are used here.
Experimental analysis by the NZ Institute of Economic Research (NZIER, 2020)
found an uncompensated own-price elasticity of demand of -4.12 on average nationally
and -6.10 in major urban areas. The NZ Institute of Economic Research’s model was
a linear approximation to the AIDS model and used HES data augmented by detailed
regional survey data on prices provided by Stats NZ.
One reason for the higher long run own-price elasticities of demand estimated here
is the use of demand system estimation and downward bias in elasticity estimation
in other models. Labandeira, Labeaga, and López-Otero (2017) conducted a meta-
analysis of energy demand studies internationally and found that demand systems
produced more elastic price elasticities than single equation models and that long term
elasticities are around three times larger, in absolute terms, than short term price
elasticities.
A meta-analysis of 419 meat demand studies showed a similar result in terms of
demand system elasticities being more elastic than other demand models. Gallet (2010)
reports a median price elasticity for meat of -0.77 with a standard deviation 1.28 and
the analysis shows that QUAIDS systems tend to result in own-price elasticities for
meat that are more elastic than simple linear demand models and than AIDS models.
A key reason for differences in elasticities between micro-level demand systems and
more aggregated models is that aggregate models average over heterogeneous prices
and heterogeneous household characteristics. By way of example, when the QUAIDS
model estimated here was used to estimate demand after a change to the structure
of electricity prices (see chapter 5), with prices increasing for some households and
Furthermore, there is no strong reason to believe that elasticity estimates would naturally tend towards
a normal distribution as the estimates come from such vastly different contexts and use vastly different
data sets and models that it does not follow that the estimates are measuring the same thing at all.
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decreasing for others, the mean ex-post observed uncompensated own-price elasticity
of demand across household types and income quintiles was -0.20 even though the
modelling was based on a model with much larger mean individual elasticities.
Studies of consumer demand based on demand systems do not generally include
a distinction between short-run and long-run effects, as the analyses typically do not
have a dynamic structure. Rather demand system elasticities are identified as being
short-run or long-run based on the data used. Nonetheless, we can observe that, our
estimates of highly inelastic demand for electricity implies inelastic demand in the short
run, based on the general meta-analysis finding that long-run elasticities are on average
three times larger than short-run elasticities.
Filippini (1995) investigated price elasticities of residential peak and off-peak elec-
tricity demand in Switzerland using an almost ideal demand system, restricted to
electricity consumption. The results of this analysis showed own-price elasticities of
demand between -1.29 and -1.50 for peak demand and -2.36 and -2.42 for off-peak
demands.9. In a related study Filippini (2011) estimated a dynamic panel to inves-
tigate differences in short-run and long-run price elasticities of residential peak and
off-peak electricity demand in Switzerland and found long-run elasticities that ranged
from -1.60 and -2.26 for peak demand and -1.27 and -1.65 for off-peak demand.
Thorsnes et al. (2012) report on a 20 month time-of-use pricing experiment in New
Zealand in which they found price sensitivity to electricity prices to be conditional
on the time of year, with consumption being unresponsive to prices during summer
months but price responsive during colder winter months when electricity bills are
typically highest. The study indicated a mean peak period price elasticity of demand
of -0.371 (standard error 0.074) and an off-peak price elasticity of demand of -0.0902
(not statistically significant in light of a standard error 0.077). These estimates hold
few implications for this study because the study was short-lived.10
Baker and Blundell (1991) found the short-run price elasticity of electricity demand
in the UK in the 1980s to be more elastic in the summer (-1.03 on average) than the
winter (-0.67) and that home owners with mortgages exhibited more elastic demand
(-1.04) than those without mortgages (-0.87) or renting (-0.94). This study used micro-
9The ranges in these estimates come from two different models, one with homogeneity restrictions
and one without homogeneity restrictions
10The authors also point out that their study is not representative of the New Zealand population.
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data, a modified form of the AIDS model and controls for the availability of selected
energy-using appliances or facilities such as central heating.
Gomez-Lobo (1996) estimated a QUAIDS model of consumer demand in the UK
using similar data to Baker and Blundell (1991), but with a data set that spanned 1985
to 1993. The study estimated short-run own-price uncompensated demand elasticities
for electricity of -0.56.
Schulte and Heindl (2017) find own-price elasticities of -0.40, on average, for Ger-
many based on a quadratic expenditure system (QES). This excludes space heating
because in Germany this is typically based on gas, oil or district heating. The esti-
mated own-price elasticity of demand for space heating is -0.50.
There is of course no reason why an elasticity estimated for one country should be
the same as the elasticity for another country. Krishnamurthy and Kriström (2015)
investigate household electricity demand across 11 OECD countries and find wide vari-
ation in price and income elasticities - despite the use of a single consistent methodol-
ogy.11 This study finds own-price elasticities of demand ranging from -0.27 for South
Korea and -1.4 for Australia.
Even within the same country there are a wide range of estimates of price elasticities
of demand, based on model variations. Fell, Li, and Paul (2014) estimated a model
of residential electricity demand for the United States and found a short-run price
elasticity of demand of -0.50, on average, and noted that this was significantly above
some estimates and significantly below others (plus or minus 0.25, approximately).
The differences appear to be related to when data was sampled, estimation method-
ology, model functional form and geographic scope. The study most similar to Fell
et al. (2014) found a short-run price elasticity of demand of -0.74 and a long-run price
elasticity of demand of -0.814 (Alberini, Gans, and Velez-Lopez, 2011).
Furthermore many of these studies for which elasticities have been estimated are
focussed on understanding the impacts of time of use pricing. Studies of time of use
pricing are invariably focussed on short term demand response, typically monthly or
weekly. This is reflects an interest in demand management and the efficiency of short
term variations in prices. The implications for sustained adaptation to price changes
is unclear.
11A double-log model with sensitivity testing using a translog model.
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Few studies explore heterogeneity in price responsiveness across households. Those
that do show considerable heterogeneity. For example Reiss and White (2005) showed
that households’ appliance portfolios had a significant effect on measured demand re-
sponse in California. One implication of this was that a large amount of measured de-
mand response came from a small number of households. The study also showed that
the relationship between income and price sensitivity followed an inverted u-shape with
demand responsiveness largest at low and high incomes. Similarly, Romero-Jordán, del
Ŕıo, and Peñasco (2016) found that low-income households are likely to be more sensi-
tive to price changes, due to binding income constraints, while high-income households
are likely to be less price sensitive.
That said, positive correlations between price elasticities of demand and incomes
are by no means guaranteed. It is conceptually possible that, at least at some levels
of income, electricity could be an inferior good. It is also possible conceptually that
higher-income households have less binding budget constraints or higher rates of saving
that allow for investment in energy-saving devices so that if prices rise significantly their
energy consumption could fall. And own-production could increase for higher-income
households, if they are more willing and able to invest in solar panels, for example,
which would cause measured demand for electricity to appear more price responsive
at higher incomes. Indeed such an effect would be bolstered by sorting effects with
higher income or higher wealth households congregating in areas more conducive to
self-production (such as in Nelson in the New Zealand context).
On balance, the elasticities estimated with QUAIDS and AIDS models are high by
international comparison, but not excessively so for longer run elasticities.
4.3 Sensitivity to model specification
The estimated models are sensitive to model specification, however the core QUAIDS
and AIDS models discussed above and used in the welfare evaluation in Chapter 5 do
not exhibit extreme parameter values relative to the other model specifications that
have been tested.
Model restriction tests raise question marks over the consistency of the empirical
models with underlying consumer demand theory. However, the model restrictions do
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not have large effects on the model parameter estimates or elasticities.
4.3.1 Tests of restrictions
Tests of the theoretical restrictions in the model have been conducted using likelihood
ratio tests comparing pairs of models with and without restrictions. The results of
these tests are summarised in Table 4.9. First we compare the core models, including
homogeneity (
∑
j γij = 0 ∀i) and symmetry (γij = γji) restrictions, with versions
of the models which drop the symmetry restrictions. Comparison of these models
suggests rejection of the symmetry restrictions in both the QUAIDS and the AIDS
models (p = 0.000 in both cases).
Comparison of unrestricted models with the models with homogeneity restrictions,
but no symmetry restrictions, indicate that homogeneity improves the model. That is,
under the likelihood ratio test we cannot reject the hypothesis of homogeneity against
the alternative of no restrictions in either the QUAIDS model (p = 0.274) or the AIDS
model (p = 0.135).
The test of joint symmetry and homogeneity against an unrestricted model further
suggests that the symmetry conditions do not improve the model.
Table 4.9: Tests of model restrictions
r2 Model restrictions Parameters Log-likelihood χ2 p (< χ2)
QUAIDS model
0.459 Homogenity and symmetry 400 393,366
0.463 Homogeneity 520 393,671 611.81 0.000
0.463 Unrestricted 536 393,681 18.90 0.274
0.459 Homogenity and symmetry 400 393,366 630.70 0.000
AIDS model
0.455 Homogenity and symmetry 384 392,585
0.459 Homogeneity 504 392,894 619.07 0.000
0.459 Unrestricted 520 392,905 22.25 0.135
0.455 Homogenity and symmetry 384 392,585 641.32 0.000
So, overall, symmetry restrictions are rejected. This means the data is not consistent
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with the underlying theoretical models being estimated. This is important in the sense
that welfare analysis follows from the underlying theoretical conditions, specifically that
the slutsky matrix of substitution elasticities is negative semi-definite with symmetric
off-diagonal parameters (the γij = γji) and negative diagonal entries (γii < 0,∀i).
Rejection of symmetry restrictions appears to be a common finding in empirical
estimation of demand systems (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Gomez-Lobo, 1996).
Although most articles do not report tests of model restrictions, of the papers reviewed
in this study that do test model restrictions only one did not show rejection of the
symmetry restrictions and that was Banks et al. (1997) where the sample data included
only a single type of household.
This raises a question about what, if anything, to do about welfare analysis when
the model is inconsistent with consumer demand theory. It appears that there is no
guidance on this in the literature. The approach taken here is to ignore these incon-
sistencies and to rely primarily on the model that includes symmetry restrictions, to
adhere to theoretical propositions over empirical estimation, and to ignore the problem
of negative own-price compensated elasticities of demand for alcohol and education on
the grounds that these are not products of primary interest in this study.
The decision to rely on the fully restricted model is justified on the grounds that
the model parameters are not substantially different from parameters of the model
estimated with homogeneity but without symmetry restrictions, as below in Table 4.10
and Table 4.11.
4.3.2 Results from alternative QUAIDS models
The alternative QUAIDS models that have been estimated show substantial sensitivity
in model results to changes in model specification. As discussed in section 4.1, the
alternative models estimated include: a model with four regional dummies; a model
estimated on a sub-sample of the data using only the surveys from 2013, 2016 and 2019;
a model with. In addition, in the tables below, the results for the core model without
symmetry restrictions is shown alongside the core model results with both symmetry
and homogeneity restrictions.
The expenditure elasticities vary very little across different model specifications.
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This is shown in Table 4.10. Price elasticities, however, vary quite considerably across
the five models shown in Table 4.11.
In terms of the key product of interest, compensated own-price elasticities for elec-
tricity range from -1.19 in the model that adds number of adults and number of children
as explanatory variables to -2.69 for the model estimated on the survey sub-sample
(2013-2019). This is substantial variation, although the results consistently point to
own-price elasticities that are high relative international averages.
The model with adults and children as explanatory variables causes substantial
changes in elasticities where expenditure is related to necessities that are likely to scale
most linearly by household size, such as eating out and accommodation. Although this
is not universally true in the sense that the own-price elasticity on grocery demand
changes very little.
The model with regional dummies has surprisingly little effect on electricity elastic-
ities, with the compensated own-price elasticity of demand declining from -1.95 in the
core model to -1.88 in the model with regional dummies. This provides some confidence
that the core model is reasonable, with respect to estimates of electricity elasticities.
That said, the compensated own-price elasticity for other energy products changes sig-
nificantly with the use of regional dummies. This likely reflects the availability and
quality of gas products which varies significantly by region with reticulated gas only
available in the North Island, albeit not everywhere in the North Island.
4.3.3 Comparison with a linear expenditure system
Estimation of a linear expenditure system shows substantial differences in expenditure
and price elasticities for electricity as compared to the almost ideal demand systems.
This is summarised in the Table 4.12 below. Here the parameters of the demand
system have been estimated on a reduced form product-by-product (i) and household-
by-household (h) basis using linear ordinary least squares and the following equation
(Creedy, 2004, p. 80):




where wih is expenditure share and µh is total expenditure.
66
Elasticities are calculated using (Creedy, 2004, p. 80):
ei = 1 +
(µ/δ3) δ2 − 1




















where ei is the expenditure elasticity, eij is the cross-price elasticity, eii is the own-
price elasticity, and ξ is the marginal utility of total expenditure (the Frisch parameter)
which is set equal to -1.9 (Creedy, 2004, p. 81).
The results of the estimation show expenditure elasticities for electricity products
that are substantially lower than for the almost ideal demand systems and elastici-
ties. The almost ideal demand system elasticities are more in line with international
estimates.
The elasticities in Table 4.12 include cross-price elasticities for a selection of other
products and including a detailed breakdown for other energy products: gas, bottled
gas, solid fuel, and other (non-transport) energy.
The LES model has been estimated on a sub-sample of the HES surveys, from
2007 to 2016, because the 2019 survey data was not available when this model was
estimated. However it is extremely unlikely that the addition of the 2019 survey would
substantially change the elasticity estimates, as far as comparison with the almost ideal
demand systems are concerned.
Notably, the LES model, as estimated here, provides a poor fit to the data, ex-
cludes data on prices and has a restrictive functional form. For these reasons it is not
considered for inclusion as a model for welfare evaluation in Chapter 5. Rather it is
provided as a point of comparison given the history of LES models in demand analysis
in New Zealand. Furthermore, it adds further evidence of the extent to which models
of demand are sensitive to model specification choices.
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Table 4.10: Comparisons of alternative models, expenditure elasticities
Model variants:
Product QUAIDS No symmetry Regions 2013-2019 Adults and children
Acommodation 0.79*** 0.76*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.81***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09)
Air transport 2.08*** 2.09*** 2.07*** 2.1*** 2.03***
(0.33) (0.3) (0.33) (0.38) (0.3)
Alcohol 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.17*** 0.99***
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.28) (0.21)
Clothing 1.58*** 1.6*** 1.6*** 1.55*** 1.62***
(0.23) (0.22) (0.23) (0.29) (0.22)
Communications 0.52*** 0.54*** 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.51***
(0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.13) (0.1)
Contents 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.33*** 1.32*** 1.29***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16) (0.2) (0.15)
Education 0.95* 0.96* 0.95* 0.86 1.17**
(0.44) (0.4) (0.44) (0.53) (0.4)
Electricity 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 0.36***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.1) (0.09)
Groceries 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.58*** 0.59*** 0.59***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.07)
Health 1.32*** 1.35*** 1.35*** 1.38*** 1.29***
(0.22) (0.2) (0.22) (0.27) (0.2)
Insurance 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 1.14*** 1.13***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.11)
Mortage interest 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.43*** 1.48*** 1.62***
(0.24) (0.22) (0.24) (0.29) (0.22)
Other energy 0.89* 0.89** 0.89** 1** 0.9**
(0.35) (0.3) (0.35) (0.38) (0.3)
Miscellaneous 1.43*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.44***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.12) (0.15) (0.11)
Recreation 1.42*** 1.44*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.4***
(0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.14) (0.1)
Eating out 1.43*** 1.42*** 1.42*** 1.36*** 1.33***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.14) (0.17) (0.13)
Transport 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.68***
(0.11) (0.1) (0.11) (0.14) (0.1)
Elasticities evaluated at sample means. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 4.11: Comparisons of alternative models, compensated own-price elasticities
Model variants:
Product QUAIDS No symmetry Regions 2013-2019 Adults and children
Acommodation -1.15*** -1.97*** -0.91*** -1.44*** -0.36*
(0.15) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Air transport -0.94*** -0.69*** -1.13*** 0.05 -0.84***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Alcohol 0.23*** 0.91*** -0.12*** -0.02 0.21***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Clothing -1.05*** -1.03*** -0.85*** -0.99*** -1.2***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Communications -1.01*** -1.09*** -1.03*** -1.16*** -0.9***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Contents -2.45*** -3.2*** -2.8*** -2.67*** -2.28***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Education 4.36*** 4.61*** 4.26*** 2.69*** 4.98***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
Electricity -1.95*** -2.06*** -1.88*** -2.69*** -1.19***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
Groceries -0.87*** -0.82*** -0.83*** -0.93*** -0.9***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Health -3.78*** 0.08* -5.49*** -3.7*** -3.74***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Insurance -0.7*** -1.31*** -0.69*** -0.3*** -0.62***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mortage interest -0.65*** 0.18*** -0.74*** -1.34*** -0.56***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02)
Other energy -0.5*** -0.12*** -0.99*** -0.09*** -0.1***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Miscellaneous -0.74*** -0.65*** -0.74*** 0.01 -0.38***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Recreation -1.09*** -2.78*** -1*** 0.49*** -0.85***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Eating out -0.52*** -1.45*** -0.98*** 0.81*** -1.1***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Transport -0.12*** -0.29*** -0.13*** 0.29*** 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Elasticities evaluated at sample means. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001
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Table 4.12: Linear expenditure system: estimated electricity elasticities
Household Own price Expenditure Gas Bottled gas Solid fuel Other energy Food Housing
65+ single -0.39 0.71 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Single - no children -0.30 0.54 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.01
Single - 1 child -0.26 0.46 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Single - 2 children -0.22 0.39 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Single - 3 children -0.18 0.33 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02
Single - 4+ children -0.32 0.58 -0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.01 0.10
65+ couple -0.40 0.73 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02
Couple - no children -0.33 0.60 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02
Couple - 1 child -0.33 0.61 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01
Couple - 2 children -0.29 0.53 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
Couple - 3 children -0.34 0.62 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Couple - 4+ children -0.22 0.40 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
3 adults - no children -0.33 0.60 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
3 adults - 1 child -0.32 0.59 -0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
3 adults - 2+ children -0.32 0.58 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.02
4+ adults - no children -0.34 0.63 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01
4+ adults - 1 child -0.19 0.34 -0.03 0.11 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
4+ adults - 2+ children -0.34 0.61 0.00 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
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Chapter 5
Counterfactual analysis of the
impact of high fixed prices
This chapter presents the results of a counterfactual experiment in which electricity
prices follow a single pricing rule with all network costs recovered from fixed charges
and remaining retail costs recovered using a variable charge (dollars per kWh). The
price changes are shown to be welfare improving based on conventional money-metric
measures of welfare changes. Distributional impacts are more equivocal though on
average the price change leads to a reduction in inequality, and an improvement in
social welfare, as measured by the Atkinson index.
5.1 Evaluation methods
The methods used here for evaluating impacts of alternative price structures follow
Creedy and Mok (2018). First, money-metric measures of welfare changes are used to
estimate the efficiency of price changes and aggregate welfare changes from a utilitar-
ian perspective. This is the typical approach used in policy analysis of welfare effects
of policy changes, predicated on the notion of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency where the only
concern is whether policy changes lead to aggregate welfare gains because, hypotheti-
cally, transfers can be used to compensate those who are negatively impacted by policy
changes (Adler and Posner, 2000).
71
Second, changes in inequality are analysed using the Atkinson index. This second
step allows us to check the extent to which inequality worsens and thus address con-
cerns that arise from the fact that policy or price changes are, in practice, not often
accompanied by transfers. Furthermore, few people are indifferent to the distributional
consequences of policy or price changes and most people are averse to transfers from
low income households to high income households.
5.1.1 Compensating variation
Welfare changes are measured in terms of the compensating variation (CV) or estimated
willingness to pay to avoid price changes. Analytically the calculation for the CV for
a single household (h) in the QUAIDS model is:
cvh = eh (p
′
h, uh0)− eh (ph, uh0) (5.1)
= exp (ln eh (p
′
h, uh0))− exp (eh (ph, uh0))
where the first line is the standard expression for CV, expenditure evaluated at the
new prices (p′h) and utility (uh0) before the price change less expenditure given prices
and utility before the price change, and the second line draws the connection to the
model’s empirical expenditure function in equation 2.6 and repeated below for ease of
reference and with subscripts denoting households (h).






Calculation of the CV requires an intermediate step of evaluating initial log-utility
levels, in terms of expenditure, from the indirect utility function (equation 2.5):
lnuh =
{[





The standard expression for CV, in equation 5.1, is the same for both the QUAIDS
and AIDS model, but the expenditure function and indirect utility functions to be
evaluated are:






Two versions of the CV are considered here. One is as above with the household as
the unit of account and without any adjustment for household size. The other is CV
adjusted for household size using the equivalence scales discussed in section 4.1.2.
Creedy and Mok (2018) note that this approach to welfare evaluation is imperfect,
ostensibly in deference to the fact that utility in consumer demand theory is a cardinal
rather than ordinal concept.
Similarly, imperfections in model estimation and the specification of a functional
form for indirect utility will invariably draw questions about whether the empirical
estimates of money-metric utility are reasonable or not (Slesnick, 1998; Torres, Hanley,
and Riera, 2011).
Nonetheless, inference about welfare effects is important given that most if not all
policy decisions rely on judgements about welfare effects, whether explicit or not. The
implicit claim here being that it is better that such analysis is carried out using a
comparable and consistent evaluation method rather than ad-hoc reasoning. Further,
the method laid out here is logically more coherent than other approaches, relying on
the idea that even if we cannot measure utility itself we can measure how much money
would be required to compensate people for price changes (Bockstael and McConnell,
2007).
Applied welfare analysis is most often based on rules-of-thumb or so-called sufficient
statistics (Chetty, 2009), such as the widespread use of consumer surplus or Harberger
triangles (Harberger, 1964). Such simplified methods are apt to ignore the effects of
existing distortions affecting consumers, often assuming that the incremental policy
under consideration is the only source of distortion. This is not as much of a problem
here as all prices and substitution possibility are included in the welfare calculations
(via price aggregators). Furthermore simplified methods are usually only reasonable
where very small price changes are concerned (Kleven, 2020) and even then more
complicated methods, such as the ones used here, substantially reduce the risk of
biased estimates of welfare effects (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel, 1996).
That said, it must be acknowledged that there are practical difficulties in inferring
the effects of policy and price changes that are well-outside experience, that is non-
marginal reforms, and these difficulties affect this analysis in so far as it reduces the
reliability of the results.
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5.1.2 Atkinson inequality measure
The Atkinson index (Atkinson, 1970) is a widely used metric for assessing inequality
and impacts of policy changes on inequality. The index has also been frequently used
in research in New Zealand analysing impacts of price and tax rate changes (Creedy,
2004; Creedy and Sleeman, 2005b, 2006; Creedy and Mok, 2018; Thomas, 2019).
The index, denoted A, is calculated via:



















where yi is a measure of income, ye is a measure of equally distributed equivalent
income, ȳ is observed mean income, and ε is a parameter that represents social aversion
to inequality. The equation for ye posits a specific form of social welfare function.
The index can be interpreted as a function of (proportional to) societal willingness
to pay to achieve a desired income distribution. It is also interpreted as the degree
of tolerance for income loss in the process of making transfers (Creedy, 2016). The
intuition for these interpretations is illustrated in Figure 5.1 for the case of two repre-
sentative incomes y1 and y2.
1 In the diagram income is distributed at point a, with y2
larger than y1. An equal distribution would see incomes distributed at point b, where
both y1 and y2 would be equal to mean income ȳ. The diagonal line passing between a
and b represents an indifference curve for a utilitarian social welfare function, concerned
only with the sum of income and not its distribution, such that a central planner would
be indifferent between allocations a or b. The concave curve represents an alternative
social welfare function with aversion to inequality where indifference between equal
distribution of income at point c or unequal distribution of c represents indifference
between two different average or total incomes ye and ȳ, subject to the distribution of
income.
1This figure has been adapted from a United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisa-
tion online resource available at http://www.fao.org/policy-support/tools-and-publications/
resources-details/en/c/848138/.
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The rate of conversion of changes in the inequality index into income equivalents











where dy/y is the mean income change equivalent to the change in the Atkinson index.
Figure 5.1: Intuition for the Atkinson index
The Atkinson index has the advantage, over other inequality measures, of being
based on two simple and transparent assumptions: the functional form of the social
welfare function and a single parameter of inequality aversion. The Atkinson index is
not objective, however, for at least two reasons. First, measured inequality is a function
of aversion to inequality with absolute amounts of inequality rising with the value of
the aversion parameter. Second, changes in inequality are all relative to the starting
point in terms of measured inequality (Creedy, 2016).
In this assessment the focus is on changes in inequality due to changes in electricity
costs. Changes in inequality are estimated by measuring the Atkinson index based
on population weighted disposable incomes before prices change and then measuring
the Atkinson index based on population weighted disposable incomes after subtracting
compensating variations, as discussed in section 5.1.1.2
2As discussed below, compensating variation values are presented here with reversed signs. How-
ever, the calculation of incomes after price changes involved subtracting compensating variations
before sign reversal.
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Table 5.1: Baseline Atkinson indices of equivalised real disposable income
Inequality aversion ε
Household 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9
Single - no children 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.20
65+ single 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
Single - 1 child 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.13
Single - 2 children 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.14
Single - 3+ children 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.12
65+ couple 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.18
Couple - no children 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.15
Couple - 1 child 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.13
Couple - 2 children 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
Couple - 3+ children 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.15
3 adults - no children 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.11
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
4+ adults - no children 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.11
Total 0.04 0.10 0.12 0.17
Weighted average for 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Estimated changes in inequality used here include changes in inequality of equiv-
alised income - using the equivalence scales discussed in section 4.1.2. Given that
this adds an additional degree of subjectivity to our estimates, we analyse changes in
inequality both with and without equivalisation for household size.
We consider a range of inequality parameters, consistent with those used in Creedy
and Sleeman (2005a). However, within that we use a central estimate for inequality
aversion of 0.60 based on an estimate of observed inequality aversion for Australia (of
0.62) from a cross-country study by Lambert, Millimet, and Slottje (2003).
Table 5.1 provides a summary of inequality measures for the baseline model, with
variations by inequality aversion parameter and inequality measures for household types
as well as across all households. In this table the income measure is equivalised dispos-
able income and the indices are population weighted averages over indices for individual
HES survey years. Complementary tables can be found in appendix D, showing indices
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by survey year (Table D.1) and indices for unequivalised disposable income (Table D.2).
5.2 Tariff restructuring scenario
To estimate the effects of higher fixed prices in electricity tariffs we consider a scenario
where all network (distribution and transmission) costs recovered from residential con-
sumers are recovered in fixed equal annual amounts per household, with the annual
fixed charges varying by network area.
Modelled counterfactual prices are summarised in Tables 5.2 and Table 5.3. The
Tables show nominal national average prices by household type and by income quintile
over the period 2007 to 2019. Smaller households would face price increases, on average,
while larger households face price declines. Lower income households would also face
price increases.
Price variation, by household type, in the baseline reflects a combination of the
effects of low fixed charge regulations, which see smaller households paying lower fixed
charges and higher variable charges, and differences in household demographics across
network areas where energy and network costs differ. Similarly, under the counterfac-
tual scenario fixed charges vary because of differences in household demographics across
network areas. Variable prices ($/kWh prices) vary much less than fixed charges be-
cause variance in network costs is larger, across network areas, than variance in average
energy and other costs.3
The advantage of this simple price change scenario is that there is no need for
complicated optimisation of two-part tariffs to ensure that network owners fully recover
their costs. The calculation of counterfactual tariffs simply requires calculating network
costs recovered, per connection, from within a network area and determining the level
of variable (per kWh) charges required to cover other non-network costs on an average
cost basis.
3Other costs include costs of metering, billing, and account management including the cost of
managing wholesale energy price risk. There is regional variation in these costs, including because of
differences in competition and locational pricing of energy to reflect transport congestion costs and
losses. However network costs typically vary more spatially than do energy costs.
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Table 5.2: Prices used in counterfactual pricing scenario, by household
Baseline prices: Counterfactual prices:
Fixed Variable Average Fixed Variable Average Price change
Household type: $ per year $/kWh $/kWh $ per year $/kWh $/kWh Percent
Single - no children 150 0.24 0.266 808 0.150 0.307 15.4
65+ single 155 0.24 0.269 800 0.152 0.301 12.0
Single - 1 child 185 0.23 0.261 799 0.149 0.275 5.5
Single - 2 children 213 0.23 0.261 814 0.151 0.263 1.0
Single - 3+ children 240 0.23 0.256 807 0.150 0.247 -3.3
65+ couple 217 0.24 0.265 813 0.154 0.263 -0.8
Couple - no children 213 0.23 0.260 810 0.151 0.262 1.1
Couple - 1 child 248 0.23 0.255 810 0.150 0.248 -3.0
Couple - 2 children 269 0.22 0.249 818 0.149 0.233 -6.6
Couple - 3+ children 294 0.22 0.247 815 0.150 0.225 -8.9
3 adults - no children 261 0.23 0.253 822 0.151 0.237 -6.6
3+ adults - 1+ children 301 0.22 0.246 836 0.150 0.219 -11.1
4+ adults - no children 273 0.22 0.245 818 0.150 0.215 -12.6
Population weighted average over 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019.
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Table 5.3: Prices used in counterfactual pricing scenario, by income quintile
Baseline prices: Counterfactual prices:
Fixed Variable Average Fixed Variable Average Price change
Income quintile: $ per year $/kWh $/kWh $ per year $/kWh $/kWh Percent
1 216 0.234 0.263 820 0.152 0.269 2.4
2 220 0.232 0.260 811 0.152 0.261 0.6
3 224 0.229 0.257 810 0.151 0.257 -0.1
4 224 0.228 0.255 809 0.150 0.254 -0.6
5 246 0.225 0.253 815 0.149 0.248 -1.9
Population weighted average over 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, and 2019.
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A single pricing rule for all households and for all network is a little crude. In
practice there may be advantages to some network owners from more nuanced pricing
methodologies such as using demand or time-of-use charges for rationing access to
limited capacity during peak periods (that is, for signalling congestion costs). It may
also be that there are people who would be prompted to disconnect from networks
if fixed charges are too high. While it is unlikely that this would be a widespread
phenomenon, it would be efficient for network owners or retailers to vary fixed charges,
where practically feasible, to avoid causing disconnections that would cause an increase
in the fixed charges of remaining connected customers.
5.3 Welfare effects of high fixed charges
5.3.1 Aggregate welfare effects and efficiency
A shift to higher fixed charges results in an increase aggregate household welfare, as
measured by estimated compensating variation unadjusted for distributional effects.
An increase in welfare is found for both the QUAIDS model of household demand and
for the AIDS model of household demand.
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarise compensating variations by household and disposable
income quintile. The size of the welfare change shown here is an aggregate over each
of the five HES survey years used in the demand systems: 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, and
2019. Changes in compensating variation by survey year are summarised in Tables D.3
and D.4 in appendix D.
In all presentations of welfare results the sign of the compensating variation has
been reversed for ease of interpretation; in tables of results positive compensating
variation indicates a welfare gain. Strictly speaking, without sign reversal, a negative
compensating variation indicates that a household would be willing to pay for a change
in the structure of pricing while a positive compensating variation indicates that a
household would have to be paid to be indifferent between the status quo and the
counterfactual pricing regime.
To put the welfare gains into context, the compensating variation estimated with
the QUAIDS model averages 5.0 percent of total residential expenditure on electricity,
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across each of the survey years, and the compensating variation estimated with the
AIDS model averages 2.2 percent of total residential expenditure on electricity.
There are two ways to interpret the compensating variations in Tables 5.4 and 5.5
in light of the fact that they represent a sum over five non-adjacent years. One is to
view each year’s result as the effect of a price change in the third year after the price
change. This interpretation is the same as the interpretation of own-price elasticities
of demand as changes in demand over at least three years in response to a persistent
one-off change in prices. That is, it takes at least three years for the price change
to reach full effect. On this interpretation, the impact on consumer welfare over the
fifteen year period spanned by the model (2007-2019) is a multiple of the modelled
effects and the multiple is less than three. On this interpretation, and assuming an
equal annual increases in compensating variation over three years, the total value of
the compensating variation over the fifteen years is 1.4 billion for the estimates from
the QUAIDS model and 600 million for the estimates from the AIDS model.
The alternative view, is that the the compensating variations reflect impacts on
welfare if prices had always included higher fixed charges, relative to the status quo. On
that view, the change in compensating variation, over the fifteen year period modelled,
is three times the modelled compensating variation. That is, 2.3 billion for the estimates
from the QUAIDS model and 1.0 billion for the estimates from the AIDS model.
This latter perspective is questionable in the sense that once-and-for-all and large
changes in the structure of pricing are likely to have structural effects, in terms of
industry cost structures and consumer investment, that are not captured in the demand
model. This is an issue related to the Lucas critique of macroeconomic models, which
questions inferences about effects of policy changes made using models calibrated to
data obtained under an alternative policy regime. While the models estimated here
are structural and behavioural, so less subject to the Lucas critique, they are not
general equilibrium models and do not capture all relevant effects. They need to be
interpreted as local models, the validity of which can be questioned in light of the large
price changes to price structures being modelled.
Results in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that low income households and small households
are worse off from a shift to high fixed charges to cover all network costs.4 However,
4Tables of mean compensating variations per household, corresponding to these aggregate results,
can be found in Tables D.5 and D.6 in appendix D
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Table 5.4: Aggregate compensating variation, QUAIDS model, 2017 dollar millions
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -6.1 -2.2 -1.2 3.3 13.3 7.1
65+ single -6.6 -4.8 -3.7 -4.8 3.1 -16.8
Single - 1 child -0.2 -0.5 0.1 0.5 3.0 3.0
Single - 2 children 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.6 2.8 4.4
Single - 3+ children 0.1 -0.3 0.1 2.8 0.6 3.3
65+ couple -3.0 -1.0 1.6 8.5 26.3 32.5
Couple - no children 6.9 22.0 35.8 44.1 75.8 184.6
Couple - 1 child 5.8 12.0 9.5 15.6 34.9 77.7
Couple - 2 children 11.1 25.1 26.1 28.2 42.6 133.1
Couple - 3+ children 6.7 9.4 4.9 13.0 20.4 54.4
3 adults - no children 10.6 9.3 13.6 34.9 35.9 104.3
3+ adults - 1+ children 10.7 18.7 21.4 19.6 49.9 120.3
4+ adults - no children 7.2 16.2 21.4 6.8 13.8 65.3
Total 43 104 131 173 323 773.2
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
the results from the QUAIDS model suggests that sole occupant households aged 65
or older are the only household type that, in aggregate, is worse off. This reflects two
things. One is heterogeneity in electricity consumption and price effects within each
household type by income quintile (that is, within each cell of Tables 5.4 and 5.5),
such that the vast majority of smaller households consume below average amounts of
electricity and would face price increases, a minority consume relatively large amounts
of electricity and would enjoy price reductions.
The second and main reason that the QUAIDS model shows sole occupant house-
holds aged 65 or older to be the only household type that, in aggregate, is worse off is
non-linear impacts on compensating variation such that the gains of a subset of house-
holds within each combination of household type and income quintile is sufficiently
large, in aggregate, as to offset more numerous small losses by other households within
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Table 5.5: Aggregate compensating variation, AIDS model, 2017 dollar millions
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -8.6 -4.9 -4.9 -4.1 4.0 -18.5
65+ single -7.8 -5.2 -5.0 -7.2 -1.1 -26.3
Single - 1 child -3.5 -1.1 -2.1 -1.1 0.8 -7.0
Single - 2 children -0.5 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 1.9 -0.3
Single - 3+ children -0.4 -0.9 -0.2 1.0 0.0 -0.6
65+ couple -7.8 -5.8 -3.9 0.3 13.7 -3.4
Couple - no children -7.3 1.6 10.3 22.3 50.7 77.7
Couple - 1 child -1.2 3.3 3.8 6.7 24.7 37.2
Couple - 2 children 3.3 11.3 12.8 16.8 36.7 80.9
Couple - 3+ children 0.1 3.0 2.5 6.9 14.5 27.1
3 adults - no children 1.2 0.2 6.4 25.6 25.6 59.0
3+ adults - 1+ children 2.3 9.9 11.1 11.0 44.6 78.8
4+ adults - no children 2.1 9.4 14.8 3.7 8.7 38.6
Total -28 20 45 81 225 343.2
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
the group.
Non-linear impacts on compensating variation, in the QUAIDS model, can be seen
in a comparison of aggregate compensating variation in Table 5.4 and mean household
compensating variation as a percentage of disposable income in Table 5.6. While the
aggregate compensating variation is shown to be positive for sole occupant households
under 65 years of age the mean compensating variation, as a percentage of total income,
is negative. Similarly, the majority of single parent households with one child and
couple households aged 65 years or older experience a negative welfare effect, even
though in aggregate these types of households are shown to benefit from the price
changes.
Differences between aggregate effects and mean effects as a percentage of dispos-
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able income also reflect that lower income households within each income quintile are
generally worse than the higher income households, other things being equal.
Table 5.6: Mean compensating variation as a percentage of disposable income,
QUAIDS model
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -0.47% -0.17% -0.06% 0.01% 0.12% -0.12%
65+ single -0.30% -0.27% -0.24% -0.26% -0.03% -0.22%
Single - 1 child -0.08% -0.05% -0.02% 0.00% 0.14% -0.01%
Single - 2 children -0.04% 0.00% 0.03% 0.05% 0.14% 0.03%
Single - 3+ children -0.01% -0.12% -0.01% 0.31% 0.08% 0.05%
65+ couple -0.20% -0.09% -0.02% 0.06% 0.23% -0.01%
Couple - no children -0.03% 0.12% 0.17% 0.18% 0.29% 0.14%
Couple - 1 child 0.02% 0.15% 0.11% 0.17% 0.30% 0.15%
Couple - 2 children 0.09% 0.28% 0.23% 0.28% 0.27% 0.23%
Couple - 3+ children 0.09% 0.19% 0.08% 0.22% 0.34% 0.18%
3 adults - no children 0.13% 0.12% 0.14% 0.32% 0.32% 0.20%
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.13% 0.23% 0.23% 0.23% 0.38% 0.24%
4+ adults - no children 0.19% 0.31% 0.37% 0.11% 0.25% 0.24%
Total -0.07% 0.06% 0.08% 0.12% 0.23% 0.08%
Population weighted means 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
In contrast to the QUAIDS model, the AIDS model shows mean compensating
variations, as a percentage of disposable income in Table 5.6 that in most cases have the
same sign as the aggregate compensating variations in Table 5.5. The only exceptions
are for larger households with two or more adults and four or more occupants and
in the lowest quintile of disposable income where mean compensating variations are
negative but aggregate compensating variations are positive.
The differences between the AIDS and QUAIDS results indicates that the welfare
analysis is highly sensitive to the use of the quadratic model with nonlinear welfare
effects.
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Table 5.7: Mean compensating variation as a percentage of disposable income, AIDS
model
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -0.43% -0.19% -0.13% -0.09% 0.00% -0.17%
65+ single -0.32% -0.25% -0.24% -0.29% -0.08% -0.24%
Single - 1 child -0.34% -0.10% -0.16% -0.10% 0.03% -0.14%
Single - 2 children -0.11% -0.04% -0.11% -0.11% 0.07% -0.07%
Single - 3+ children -0.13% -0.25% -0.08% 0.11% -0.02% -0.08%
65+ couple -0.28% -0.18% -0.12% -0.05% 0.09% -0.11%
Couple - no children -0.13% -0.02% 0.02% 0.07% 0.17% 0.02%
Couple - 1 child -0.10% 0.03% 0.03% 0.05% 0.19% 0.04%
Couple - 2 children -0.01% 0.11% 0.09% 0.15% 0.23% 0.11%
Couple - 3+ children -0.10% 0.02% 0.03% 0.10% 0.21% 0.05%
3 adults - no children -0.02% -0.04% 0.04% 0.21% 0.20% 0.08%
3+ adults - 1+ children -0.02% 0.09% 0.08% 0.11% 0.30% 0.11%
4+ adults - no children 0.02% 0.17% 0.22% 0.05% 0.16% 0.12%
Total -0.16% -0.05% -0.02% 0.02% 0.13% -0.02%
Population weighted means 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
In principle, the non-linearity of the QUAIDS model is a strength, in light of the
fact that it is unwise to reason on the average if phenomena are non-linear and given
that observed distributions of both electricity consumption and household expenditure
have long right tails.
In practice, however, it seems wise to treat the non-linear results from the QUAIDS
model with some caution. The consequence of model error is potentially large, given
non-linearities. Furthermore, the effects on some combinations of household type and
income are inferred from limited numbers of observations. That is, the QUAIDS model
results are heavily influenced by a small number of observations.
The efficiency gains from the change in price structures are smaller when based on
85
Table 5.8: Aggregate equivalised compensating variation, QUAIDS model, 2017
dollar millions
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -6.1 -2.2 -1.2 3.3 13.3 7.1
65+ single -6.6 -4.8 -3.7 -4.8 3.1 -16.8
Single - 1 child -0.1 -0.4 0.1 0.4 2.5 2.5
Single - 2 children 0.1 0.0 0.7 0.4 2.0 3.2
Single - 3+ children 0.1 -0.1 0.0 1.8 0.4 2.1
65+ couple -2.3 -0.7 1.2 6.4 19.9 24.6
Couple - no children 5.3 16.7 27.1 33.4 57.5 139.9
Couple - 1 child 3.9 8.2 6.5 10.6 23.9 53.1
Couple - 2 children 7.0 15.8 16.4 17.8 26.8 83.8
Couple - 3+ children 3.9 5.4 2.9 7.5 11.8 31.4
3 adults - no children 6.8 6.0 8.8 22.5 23.1 67.2
3+ adults - 1+ children 6.3 10.6 11.8 11.0 26.6 66.3
4+ adults - no children 4.1 8.8 12.2 3.9 7.8 36.7
Total 22 63 83 114 219 501.1
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
equivalised compensating variation as summarised in Tables 5.8 and 5.9.
5.3.2 Impacts of high fixed charges on inequality
A shift to high fixed charges is estimated to reduce income inequality, as measured by
the Atkinson index. This general finding is not sensitive to the choice of inequality
aversion parameter (ε) or to QUAIDS or AIDS model specification.
Percentage changes in the Atkinson index are summarised in Tables 5.10 and 5.11.
The effect on income inequality is predictably small given the relatively small share
of electricity in household expenditure. The total changes in inequality, using the
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Table 5.9: Aggregate equivalised compensating variation, AIDS model, 2017 dollar
millions
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -8.6 -4.9 -4.9 -4.1 4.0 -18.5
65+ single -7.8 -5.2 -5.0 -7.2 -1.1 -26.3
Single - 1 child -2.9 -1.0 -1.7 -0.9 0.6 -5.8
Single - 2 children -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 1.4 -0.2
Single - 3+ children -0.3 -0.6 -0.2 0.6 0.0 -0.4
65+ couple -5.9 -4.4 -2.9 0.2 10.4 -2.6
Couple - no children -5.5 1.2 7.8 16.9 38.4 58.9
Couple - 1 child -0.8 2.3 2.6 4.6 16.9 25.4
Couple - 2 children 2.1 7.1 8.1 10.6 23.1 50.9
Couple - 3+ children 0.1 1.7 1.4 4.0 8.4 15.7
3 adults - no children 0.8 0.1 4.1 16.5 16.5 38.0
3+ adults - 1+ children 1.5 5.6 6.1 6.2 23.6 43.0
4+ adults - no children 1.1 5.1 8.4 2.1 5.0 21.7
Total -27 7 23 49 147 199.8
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
QUAIDS model, range from -0.17 percent where ε = 0.5 to -0.34 percent where ε = 0.2.
In terms of absolute changes (in number of index units), the changes in inequality are
smallest at ε = 0.2 and largest at ε = 0.9.
Higher rates of inequality aversion give higher weight (greater weight in social wel-
fare) to low income households in the construction of the Atkinson index. Thus the
fact that the impact on inequality gets larger, in absolute terms, as the rate of inequal-
ity aversion rises indicates that the source of the inequality reduction is, on balance,
positive impacts on lower income households.
Inequality does not decline in every year, rather it is shown to increase in 2007 and
2016. That being so, these findings are not generalisable without qualification that
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Table 5.10: Percentage change in Atkinson index of equivalised income, QUAIDS
model
Inequality aversion ε
Household 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9
Single - no children 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07
65+ single -5.34 -3.09 -3.06 -3.94
Single - 1 child 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.20
Single - 2 children -0.06 -0.72 -1.12 -3.38
Single - 3+ children 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22
65+ couple -0.36 -0.31 -0.28 -0.14
Couple - no children 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04
Couple - 1 child -0.38 -0.40 -0.41 -0.41
Couple - 2 children -0.35 -0.31 -0.29 -0.20
Couple - 3+ children -0.16 -0.23 -0.28 -0.65
3 adults - no children -0.22 -0.22 -0.21 -0.19
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.09 0.13 0.14 0.17
4+ adults - no children 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.06
Total -0.34 -0.17 -0.17 -0.25
Weighted average for 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
they are data or context-specific. Annual changes in inequality can be found in Tables
D.7 and D.7 in appendix D.
The findings of reduced inequality on average do, however, provide evidence against
presumptions of negative distributional consequences of higher fixed charges. Further-
more, even if there are instances of negative effects that require correction there are suf-
ficiently large aggregate welfare or efficiency gains from a shift to higher fixed charges
that targeted transfers could be used to compensate negatively effected households
without undermining overall efficiency improvements and welfare gains.
Interestingly, the shift to higher fixed charges is estimated to cause a decline in
within-group inequality for households of people aged 65 or older whether living alone
or in couples. This reflects relatively large increases in average electricity prices for
a subset of higher income households who consume comparatively little electricity.
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Table 5.11: Percentage change in Atkinson index of equivalised income, AIDS model
Inequality aversion ε:
Household 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9
Single - no children 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.31
65+ single -5.31 -3.00 -2.92 -3.51
Single - 1 child 0.67 0.72 0.74 0.80
Single - 2 children 0.41 0.22 0.09 -0.76
Single - 3+ children 0.36 0.41 0.44 0.54
65+ couple -0.30 -0.26 -0.24 -0.09
Couple - no children 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.05
Couple - 1 child -0.28 -0.31 -0.32 -0.35
Couple - 2 children -0.20 -0.17 -0.15 -0.10
Couple - 3+ children 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.25
3 adults - no children -0.10 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.31
4+ adults - no children 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.22
Total -0.24 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06
Weighted average for 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
This in turn reflects the comparatively high income and comparatively low electricity
consumption of households that remain connected to the labour force. Furthermore,
although our data does not provide evidence for it, this may be due to wealthier house-
holds being more likely to have greater access to a range of energy sources including
reticulated gas or self-production with solar photovoltaics.
Measured changes in inequality are sensitive to equivalisation. Inequality falls by
less if income is measured by disposable income without equivalisation (see Table D.9
in appendix D). However the general finding of, on balance, a reduction in inequality
does not change.
Converting the changes in the Atkinson indices into changes in social welfare, using
the relationship in equation 5.7, finds an average gain in social welfare across each of
the models and for equivalised and unequivalised income. This is summarised in Table
5.12. The social welfare changes range from an average annual improvement valued at
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1 million dollars through to an average annual improvement of 24 million dollars.
The social welfare changes, based on the social welfare function underpinning the
Atkinson index, are apt to understate potential welfare gains because of the fact that
the aggregate welfare gains permit funding of targeted assistance, which could, in
principle, further reduce inequality.
Table 5.12: Changes in social welfare based on changes in Atkinson index social
welfare function
Year:
2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Average
National household disposable income, 2017 dollar millions:
Unequivalised income 114,846 125,540 132,744 146,718 170,666
Equivalised income 75,752 81,982 83,022 94,601 111,425
QUAIDS model, equivalised income, ε = 0.6:
A0 0.1136 0.1110 0.1170 0.1120 0.1287
A1 0.1137 0.1106 0.1166 0.1123 0.1281
Social welfare change -1.9 33.2 36.1 -36.6 72.4 20.6
QUAIDS model, unequivalised income, ε = 0.6:
A0 0.1354 0.1320 0.1377 0.1302 0.1539
A1 0.1355 0.1317 0.1375 0.1306 0.1533
Social welfare change -7.6 55.1 36.9 -68.6 105.9 24.3
AIDS model, equivalised income, ε = 0.6:
A0 0.1136 0.1110 0.1170 0.1120 0.1287
A1 0.1138 0.1108 0.1167 0.1124 0.1284
Social welfare change -14.9 19.6 27.6 -42.6 38.0 5.5
AIDS model, unequivalised income, ε = 0.6:
A0 0.1354 0.1320 0.1377 0.1302 0.1539
A1 0.1356 0.1318 0.1376 0.1306 0.1536
Social welfare change -27.7 35.1 23.0 -76.8 51.8 1.1




This research finds evidence against the hypothesis that high fixed charges in residential
electricity tariffs would reduce social welfare or increase inequality. Rather, high kWh
prices are found to reduce consumer welfare and exacerbate inequality.
This central finding is empirical evidence for a basic tenet of economics: that ef-
ficient prices should reflect marginal costs. Recovering network costs through high
kWh prices, much higher than marginal costs, is inefficient because it causes people
to economise on electricity use for no good reason. It acts like a tax on electricity
consumption.
Efficiently recovering non-marginal costs is a perennial problem in economics, in
politics and for pricing practitioners. There is no single best way for recovering non-
marginal costs in network industries with significant economies of scale. Empirical
analysis is needed to help identify the better of numerous methods for recovering net-
work owners’ sunk costs.
The main empirical contribution of this research is to analyse the balance of effects
of pricing reforms across different types of households. In this hypothetical pricing
reform high kWh charges are reduced and fixed charges are increased significantly,
such that all network (distribution and transmission) costs recovered from residential
consumers are recovered from fixed charges.
Aggregate efficiency gains from this tariff reform range from 2.2 percent to 5.0
percent of total residential expenditure. These are non-trivial gains in light of the fact
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that residential electricity expenditure exceeds 3 billion dollars annually.
Further, inequality is estimated to reduce with a pricing rule that includes high
fixed charges. This effect is more equivocal than the finding of aggregate efficiency gains
but, on balance, it refutes presumptions that high kWh charges are progressive because
higher income households consume more electricity than lower income households. This
result follows somewhat naturally from the observation household composition - age,
number of adults and number of children - has a larger effect on electricity expenditure
than household income.
Empirical results such as these will invariably raise questions about the methods
of analysis and whether alternative methods would contradict these results. There
are no simple answers to these questions, but this research does provide insights into
the sensitivity of model results to model specification. This is something that is often
overlooked in empirical analysis using demand systems.
First, the QUAIDS model produces substantially larger estimates of price elastic-
ities of demand and welfare effects than the AIDS model. This could be read in two
different ways. One is that AIDS models are not a good approximation to QUIADS
models - that the inclusion of a quadratic income effect is empirically consequential.
The other is that the QUAIDS model is more sensitive to variations in the model data,
apt to be influenced by a small number of observations, and more sensitive to sub-
optimal sample sizes or errors in the data. Either way, it is shown that choice of model
specification is empirically important.
Second, model specification choices, such as restrictions and choice of demographic
variables, have a material effect on the empirical implications and economic interpre-
tations of the QUAIDS model results. A case in point is the long-run uncompensated
own price elasticities for electricity range which range from -1.2 to -2.7 in the models
tested here. This result is important because most studies do not report these sorts of
results and researchers have no guide, a priori, about whether or not their model speci-
fication choices are of much empirical consequence and thus how much effort should be
expended in identifying a sound model specification. And readers of research have no
way to know whether the single model specification presented to them is very sensitive
to these sorts of choices. The results of that sensitivity tests suggest that researchers
should conduct and report more sensitivity analyses and readers should be sceptical of
models that do not report such tests.
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Further research could improve understanding about electricity pricing and demand
modelling by building on the framework and methods used here. Natural extensions or
additions follow from the simplifications in this research. For example, the model used
here contained a simplified treatment of differences in demographics and preferences
amongst households. Application of the price scaling method of Ray (1983), where
equivalence scales for household sizes are endogenous and vary with relative prices,
would be a substantial improvement. The estimated equivalence scales would be fully
consistent with the underlying theoretical model. Importantly it would provide for a
more nuanced understanding of economies of costs of living, household economies of
scale, and costs of children.
Accurate information on costs of living is practically very important. It is of central
importance for research into income inequality and thus influences income support and
social assistance policies. Estimates of costs of living are also used by Department of
Inland Revenue for setting tax rules and calculating child support obligations. In the
private sector, banks use estimates of costs of living to set lending criteria.
As discussed in the introductory chapter, analysis of natural experiments or perhaps
quasi-experimental analysis would be a valuable methodological extension or alterna-
tive to deepen understanding of household electricity demand. Consumer behaviour
can be shown to deviate from theoretically optimal behaviour. While this does not
invalidate consumer-theoretic analysis altogether, less theoretically restrictive analysis
could provide different insights and insights less encumbered by theory. Experimen-
tal or quasi-experimental analysis would thus complement the methods used in this
research.
The electricity sector is replete with natural experiments from changes to pricing
structures and to policies that vary across across will-defined boundaries. Although
connecting data on electricity consumption and prices to household characteristics is
challenging.
Replication of the analysis of Beatty et al. (2014) would be valuable; exploiting
the natural experiment of the introduction of a winter energy payment. This sort of
behavioural and quasi-experimental analysis has not been carried out in New Zealand
before. Understanding how people on low incomes respond to the winter energy pay-
ments would be very valuable such as for calibrating targeted transfer payments, if
necessary, in the event that, for example, steps are taken to repeal the low fixed charge
93
regulations. It is practically very important to find ways to improve the acceptability
of ostensibly efficient policy changes. This may include targeted transfers.
A central premise of this research is that the welfare effects of prices for recovery
of sunk costs has been insufficiently interrogated in New Zealand. Thus this research
considers only high fixed charges and two-part tariffs. These practical simplifications
miss two important elements of electricity pricing: consumer choice over prices and
efficient peak load pricing. A more complete analysis of the efficiency of electricity
pricing would address these things by analysing menus of prices and multi-part tariffs.
Menus of tariffs are more efficient than single pricing rules because they allow peo-
ple to choose the kinds of services and pricing options that suit them. Furthermore,
consumer choice in the context of multiple non-linear prices is of central importance
to policy because it is a major source of political tension. Multi-part tariffs and menus
of tariffs are methods for price discrimination and while price discrimination can be
welfare improving (Wilson, 1993) it is very often a source of concern in terms of dis-
tributional consequences.
It is important that prices signal incremental costs of demand, where these costs
are material, and thus due consideration must be given to including marginal costs
subject to analysis of the impacts of those prices and taking account of imperfections
in consumer behaviour. It is possible that incremental costs will become increasingly
important for electricity pricing. Charging of electric vehicles is a case in point. It is
possible that electric vehicle charging could place substantial and unnecessary stress
on distribution networks. Pricing that incentivises charging of vehicles outside of dis-
tribution network peaks could help to manage this risk.
Thus, in summary, there are many nuances to electricity pricing that are not consid-
ered here. This is but one contribution to improving one aspect of pricing. Nonetheless,
the hope is that these results are of practical use even if only as a challenge to precon-




Table A.1: Product categories
Components:
Expenditure groups: NZHEC code Description
Accommodation 04.1.01 Actual rentals for housing
04.2.01 Purchase of housing
04.3.01 Property maintenance materials
04.3.02 Property maintenance services
04.4.01 Water supply
04.4.02 Refuse disposal and recycling
04.4.03 Local authority rates and payments
04.4.04 Other property related services
Air transport 07.3.03 Domestic air transport
07.3.04 International air transport
Alcohol 02.1.01 Beer
02.1.02 Wine
02.1.03 Spirits and liqueurs
02.2.00 Cigarettes and tobacco
Clothing 03.1.02 Men’s clothing
03.1.03 Women’s clothing
03.1.04 Children’s and infants’ clothing
Continued on next page
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Product groupings, continued from previous page
Expenditure groups: NZHEC code Description
03.1.05 Clothing accessories




03.2.04 Children’s and infants’ footwear
Communication 08.1.00 Postal services
08.2.00 Telecommunication equipment
08.3.00 Telecommunication services
Contents 05.1.01 Furniture and furnishings
05.1.02 Carpets and other floor coverings
05.2.00 Household textiles
05.3.01 Major household appliances
05.3.02 Small electrical household appliances
05.3.03 Repair and hire of household appliances
05.4.00 Glassware, tableware and household utensils
05.5.01 Major tools and equipment for the house
and garden
05.5.02 Small tools and accessories for the house
and garden
05.6.01 Cleaning products and other household
supplies
05.6.02 Other household services
Education 10.1.00 Early childhood education
10.2.00 Primary and secondary education
10.3.00 Tertiary and other post school education
10.4.00 Other educational fees
Electricity 04.5.01 Electricity
Other energy 04.5.02 Gas
Continued on next page
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Product groupings, continued from previous page




01.2.01 Meat and poultry
01.2.02 Fish and other seafood
01.3.01 Bread and cereals
01.3.02 Milk, cheese and eggs
01.3.03 Oils and fats
01.3.04 Food additives and condiments
01.3.05 Confectionery, nuts and snacks
01.3.06 Other grocery food
01.4.01 Coffee, tea and other hot drinks
01.4.02 Soft drinks, waters and juices
Health 06.1.01 Pharmaceutical products
06.1.02 Other medical products










Other 11.1.01 Hairdressing and personal grooming services
11.1.02 Electrical appliances for personal care
11.1.03 Other appliances, articles and products for
personal care
11.3.01 Jewellery and watches
Continued on next page
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Product groupings, continued from previous page
Expenditure groups: NZHEC code Description
11.3.02 Other personal effects
11.6.01 Vocational services
11.6.02 Professional services
11.6.03 Real estate services
11.6.04 Other miscellaneous services not elsewhere
classified
Recreation and culture 09.1.01 Audio-visual equipment
09.1.02 Computing equipment
09.1.03 Recording media
09.2.00 Major recreational and cultural equipment
09.3.01 Games, toys and hobbies
09.3.02 Equipment for sport, camping and outdoor
recreation
09.3.03 Plants, flowers and gardening supplies
09.3.04 Pets and pet-related products




09.5.02 Newspapers and magazines
09.5.04 Stationery and drawing materials
09.6.00 Accommodation services
Takeaways 01.5.01 Restaurant meals
01.5.02 Ready-to-eat food
Transport 07.2.01 Vehicle parts and accessories
07.2.02 Petrol
07.2.03 Other vehicle fuels and lubricants
07.2.04 Vehicle servicing and repairs
07.2.05 Other private transport services
07.3.01 Rail passenger transport
Continued on next page
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Product groupings, continued from previous page
Expenditure groups: NZHEC code Description
07.3.02 Road passenger transport
07.3.05 Sea passenger transport
Vehicles 07.1.01 Purchase of new motor cars
07.1.02 Purchase of second-hand motor cars
07.1.03 Purchase of motorcycles
07.1.04 Purchase of bicycles
NZHEC is NZ Household expenditure classification.
Table A.2: Geographic concordance for QSDEP data
QSDEP area Territorial local authority
Ashburton Ashburton District
Auckland Central Auckland














Hawera South Taranaki District
Invercargill Invercargill City
Kaiapoi Waimakariri District
Kerikeri Far North District
QSDEP concordance, continued on next page
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QSDEP concordance, continued from previous page
QSDEP area Territorial local authority
Masterton Carterton District
Masterton Masterton District




New Plymouth New Plymouth District
New Plymouth Stratford District
Oamaru Waitaki District
Otorohanga Otorohanga District
Palmerston North Manawatu District
Palmerston North Palmerston North City
Paraparaumu Horowhenua District


















QSDEP concordance, continued on next page
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QSDEP concordance, continued from previous page
QSDEP area Territorial local authority
Timaru Timaru District
Timaru Waimate District
Waipukurau Central Hawke’s Bay District
Wellington City Lower Hutt City
Wellington City Porirua City
Wellington City Upper Hutt City













Partial derivatives of QUAIDS
elasticities










































Non-zero partial derivatives of the uncompensated elasticity function, with respect
















































































































































































































Non-zero partial derivatives of the compensated elasticity function, with respect to


































































































































































































































































































































Estimation results and alternative
models
C.1 Seasonal adjustment
Seasonal adjustment factors were estimated by a linear regression model of household
electricity expenditure including included dummy variables for survey months (see
Table C.1). The model was estimated with ordinary least squares and on all survey
years. Survey year and region of residence were also included as dummy variables.
An ANOVA test of model equivalence was used to test the joint importance of the
survey month dummies, rejecting (p < 0.001) the null of equivalence of models with
and without the survey month dummies.
Table C.1: Estimation of monthly seasonal adjustment factors
Dependent: Natural logarithm of electricity expenditure
Variable Coefficient Standard error Significance
Intercept 6.60 0.04 ***
Household size 0.20 0.01 ***
Number of children 0.001 0.02
Income 0.000001 0.00 ***
Household size x number of children -0.02 0.00 ***
Continued on next page
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June 0.11 0.03 ***
July 0.27 0.03 ***
August 0.29 0.03 ***
September 0.26 0.03 ***
October 0.21 0.03 ***
November 0.13 0.03 ***
December 0.06 0.03 *
2010 0.15 0.02 ***
2013 0.24 0.02 ***
2016 0.28 0.02 ***
2019 0.25 0.02 ***
Auckland -0.06 0.04
Waikato -0.04 0.04
Bay of Plenty 0.08 0.04
Gisborne 0.21 0.06 ***
Hawke’s Bay 0.08 0.05
Taranaki -0.13 0.05 *
Manawatu-Whanganui -0.08 0.04
Wellington -0.04 0.04
West Coast 0.21 0.07 **
Canterbury 0.08 0.04 *
Otago 0.10 0.04 *
Southland 0.18 0.05 ***
Tasman 0.04 0.07
Nelson 0.05 0.05
Marlborough 0.20 0.06 **
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
107
C.2 Demand systems coefficients
The tables below present estimated coefficients for the main quadratic almost ideal
demand system (QUAIDS) model and alternative almost ideal demand (AIDS) model.
Table C.2 provides an example of the first stage regression used to correct for
potential endogeneity of total expenditure, from which the model residuals are used as
an explanatory variable in the demand system estimation.
Table C.2: QUAIDS model first stage regression
Dependent: log of household expenditure
Coefficient Estimate Standard error Significance
Intercept 9.773930 0.0422074 ***
Log disposable income 40.870433 0.6328159 ***
Square of log of disposable income 13.720517 0.4814514 ***
Equivalence scale 0.557705 0.0176261 ***
Reference person age 0.013254 0.0013389 ***
Square of reference person age -0.000138 0.0000130 ***
Log of 1 + share of income from benefits -0.477385 0.0207413 ***
Data is from HES surveys 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
Income terms are orthogonal polynomial terms, implemented with R function poly
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001
Tables C.3 and C.4 present the coefficients of the QUAIDS and AIDS models in full
for the versions with both homogeneity and symmetry restrictions. The size of these
tables is regrettably unwieldy given the several hundred parameters in each model. As
a result each of the tables of coefficients stretch for around a dozen pages. For this
reason the coefficients for other models are not presented here though they available
in an accompanying data appendix.
Each table lists the type of coefficient that has been estimated. The αi, βi, and
λi coefficients vary only by a single product variable i. The γij and δis (demographic)
coefficients vary by expenditure share product variable i and counterpart product price
variable j and demographic variable s.
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In the tables of coefficients products have been summarised with a shortened prod-
uct code. The codes are: accom = Accommodation; air = Air transport; alc = Alcohol
and tobacco; cloth = Clothing; comm = Communications; cont = Household con-
tents; take = Takeaways and eating out; educ = Education; elec = Electricity; food =
Groceries; hlth = Health; insur = Insurance; othr = Miscellaneous;mort = Mortgage
interest; nrg = Energy excluding electricity; rec = Recreation; trans = Transport.
Table C.3: Coefficients of QUAIDS model
Dependent: Expenditure share by product
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
αi comm 0.123924 0.0074671 ***
αi cont -0.056785 0.0110883 ***
αi elec 0.249064 0.0075418 ***
αi food 0.033184 0.0176932
αi hlth -0.050793 0.0098421 ***
αi accom 1.034077 0.0335199 ***
αi insur -0.046849 0.0099698 ***
αi othr -0.094676 0.0138595 ***
αi rec -0.116523 0.0159993 ***
αi take -0.028687 0.0096994 **
αi trans -0.097158 0.0132689 ***
αi air -0.009889 0.0102144
αi nrg 0.010432 0.0043000 *
αi alc -0.047179 0.0102929 ***
αi educ 0.049082 0.0080056 ***
αi cloth -0.036823 0.0101083 ***
αi mort 0.085601 0.0211540 ***
βi comm -0.030805 0.0035820 ***
βi cont 0.035862 0.0053048 ***
βi elec -0.101184 0.0036414 ***
βi food 0.002105 0.0084109
βi hlth 0.032962 0.0046888 ***
βi accom -0.241588 0.0159085 ***
βi insur 0.029720 0.0047818 ***
Continued on next page
109
Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
βi othr 0.076462 0.0066138 ***
βi rec 0.074090 0.0075982 ***
βi take 0.044432 0.0046175 ***
βi trans 0.064051 0.0063313 ***
βi air 0.009418 0.0048828
βi nrg -0.006885 0.0021435 **
βi alc 0.035019 0.0049166 ***
βi educ -0.019430 0.0038347 ***
βi cloth 0.021202 0.0048273 ***
βi mort -0.025428 0.0101950 *
λi comm 0.001565 0.0004138 ***
λi cont -0.002881 0.0006164 ***
λi elec 0.008839 0.0004190 ***
λi food -0.007775 0.0009804 ***
λi hlth -0.002983 0.0005453 ***
λi accom 0.023538 0.0018596 ***
λi insur -0.002745 0.0005556 ***
λi othr -0.005745 0.0007696 ***
λi rec -0.004494 0.0008863 ***
λi take -0.003408 0.0005372 ***
λi trans -0.010235 0.0007367 ***
λi air 0.001449 0.0005663 *
λi nrg 0.000744 0.0002393 **
λi alc -0.003921 0.0005712 ***
λi educ 0.002407 0.0004434 ***
λi cloth -0.000788 0.0005599
λi mort 0.006436 0.0011778 ***
γij comm comm 0.002747 0.0082127
γij comm cont 0.006663 0.0083074
γij comm elec 0.034291 0.0058805 ***
γij comm food 0.001436 0.0045461
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij comm hlth -0.026820 0.0119118 *
γij comm accom -0.021032 0.0197747
γij comm insur -0.009105 0.0102270
γij comm othr -0.005256 0.0078412
γij comm rec 0.027610 0.0160657
γij comm take -0.035136 0.0120904 **
γij comm trans 0.017613 0.0060748 **
γij comm air -0.024504 0.0064678 ***
γij comm nrg 0.007106 0.0066961
γij comm alc 0.020151 0.0101360 *
γij comm educ -0.001676 0.0093714
γij comm cloth 0.019530 0.0104414
γij comm mort -0.013618 0.0088660
γij cont comm 0.006663 0.0083074
γij cont cont -0.057289 0.0167229 ***
γij cont elec -0.042494 0.0082667 ***
γij cont food 0.009353 0.0054670
γij cont hlth -0.034657 0.0153879 *
γij cont accom 0.038434 0.0294880
γij cont insur 0.026964 0.0137180 *
γij cont othr -0.023585 0.0106172 *
γij cont rec -0.028216 0.0193955
γij cont take 0.052015 0.0171244 **
γij cont trans 0.008651 0.0080783
γij cont air 0.029618 0.0091274 **
γij cont nrg -0.014119 0.0090226
γij cont alc -0.029035 0.0129534 *
γij cont educ 0.016118 0.0120397
γij cont cloth 0.008870 0.0145246
γij cont mort 0.032708 0.0115318 **
γij elec comm 0.034291 0.0058805 ***
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij elec cont -0.042494 0.0082667 ***
γij elec elec -0.010083 0.0075284
γij elec food 0.007994 0.0046335
γij elec hlth 0.029270 0.0094516 **
γij elec accom -0.017442 0.0236890
γij elec insur -0.005430 0.0092864
γij elec othr -0.000783 0.0084001
γij elec rec -0.029207 0.0139026 *
γij elec take 0.043799 0.0099587 ***
γij elec trans 0.003082 0.0059881
γij elec air -0.000853 0.0065138
γij elec nrg 0.000699 0.0048471
γij elec alc -0.009142 0.0081650
γij elec educ 0.036834 0.0071803 ***
γij elec cloth -0.000009 0.0087902
γij elec mort -0.040525 0.0082489 ***
γij food comm 0.001436 0.0045461
γij food cont 0.009353 0.0054670
γij food elec 0.007994 0.0046335
γij food food 0.003794 0.0081302
γij food hlth -0.011349 0.0050522 *
γij food accom -0.022236 0.0153088
γij food insur 0.001333 0.0054479
γij food othr -0.003997 0.0064938
γij food rec 0.009761 0.0079531
γij food take 0.002625 0.0051714
γij food trans -0.003679 0.0055790
γij food air -0.007176 0.0050440
γij food nrg 0.000432 0.0033971
γij food alc 0.015608 0.0050789 **
γij food educ -0.002361 0.0043601
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij food cloth 0.002547 0.0051687
γij food mort -0.004084 0.0092812
γij hlth comm -0.026820 0.0119118 *
γij hlth cont -0.034657 0.0153879 *
γij hlth elec 0.029270 0.0094516 **
γij hlth food -0.011349 0.0050522 *
γij hlth hlth -0.073234 0.0333069 *
γij hlth accom -0.023742 0.0323277
γij hlth insur -0.042837 0.0187170 *
γij hlth othr 0.029883 0.0109770 **
γij hlth rec 0.073089 0.0297022 *
γij hlth take -0.027625 0.0271919
γij hlth trans 0.012445 0.0093674
γij hlth air -0.019955 0.0110201
γij hlth nrg -0.002744 0.0116212
γij hlth alc 0.063857 0.0179659 ***
γij hlth educ -0.033004 0.0189469
γij hlth cloth 0.084287 0.0213368 ***
γij hlth mort 0.003136 0.0122265
γij accom comm -0.021032 0.0197747
γij accom cont 0.038434 0.0294880
γij accom elec -0.017442 0.0236890
γij accom food -0.022236 0.0153088
γij accom hlth -0.023742 0.0323277
γij accom accom 0.107462 0.0558840
γij accom insur 0.003693 0.0302846
γij accom othr 0.023958 0.0261640
γij accom rec 0.010239 0.0345496
γij accom take -0.047936 0.0349334
γij accom trans -0.044972 0.0208450 *
γij accom air 0.040234 0.0238503
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij accom nrg 0.046161 0.0267487
γij accom alc 0.048852 0.0295500
γij accom educ -0.054655 0.0280603
γij accom cloth -0.041899 0.0317106
γij accom mort -0.045119 0.0329418
γij insur comm -0.009105 0.0102270
γij insur cont 0.026964 0.0137180 *
γij insur elec -0.005430 0.0092864
γij insur food 0.001333 0.0054479
γij insur hlth -0.042837 0.0187170 *
γij insur accom 0.003693 0.0302846
γij insur insur 0.017390 0.0222449
γij insur othr -0.026842 0.0111619 *
γij insur rec -0.009739 0.0224744
γij insur take 0.007370 0.0199688
γij insur trans -0.001766 0.0088811
γij insur air -0.003373 0.0101262
γij insur nrg -0.004810 0.0109274
γij insur alc 0.000654 0.0164806
γij insur educ 0.028040 0.0159884
γij insur cloth 0.007526 0.0167912
γij insur mort 0.010933 0.0129980
γij othr comm -0.005256 0.0078412
γij othr cont -0.023585 0.0106172 *
γij othr elec -0.000783 0.0084001
γij othr food -0.003997 0.0064938
γij othr hlth 0.029883 0.0109770 **
γij othr accom 0.023958 0.0261640
γij othr insur -0.026842 0.0111619 *
γij othr othr 0.036117 0.0154230 *
γij othr rec 0.015413 0.0156922
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij othr take 0.003774 0.0115663
γij othr trans -0.024668 0.0083277 **
γij othr air -0.024836 0.0088175 **
γij othr nrg 0.004480 0.0079846
γij othr alc -0.010230 0.0101191
γij othr educ -0.011020 0.0090475
γij othr cloth 0.013600 0.0109341
γij othr mort 0.003994 0.0129869
γij rec comm 0.027610 0.0160657
γij rec cont -0.028216 0.0193955
γij rec elec -0.029207 0.0139026 *
γij rec food 0.009761 0.0079531
γij rec hlth 0.073089 0.0297022 *
γij rec accom 0.010239 0.0345496
γij rec insur -0.009739 0.0224744
γij rec othr 0.015413 0.0156922
γij rec rec 0.001909 0.0447019
γij rec take 0.080395 0.0330807 *
γij rec trans 0.014535 0.0131146
γij rec air 0.058371 0.0150279 ***
γij rec nrg -0.003906 0.0169572
γij rec alc -0.085904 0.0236679 ***
γij rec educ -0.032084 0.0246395
γij rec cloth -0.089262 0.0239002 ***
γij rec mort -0.013002 0.0184709
γij take comm -0.035136 0.0120904 **
γij take cont 0.052015 0.0171244 **
γij take elec 0.043799 0.0099587 ***
γij take food 0.002625 0.0051714
γij take hlth -0.027625 0.0271919
γij take accom -0.047936 0.0349334
Continued on next page
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Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij take insur 0.007370 0.0199688
γij take othr 0.003774 0.0115663
γij take rec 0.080395 0.0330807 *
γij take take -0.004167 0.0418888
γij take trans 0.004537 0.0096748
γij take air -0.031881 0.0119692 **
γij take nrg -0.002618 0.0132802
γij take alc -0.016165 0.0213665
γij take educ -0.020309 0.0208079
γij take cloth -0.018152 0.0210336
γij take mort 0.009475 0.0125671
γij trans comm 0.017613 0.0060748 **
γij trans cont 0.008651 0.0080783
γij trans elec 0.003082 0.0059881
γij trans food -0.003679 0.0055790
γij trans hlth 0.012445 0.0093674
γij trans accom -0.044972 0.0208450 *
γij trans insur -0.001766 0.0088811
γij trans othr -0.024668 0.0083277 **
γij trans rec 0.014535 0.0131146
γij trans take 0.004537 0.0096748
γij trans trans 0.072567 0.0091086 ***
γij trans air -0.003132 0.0069383
γij trans nrg -0.000979 0.0055330
γij trans alc -0.027050 0.0080627 ***
γij trans educ 0.008988 0.0071876
γij trans cloth -0.022074 0.0084771 **
γij trans mort -0.014097 0.0103495
γij air comm -0.024504 0.0064678 ***
γij air cont 0.029618 0.0091274 **
γij air elec -0.000853 0.0065138
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij air food -0.007176 0.0050440
γij air hlth -0.019955 0.0110201
γij air accom 0.040234 0.0238503
γij air insur -0.003373 0.0101262
γij air othr -0.024836 0.0088175 **
γij air rec 0.058371 0.0150279 ***
γij air take -0.031881 0.0119692 **
γij air trans -0.003132 0.0069383
γij air air 0.002104 0.0102292
γij air nrg -0.001584 0.0065774
γij air alc 0.034563 0.0096077 ***
γij air educ -0.036786 0.0092848 ***
γij air cloth -0.024293 0.0104592 *
γij air mort 0.013484 0.0093518
γij nrg comm 0.007106 0.0066961
γij nrg cont -0.014119 0.0090226
γij nrg elec 0.000699 0.0048471
γij nrg food 0.000432 0.0033971
γij nrg hlth -0.002744 0.0116212
γij nrg accom 0.046161 0.0267487
γij nrg insur -0.004810 0.0109274
γij nrg othr 0.004480 0.0079846
γij nrg rec -0.003906 0.0169572
γij nrg take -0.002618 0.0132802
γij nrg trans -0.000979 0.0055330
γij nrg air -0.001584 0.0065774
γij nrg nrg 0.006360 0.0070113
γij nrg alc -0.039523 0.0095277 ***
γij nrg educ 0.014606 0.0087138
γij nrg cloth 0.002910 0.0104588
γij nrg mort -0.012472 0.0069418
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γij alc comm 0.020151 0.0101360 *
γij alc cont -0.029035 0.0129534 *
γij alc elec -0.009142 0.0081650
γij alc food 0.015608 0.0050789 **
γij alc hlth 0.063857 0.0179659 ***
γij alc accom 0.048852 0.0295500
γij alc insur 0.000654 0.0164806
γij alc othr -0.010230 0.0101191
γij alc rec -0.085904 0.0236679 ***
γij alc take -0.016165 0.0213665
γij alc trans -0.027050 0.0080627 ***
γij alc air 0.034563 0.0096077 ***
γij alc nrg -0.039523 0.0095277 ***
γij alc alc 0.035514 0.0204260
γij alc educ -0.028684 0.0144334 *
γij alc cloth 0.007556 0.0155659
γij alc mort 0.018980 0.0113418
γij educ comm -0.001676 0.0093714
γij educ cont 0.016118 0.0120397
γij educ elec 0.036834 0.0071803 ***
γij educ food -0.002361 0.0043601
γij educ hlth -0.033004 0.0189469
γij educ accom -0.054655 0.0280603
γij educ insur 0.028040 0.0159884
γij educ othr -0.011020 0.0090475
γij educ rec -0.032084 0.0246395
γij educ take -0.020309 0.0208079
γij educ trans 0.008988 0.0071876
γij educ air -0.036786 0.0092848 ***
γij educ nrg 0.014606 0.0087138
γij educ alc -0.028684 0.0144334 *
Continued on next page
118
Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij educ educ 0.065318 0.0200554 **
γij educ cloth 0.035531 0.0153801 *
γij educ mort 0.015145 0.0092847
γij cloth comm 0.019530 0.0104414
γij cloth cont 0.008870 0.0145246
γij cloth elec -0.000009 0.0087902
γij cloth food 0.002547 0.0051687
γij cloth hlth 0.084287 0.0213368 ***
γij cloth accom -0.041899 0.0317106
γij cloth insur 0.007526 0.0167912
γij cloth othr 0.013600 0.0109341
γij cloth rec -0.089262 0.0239002 ***
γij cloth take -0.018152 0.0210336
γij cloth trans -0.022074 0.0084771 **
γij cloth air -0.024293 0.0104592 *
γij cloth nrg 0.002910 0.0104588
γij cloth alc 0.007556 0.0155659
γij cloth educ 0.035531 0.0153801 *
γij cloth cloth -0.004523 0.0234485
γij cloth mort 0.017854 0.0118379
γij mort comm -0.013618 0.0088660
γij mort cont 0.032708 0.0115318 **
γij mort elec -0.040525 0.0082489 ***
γij mort food -0.004084 0.0092812
γij mort hlth 0.003136 0.0122265
γij mort accom -0.045119 0.0329418
γij mort insur 0.010933 0.0129980
γij mort othr 0.003994 0.0129869
γij mort rec -0.013002 0.0184709
γij mort take 0.009475 0.0125671
γij mort trans -0.014097 0.0103495
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γij mort air 0.013484 0.0093518
γij mort nrg -0.012472 0.0069418
γij mort alc 0.018980 0.0113418
γij mort educ 0.015145 0.0092847
γij mort cloth 0.017854 0.0118379
γij mort mort 0.017208 0.0184944
δis comm size 0.006121 0.0016174 ***
δis comm age -0.000081 0.0000956
δis comm age sq 0.000002 0.0000009 *
δis comm benefit -0.008505 0.0018717 ***
δis comm resid 0.000171 0.0012694
δis cont size -0.010967 0.0024844 ***
δis cont age -0.000046 0.0001476
δis cont age sq 0.000005 0.0000014 ***
δis cont benefit 0.002191 0.0028582
δis cont resid -0.000445 0.0019306
δis elec size 0.026367 0.0016464 ***
δis elec age 0.000315 0.0000969 **
δis elec age sq -0.000001 0.0000009
δis elec benefit 0.006351 0.0018996 ***
δis elec resid -0.001164 0.0012915
δis food size 0.128338 0.0039422 ***
δis food age 0.000978 0.0002352 ***
δis food age sq -0.000001 0.0000023
δis food benefit 0.005302 0.0045566
δis food resid 0.015042 0.0030649 ***
δis hlth size -0.009891 0.0022161 ***
δis hlth age -0.000312 0.0001317 *
δis hlth age sq 0.000009 0.0000013 ***
δis hlth benefit 0.011282 0.0025471 ***
δis hlth resid -0.000360 0.0017199
Continued on next page
120
Coefficients of QUAIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
δis accom size -0.057117 0.0076316 ***
δis accom age -0.002035 0.0004563 ***
δis accom age sq -0.000019 0.0000044 ***
δis accom benefit 0.089030 0.0087693 ***
δis accom resid 0.055003 0.0059020 ***
δis insur size -0.014605 0.0022374 ***
δis insur age 0.001023 0.0001329 ***
δis insur age sq 0.000001 0.0000013
δis insur benefit -0.019033 0.0025746 ***
δis insur resid -0.019023 0.0017382 ***
δis othr size -0.030439 0.0031126 ***
δis othr age 0.000159 0.0001853
δis othr age sq -0.000001 0.0000018
δis othr benefit -0.014199 0.0035850 ***
δis othr resid -0.026949 0.0024173 ***
δis rec size -0.033232 0.0036197 ***
δis rec age -0.000411 0.0002158
δis rec age sq 0.000014 0.0000021 ***
δis rec benefit -0.003811 0.0041615
δis rec resid -0.013597 0.0028050 ***
δis take size -0.007510 0.0021758 ***
δis take age -0.001427 0.0001294 ***
δis take age sq 0.000014 0.0000013 ***
δis take benefit -0.010661 0.0025033 ***
δis take resid -0.014530 0.0016889 ***
δis trans size 0.031183 0.0029712 ***
δis trans age 0.001084 0.0001770 ***
δis trans age sq -0.000008 0.0000017 ***
δis trans benefit -0.019802 0.0034259 ***
δis trans resid 0.003345 0.0023089
δis air size -0.019379 0.0022623 ***
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δis air age -0.000028 0.0001342
δis air age sq 0.000002 0.0000013
δis air benefit -0.000655 0.0026087
δis air resid -0.004142 0.0017632 *
δis nrg size 0.003966 0.0008669 ***
δis nrg age 0.000236 0.0000487 ***
δis nrg age sq -0.000002 0.0000005 ***
δis nrg benefit 0.003065 0.0010004 **
δis nrg resid -0.002149 0.0007004 **
δis alc size -0.014455 0.0023094 ***
δis alc age 0.000717 0.0001372 ***
δis alc age sq -0.000007 0.0000013 ***
δis alc benefit 0.004700 0.0026582
δis alc resid -0.009415 0.0017948 ***
δis educ size 0.020812 0.0017668 ***
δis educ age -0.000741 0.0001044 ***
δis educ age sq 0.000004 0.0000010 ***
δis educ benefit -0.005398 0.0020358 **
δis educ resid 0.006304 0.0013798 ***
δis cloth size 0.000197 0.0022564
δis cloth age -0.000469 0.0001338 ***
δis cloth age sq 0.000006 0.0000013 ***
δis cloth benefit 0.000847 0.0025948
δis cloth resid -0.001253 0.0017548
δis mort size -0.019387 0.0045855 ***
δis mort age 0.001038 0.0002712 ***
δis mort age sq -0.000018 0.0000026 ***
δis mort benefit -0.040704 0.0053252 ***
δis mort resid 0.013164 0.0035995 ***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
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Table C.4: Coefficients of AIDS model
Dependent: Expenditure share by product
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
αi comm 0.099597 0.004028 ***
αi cont -0.015929 0.006257 *
αi elec 0.128629 0.003914 ***
αi food 0.153133 0.009776 ***
αi hlth -0.006218 0.005661
αi accom 0.673984 0.019169 ***
αi insur -0.005516 0.005690
αi othr -0.008173 0.007844
αi rec -0.054742 0.009210 ***
αi take 0.018406 0.005528 ***
αi trans 0.052384 0.007521 ***
αi air -0.028785 0.005633 ***
αi nrg -0.001182 0.001765
αi alc 0.010298 0.005849
αi educ 0.010830 0.004416 *
αi cloth -0.024996 0.005755 ***
αi mort -0.001722 0.011480
βi comm -0.018547 0.001133 ***
βi cont 0.013632 0.001757 ***
βi elec -0.031664 0.001106 ***
βi food -0.061822 0.002769 ***
βi hlth 0.008741 0.001581 ***
βi accom -0.047713 0.005390 ***
βi insur 0.007593 0.001581 ***
βi othr 0.030093 0.002210 ***
βi rec 0.038886 0.002578 ***
βi take 0.017312 0.001537 ***
βi trans -0.017524 0.002126 ***
βi air 0.019621 0.001588 ***
βi nrg -0.000661 0.000497
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βi alc 0.003870 0.001643 *
βi educ -0.000634 0.001237
βi cloth 0.014981 0.001612 ***
βi mort 0.023836 0.003256 ***
γij comm comm -0.000320 0.008392
γij comm cont 0.009251 0.008496
γij comm elec 0.028512 0.005877 ***
γij comm food 0.003298 0.004592
γij comm hlth -0.025947 0.012284 *
γij comm accom -0.035058 0.019613
γij comm insur -0.007476 0.010476
γij comm othr 0.001635 0.008060
γij comm rec 0.033066 0.016560 *
γij comm take -0.035398 0.012409 **
γij comm trans 0.017449 0.006172 **
γij comm air -0.025679 0.006624 ***
γij comm nrg 0.014103 0.006779 *
γij comm alc 0.018311 0.010504
γij comm educ -0.002985 0.009631
γij comm cloth 0.019868 0.010679
γij comm mort -0.012630 0.009039
γij cont comm 0.009251 0.008496
γij cont cont -0.058771 0.017117 ***
γij cont elec -0.034853 0.008353 ***
γij cont food 0.014679 0.005581 **
γij cont hlth -0.033967 0.015776 *
γij cont accom 0.039362 0.029281
γij cont insur 0.026533 0.014019
γij cont othr -0.030099 0.010977 **
γij cont rec -0.031719 0.019844
γij cont take 0.051446 0.017412 **
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γij cont trans 0.006663 0.008259
γij cont air 0.023588 0.009350 *
γij cont nrg -0.008799 0.009109
γij cont alc -0.038113 0.013302 **
γij cont educ 0.024311 0.012283 *
γij cont cloth 0.008385 0.014830
γij cont mort 0.032104 0.011731 **
γij elec comm 0.028512 0.005877 ***
γij elec cont -0.034853 0.008353 ***
γij elec elec -0.016165 0.007292 *
γij elec food 0.003910 0.004406
γij elec hlth 0.021898 0.009628 *
γij elec accom -0.021386 0.023309
γij elec insur -0.000866 0.009373
γij elec othr 0.009218 0.008519
γij elec rec -0.018943 0.014114
γij elec take 0.045470 0.009997 ***
γij elec trans -0.002562 0.005972
γij elec air 0.005792 0.006536
γij elec nrg -0.000026 0.004585
γij elec alc -0.010012 0.008297
γij elec educ 0.038049 0.007226 ***
γij elec cloth -0.007259 0.008920
γij elec mort -0.040776 0.008017 ***
γij food comm 0.003298 0.004592
γij food cont 0.014679 0.005581 **
γij food elec 0.003910 0.004406
γij food food 0.001843 0.008264
γij food hlth -0.010214 0.005170 *
γij food accom -0.033617 0.014483 *
γij food insur -0.000949 0.005549
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γij food othr -0.001386 0.006537
γij food rec 0.011040 0.008037
γij food take 0.001901 0.005205
γij food trans -0.003804 0.005649
γij food air -0.004086 0.005155
γij food nrg 0.002427 0.003365
γij food alc 0.017892 0.005193 ***
γij food educ -0.003325 0.004440
γij food cloth 0.002132 0.005320
γij food mort -0.001740 0.009476
γij hlth comm -0.025947 0.012284 *
γij hlth cont -0.033967 0.015776 *
γij hlth elec 0.021898 0.009628 *
γij hlth food -0.010214 0.005170 *
γij hlth hlth -0.071241 0.034340 *
γij hlth accom -0.024256 0.032432
γij hlth insur -0.045844 0.019162 *
γij hlth othr 0.028383 0.011426 *
γij hlth rec 0.069118 0.030679 *
γij hlth take -0.022764 0.027876
γij hlth trans 0.014280 0.009587
γij hlth air -0.026500 0.011328 *
γij hlth nrg 0.001647 0.011826
γij hlth alc 0.058993 0.018718 **
γij hlth educ -0.024258 0.019468
γij hlth cloth 0.089274 0.021788 ***
γij hlth mort 0.001400 0.012469
γij accom comm -0.035058 0.019613
γij accom cont 0.039362 0.029281
γij accom elec -0.021386 0.023309
γij accom food -0.033617 0.014483 *
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γij accom hlth -0.024256 0.032432
γij accom accom 0.074639 0.054133
γij accom insur 0.006060 0.030346
γij accom othr 0.041916 0.026030
γij accom rec 0.030445 0.034546
γij accom take -0.044198 0.035036
γij accom trans -0.054926 0.020356 **
γij accom air 0.044377 0.023657
γij accom nrg 0.054486 0.026520 *
γij accom alc 0.048067 0.029572
γij accom educ -0.052957 0.028012
γij accom cloth -0.036237 0.031627
γij accom mort -0.036719 0.031768
γij insur comm -0.007476 0.010476
γij insur cont 0.026533 0.014019
γij insur elec -0.000866 0.009373
γij insur food -0.000949 0.005549
γij insur hlth -0.045844 0.019162 *
γij insur accom 0.006060 0.030346
γij insur insur 0.014912 0.022751
γij insur othr -0.027171 0.011552 *
γij insur rec -0.004697 0.023054
γij insur take 0.008312 0.020337
γij insur trans -0.002491 0.009045
γij insur air -0.005986 0.010373
γij insur nrg -0.004391 0.011056
γij insur alc 0.003713 0.017024
γij insur educ 0.027203 0.016308
γij insur cloth 0.006692 0.017094
γij insur mort 0.006447 0.013236
γij othr comm 0.001635 0.008060
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γij othr cont -0.030099 0.010977 **
γij othr elec 0.009218 0.008519
γij othr food -0.001386 0.006537
γij othr hlth 0.028383 0.011426 *
γij othr accom 0.041916 0.026030
γij othr insur -0.027171 0.011552 *
γij othr othr 0.022294 0.015906
γij othr rec 0.006537 0.016216
γij othr take -0.002908 0.011935
γij othr trans -0.019718 0.008513 *
γij othr air -0.025995 0.009073 **
γij othr nrg 0.006150 0.008152
γij othr alc -0.008246 0.010515
γij othr educ -0.009970 0.009344
γij othr cloth 0.006767 0.011362
γij othr mort 0.002592 0.013150
γij rec comm 0.033066 0.016560 *
γij rec cont -0.031719 0.019844
γij rec elec -0.018943 0.014114
γij rec food 0.011040 0.008037
γij rec hlth 0.069118 0.030679 *
γij rec accom 0.030445 0.034546
γij rec insur -0.004697 0.023054
γij rec othr 0.006537 0.016216
γij rec rec -0.010235 0.046150
γij rec take 0.078093 0.034077 *
γij rec trans 0.014648 0.013353
γij rec air 0.059711 0.015409 ***
γij rec nrg -0.019179 0.017261
γij rec alc -0.084661 0.024580 ***
γij rec educ -0.027962 0.025388
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γij rec cloth -0.089119 0.024481 ***
γij rec mort -0.016143 0.018631
γij take comm -0.035398 0.012409 **
γij take cont 0.051446 0.017412 **
γij take elec 0.045470 0.009997 ***
γij take food 0.001901 0.005205
γij take hlth -0.022764 0.027876
γij take accom -0.044198 0.035036
γij take insur 0.008312 0.020337
γij take othr -0.002908 0.011935
γij take rec 0.078093 0.034077 *
γij take take 0.027380 0.042735
γij take trans 0.007741 0.009808
γij take air -0.034300 0.012209 **
γij take nrg -0.026295 0.013344 *
γij take alc -0.023581 0.022157
γij take educ -0.023880 0.021274
γij take cloth -0.019269 0.021391
γij take mort 0.012250 0.012659
γij trans comm 0.017449 0.006172 **
γij trans cont 0.006663 0.008259
γij trans elec -0.002562 0.005972
γij trans food -0.003804 0.005649
γij trans hlth 0.014280 0.009587
γij trans accom -0.054926 0.020356 **
γij trans insur -0.002491 0.009045
γij trans othr -0.019718 0.008513 *
γij trans rec 0.014648 0.013353
γij trans take 0.007741 0.009808
γij trans trans 0.073555 0.009248 ***
γij trans air -0.002142 0.007083
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γij trans nrg 0.006498 0.005552
γij trans alc -0.029013 0.008272 ***
γij trans educ 0.009631 0.007317
γij trans cloth -0.022500 0.008686 **
γij trans mort -0.013308 0.010454
γij air comm -0.025679 0.006624 ***
γij air cont 0.023588 0.009350 *
γij air elec 0.005792 0.006536
γij air food -0.004086 0.005155
γij air hlth -0.026500 0.011328 *
γij air accom 0.044377 0.023657
γij air insur -0.005986 0.010373
γij air othr -0.025995 0.009073 **
γij air rec 0.059711 0.015409 ***
γij air take -0.034300 0.012209 **
γij air trans -0.002142 0.007083
γij air air -0.000432 0.010471
γij air nrg -0.001700 0.006600
γij air alc 0.036457 0.009919 ***
γij air educ -0.035135 0.009506 ***
γij air cloth -0.024327 0.010724 *
γij air mort 0.016356 0.009538
γij nrg comm 0.014103 0.006779 *
γij nrg cont -0.008799 0.009109
γij nrg elec -0.000026 0.004585
γij nrg food 0.002427 0.003365
γij nrg hlth 0.001647 0.011826
γij nrg accom 0.054486 0.026520 *
γij nrg insur -0.004391 0.011056
γij nrg othr 0.006150 0.008152
γij nrg rec -0.019179 0.017261
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γij nrg take -0.026295 0.013344 *
γij nrg trans 0.006498 0.005552
γij nrg air -0.001700 0.006600
γij nrg nrg 0.003872 0.006564
γij nrg alc -0.030962 0.009727 **
γij nrg educ 0.008643 0.008759
γij nrg cloth 0.008453 0.010586
γij nrg mort -0.014927 0.006895 *
γij alc comm 0.018311 0.010504
γij alc cont -0.038113 0.013302 **
γij alc elec -0.010012 0.008297
γij alc food 0.017892 0.005193 ***
γij alc hlth 0.058993 0.018718 **
γij alc accom 0.048067 0.029572
γij alc insur 0.003713 0.017024
γij alc othr -0.008246 0.010515
γij alc rec -0.084661 0.024580 ***
γij alc take -0.023581 0.022157
γij alc trans -0.029013 0.008272 ***
γij alc air 0.036457 0.009919 ***
γij alc nrg -0.030962 0.009727 **
γij alc alc 0.036009 0.021378
γij alc educ -0.028044 0.014962
γij alc cloth 0.011727 0.016050
γij alc mort 0.021461 0.011590
γij educ comm -0.002985 0.009631
γij educ cont 0.024311 0.012283 *
γij educ elec 0.038049 0.007226 ***
γij educ food -0.003325 0.004440
γij educ hlth -0.024258 0.019468
γij educ accom -0.052957 0.028012
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γij educ insur 0.027203 0.016308
γij educ othr -0.009970 0.009344
γij educ rec -0.027962 0.025388
γij educ take -0.023880 0.021274
γij educ trans 0.009631 0.007317
γij educ air -0.035135 0.009506 ***
γij educ nrg 0.008643 0.008759
γij educ alc -0.028044 0.014962
γij educ educ 0.056772 0.020548 **
γij educ cloth 0.029909 0.015689
γij educ mort 0.013996 0.009440
γij cloth comm 0.019868 0.010679
γij cloth cont 0.008385 0.014830
γij cloth elec -0.007259 0.008920
γij cloth food 0.002132 0.005320
γij cloth hlth 0.089274 0.021788 ***
γij cloth accom -0.036237 0.031627
γij cloth insur 0.006692 0.017094
γij cloth othr 0.006767 0.011362
γij cloth rec -0.089119 0.024481 ***
γij cloth take -0.019269 0.021391
γij cloth trans -0.022500 0.008686 **
γij cloth air -0.024327 0.010724 *
γij cloth nrg 0.008453 0.010586
γij cloth alc 0.011727 0.016050
γij cloth educ 0.029909 0.015689
γij cloth cloth -0.000711 0.023873
γij cloth mort 0.016217 0.012117
γij mort comm -0.012630 0.009039
γij mort cont 0.032104 0.011731 **
γij mort elec -0.040776 0.008017 ***
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of AIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
γij mort food -0.001740 0.009476
γij mort hlth 0.001400 0.012469
γij mort accom -0.036719 0.031768
γij mort insur 0.006447 0.013236
γij mort othr 0.002592 0.013150
γij mort rec -0.016143 0.018631
γij mort take 0.012250 0.012659
γij mort trans -0.013308 0.010454
γij mort air 0.016356 0.009538
γij mort nrg -0.014927 0.006895 *
γij mort alc 0.021461 0.011590
γij mort educ 0.013996 0.009440
γij mort cloth 0.016217 0.012117
γij mort mort 0.013419 0.018724
δis comm comm 0.006065 0.001639 ***
δis comm cont -0.000050 0.000098
δis comm elec 0.000002 0.000001 *
δis comm food -0.007429 0.001860 ***
δis comm hlth -0.001195 0.001269
δis cont accom -0.010490 0.002552 ***
δis cont insur -0.000029 0.000153
δis cont othr 0.000005 0.000001 **
δis cont rec 0.000515 0.002894
δis cont take 0.001542 0.001972
δis elec trans 0.022535 0.001598 ***
δis elec air 0.000193 0.000095 *
δis elec nrg -0.000001 0.000001
δis elec alc 0.017048 0.001812 ***
δis elec educ -0.010520 0.001237 ***
δis food cloth 0.134743 0.004035 ***
δis food mort 0.000955 0.000242 ***
Continued on next page
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Coefficients of AIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
δis food comm -0.000001 0.000002
δis food cont -0.004415 0.004580
δis food elec 0.022637 0.003117 ***
δis hlth food -0.007714 0.002294 ***
δis hlth hlth -0.000264 0.000137
δis hlth accom 0.000009 0.000001 ***
δis hlth insur 0.008471 0.002601 **
δis hlth othr 0.002350 0.001773
δis accom rec -0.078007 0.007846 ***
δis accom take -0.002148 0.000470 ***
δis accom trans -0.000017 0.000005 ***
δis accom air 0.113497 0.008902 ***
δis accom nrg 0.034652 0.006061 ***
δis insur alc -0.012259 0.002294 ***
δis insur educ 0.001003 0.000137 ***
δis insur cloth 0.000001 0.000001
δis insur mort -0.021646 0.002601 ***
δis insur comm -0.018023 0.001772 ***
δis othr cont -0.028064 0.003214 ***
δis othr elec 0.000239 0.000193
δis othr food -0.000002 0.000002
δis othr hlth -0.019870 0.003648 ***
δis othr accom -0.022888 0.002484 ***
δis rec insur -0.030620 0.003747 ***
δis rec othr -0.000354 0.000224
δis rec rec 0.000014 0.000002 ***
δis rec take -0.006433 0.004249
δis rec trans -0.010178 0.002895 ***
δis take air -0.005938 0.002230 **
δis take nrg -0.001328 0.000133 ***
δis take alc 0.000013 0.000001 ***
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Coefficients of AIDS model, continued from previous page
Coefficient Variable i Variable j/s Estimate Standard error Significance
δis take educ -0.013194 0.002529 ***
δis take cloth -0.011645 0.001723 ***
δis trans mort 0.036616 0.003093 ***
δis trans comm 0.001179 0.000185 ***
δis trans cont -0.000009 0.000002 ***
δis trans elec -0.027722 0.003511 ***
δis trans food 0.008579 0.002391 ***
δis air hlth -0.018836 0.002305 ***
δis air accom 0.000013 0.000138
δis air insur 0.000001 0.000001
δis air othr -0.001011 0.002615
δis air rec -0.003159 0.001782
δis nrg take 0.002016 0.000696 **
δis nrg trans 0.000147 0.000041 ***
δis nrg air -0.000001 0.000000 *
δis nrg nrg 0.002397 0.000784 **
δis nrg alc -0.002272 0.000545 ***
δis alc educ -0.012246 0.002385 ***
δis alc cloth 0.000726 0.000143 ***
δis alc mort -0.000007 0.000001 ***
δis alc comm 0.001179 0.002705
δis alc cont -0.007094 0.001843 ***
δis educ elec 0.020667 0.001791 ***
δis educ food -0.000673 0.000107 ***
δis educ hlth 0.000004 0.000001 ***
δis educ accom -0.004075 0.002031 *
δis educ insur 0.005380 0.001386 ***
δis cloth othr 0.000438 0.002340
δis cloth rec -0.000482 0.000140 ***
δis cloth take 0.000006 0.000001 ***
δis cloth trans 0.000447 0.002652
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Coefficients of AIDS model, continued from previous page
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δis cloth air -0.000404 0.001808
δis mort nrg -0.018905 0.004726 ***
δis mort alc 0.000872 0.000283 **
δis mort educ -0.000017 0.000003 ***
δis mort cloth -0.037760 0.005368 ***
δis mort mort 0.012238 0.003656 ***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
C.3 Empirical distributions for demand elasticities
This subsection presents summaries of the variance in individual household product-
specific uncompensated own-price demand elasticities under the AIDS model and QUAIDS
model. The summaries are based on a random sample of 3,000 households observed
in our overall data set. The variance in household elasticities is presented by way of
empirical kernel densities.1
C.4 Elasticities
1Produced using a default bandwidth in R which is ”0.9 times the minimum of the standard
deviation and the interquartile range divided by 1.34 times the sample size to the negative one-fifth
power” https://www.rdocumentation.org/packages/stats/versions/3.6.2/topics/bandwidth.
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Figure C.1: Accommodation, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical
densities.
Figure C.2: Air transport, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Figure C.3: Alcohol and tobacco, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical
densities.
Figure C.4: Clothing, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Figure C.5: Communications, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical
densities.
Figure C.6: Household contents, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical
densities.
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Figure C.7: Education, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
Figure C.8: Electricity, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Figure C.9: Groceries, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
Figure C.10: Health, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Figure C.11: Insurance, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
Figure C.12: Mortgage interest, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical
densities.
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Figure C.13: Energy excluding electricity, own-price uncompensated elasticities
empirical densities.
Figure C.14: Miscellaneous, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Figure C.15: Recreation, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
Figure C.16: Takeaways and eating out, own-price uncompensated elasticities
empirical densities.
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Figure C.17: Transport, own-price uncompensated elasticities empirical densities.
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Table C.5: QUAIDS model compensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -1.15 0.23 0.33 -0.09 -0.20 0.32 -0.04 -0.28 -0.36 0.04 0.01 0.13 0.43 -0.23 0.23 0.40 0.01
air 3.17 -0.94 2.00 -1.26 -1.36 1.39 -1.80 -1.95 0.45 -0.06 -1.40 -0.26 -1.33 1.13 -0.09 3.45 -0.09
alc 2.74 1.28 0.23 0.37 0.82 -1.48 -1.01 -0.88 0.12 0.74 1.99 0.14 -0.44 0.94 -1.07 -3.17 -1.18
cloth -0.59 -0.89 0.41 -1.05 0.89 0.29 -0.80 1.23 0.11 0.22 3.39 0.33 0.23 0.80 0.35 -3.41 -0.93
comm -1.23 -0.66 0.57 0.57 -1.01 0.32 -0.82 -0.07 0.59 0.24 -0.60 -0.15 0.20 -0.40 0.36 0.98 0.64
cont 1.83 0.59 -0.98 0.17 0.33 -2.45 1.16 0.62 -0.49 0.47 -0.87 0.69 -0.80 0.95 -0.18 -0.77 0.07
take -0.08 -0.81 -0.68 -0.51 -0.74 1.19 -0.52 -0.48 1.57 0.17 -0.70 0.30 -0.18 0.52 -0.57 1.88 0.07
educ -5.77 -3.33 -2.32 2.98 -0.24 2.44 -1.87 4.36 3.22 -0.10 -2.04 2.48 -0.56 1.12 0.73 -2.41 1.26
elec -1.71 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.45 -0.45 1.24 0.68 -1.95 0.30 0.68 0.02 0.61 -1.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.41
food 0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.01 0.07 0.10 0.01 -0.01 0.11 -0.87 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.01
hlth 0.19 -0.95 2.05 3.23 -0.83 -1.34 -1.06 -0.80 1.31 -0.27 -3.78 -1.59 0.90 0.28 0.13 2.48 0.37
insur 0.63 -0.11 0.08 0.15 -0.09 0.54 0.22 0.51 0.06 0.11 -0.83 -0.70 -0.49 0.23 -0.09 -0.05 -0.03
othr 1.51 -0.36 -0.17 0.08 0.15 -0.47 -0.10 -0.08 0.49 0.10 0.35 -0.36 -0.74 0.22 0.11 0.07 -0.37
mort -0.56 0.36 0.43 0.35 -0.24 0.68 0.32 0.25 -0.79 0.02 0.08 0.19 0.17 -0.65 -0.28 -0.14 -0.20
nrg 8.47 -0.27 -4.83 1.47 2.28 -1.27 -3.83 1.27 -0.36 0.56 0.57 -0.80 1.26 -2.52 -0.50 -2.90 1.30
rec 1.11 0.67 -0.95 -0.96 0.45 -0.35 0.84 -0.27 0.04 0.24 0.74 -0.01 0.05 0.00 -0.19 -1.09 0.12
trans 0.03 -0.05 -0.45 -0.34 0.34 0.02 0.01 0.18 0.29 0.04 0.12 -0.04 -0.39 -0.07 0.11 0.08 -0.12
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.6: AIDS model compensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -0.40 0.20 0.24 -0.15 -0.10 0.21 -0.17 -0.23 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 0.07 0.23 -0.13 0.25 0.20 -0.16
air 2.48 -0.92 2.05 -1.26 -1.46 1.40 -1.78 -1.93 0.23 -0.34 -1.40 -0.25 -1.24 1.06 -0.09 3.55 -0.12
alc 1.92 1.34 0.32 0.45 0.69 -1.32 -0.79 -0.99 -0.33 0.75 2.15 0.19 -0.21 0.84 -1.10 -2.92 -0.97
cloth -1.28 -0.88 0.49 -0.97 0.76 0.39 -0.66 1.16 -0.30 0.09 3.49 0.33 0.40 0.73 0.33 -3.26 -0.83
comm -0.59 -0.68 0.49 0.51 -0.94 0.25 -0.90 -0.06 0.84 0.35 -0.66 -0.15 0.06 -0.32 0.37 0.87 0.56
cont 1.11 0.61 -0.88 0.24 0.24 -2.35 1.29 0.59 -0.82 0.42 -0.77 0.70 -0.61 0.85 -0.21 -0.62 0.21
take -0.93 -0.79 -0.54 -0.42 -0.86 1.32 -0.26 -0.57 1.11 0.09 -0.51 0.27 0.05 0.39 -0.64 2.06 0.23
educ -4.74 -3.29 -2.61 2.83 -0.24 2.32 -2.21 4.34 3.63 -0.15 -2.25 2.61 -0.87 1.36 0.82 -2.54 0.98
elec -0.09 0.08 -0.18 -0.15 0.65 -0.69 0.90 0.77 -1.19 0.38 0.44 0.02 0.18 -0.82 0.01 -0.38 0.07
food 0.07 -0.04 0.14 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.02 -0.01 0.13 -0.74 -0.06 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.11 0.08
hlth -0.73 -0.93 2.20 3.33 -0.94 -1.19 -0.77 -0.88 0.82 -0.31 -3.58 -1.63 1.15 0.13 0.07 2.68 0.58
insur 0.31 -0.08 0.10 0.16 -0.11 0.56 0.21 0.53 0.02 0.09 -0.84 -0.66 -0.43 0.19 -0.08 0.02 0.02
othr 0.75 -0.32 -0.09 0.15 0.03 -0.37 0.03 -0.13 0.13 0.02 0.45 -0.32 -0.56 0.13 0.09 0.25 -0.24
mort -0.55 0.36 0.44 0.36 -0.23 0.67 0.30 0.27 -0.77 0.01 0.07 0.19 0.17 -0.65 -0.28 -0.15 -0.21
nrg 9.08 -0.27 -4.99 1.39 2.33 -1.39 -4.23 1.41 0.06 0.57 0.29 -0.66 1.05 -2.38 -0.37 -3.03 1.14
rec 0.48 0.70 -0.89 -0.92 0.37 -0.28 0.92 -0.29 -0.21 0.17 0.79 0.01 0.19 -0.08 -0.20 -0.96 0.20
trans -0.47 -0.03 -0.36 -0.29 0.29 0.12 0.13 0.14 0.05 0.15 0.21 0.01 -0.22 -0.15 0.09 0.25 0.07
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.7: QUAIDS model, sample 2013-2019, uncompensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -1.62 0.26 0.58 -0.30 -0.29 0.09 -0.16 -0.10 -0.24 -0.02 0.11 -0.23 0.39 -0.55 0.27 0.78 0.04
air 2.87 0.01 1.40 -0.13 -1.04 1.02 -1.62 -1.59 0.93 -0.23 -0.76 -0.22 -1.82 0.51 -0.34 -0.21 0.21
alc 5.26 1.16 -0.05 -0.84 1.19 -1.38 -3.20 -0.53 -0.49 0.27 1.95 -0.43 -0.62 0.41 -1.21 -1.35 -1.13
cloth -2.95 -0.11 -0.91 -1.03 1.19 2.45 1.53 -0.77 0.77 0.20 5.78 1.07 1.16 -0.07 1.29 -7.64 -2.96
comm -1.77 -0.58 0.81 0.75 -1.18 0.42 -1.91 0.47 0.06 0.07 -0.56 0.20 0.17 -0.93 0.31 2.14 0.54
cont 0.53 0.56 -0.93 1.52 0.42 -2.72 2.25 0.39 0.23 0.43 -1.45 0.36 -0.42 -0.04 -0.47 -1.49 -0.17
take -0.91 -0.82 -1.96 0.87 -1.72 2.04 0.75 -0.65 1.16 -0.33 -3.43 1.67 -0.61 2.49 -0.28 0.68 0.05
educ -2.31 -3.26 -1.32 -1.77 1.71 1.44 -2.63 2.68 3.53 0.29 1.32 1.58 -0.78 1.80 0.73 -3.78 -0.24
elec -1.11 0.39 -0.25 0.37 0.05 0.17 0.97 0.73 -2.71 0.25 0.51 0.64 0.15 0.56 -0.09 -1.97 0.33
food -0.03 -0.04 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.10 0.02 0.09 -1.01 -0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.11 0.02
hlth 0.90 -0.58 1.82 5.01 -0.76 -2.01 -5.24 0.50 0.94 -0.44 -3.73 0.10 0.56 -0.80 -0.78 3.04 0.49
insur -1.00 -0.08 -0.20 0.46 0.14 0.25 1.28 0.30 0.59 -0.04 0.05 -0.37 -0.87 -0.71 -0.15 -0.10 -0.54
othr 1.36 -0.57 -0.24 0.41 0.09 -0.24 -0.38 -0.12 0.11 0.03 0.23 -0.71 -0.09 -0.07 0.07 -0.50 -0.39
mort -2.56 0.22 0.18 -0.05 -0.72 -0.07 2.07 0.39 0.62 -0.14 -0.48 -0.83 -0.15 -1.41 0.02 0.99 0.44
nrg 11.45 -1.31 -5.64 5.56 2.12 -3.28 -2.11 1.37 -0.86 0.50 -3.89 -1.49 0.84 0.21 -0.09 -6.90 2.52
rec 2.14 -0.05 -0.41 -2.15 0.96 -0.67 0.34 -0.46 -1.17 -0.19 0.99 -0.07 -0.40 0.61 -0.45 0.37 -0.38
trans 0.13 0.06 -0.41 -1.00 0.29 -0.09 0.03 -0.04 0.23 0.04 0.19 -0.42 -0.38 0.38 0.20 -0.45 0.23
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.8: QUAIDS model, sample 2013-2019, compensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -1.44 0.28 0.60 -0.28 -0.26 0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.20 0.10 0.13 -0.19 0.45 -0.51 0.28 0.85 0.09
air 3.37 0.05 1.46 -0.08 -0.96 1.10 -1.53 -1.57 1.04 0.07 -0.70 -0.10 -1.67 0.62 -0.33 -0.03 0.36
alc 5.54 1.18 -0.02 -0.81 1.23 -1.34 -3.15 -0.52 -0.43 0.44 1.98 -0.36 -0.54 0.47 -1.20 -1.25 -1.04
cloth -2.58 -0.08 -0.87 -0.99 1.25 2.51 1.59 -0.75 0.85 0.43 5.83 1.15 1.26 0.01 1.30 -7.51 -2.85
comm -1.65 -0.57 0.82 0.76 -1.16 0.44 -1.89 0.47 0.09 0.15 -0.54 0.23 0.20 -0.90 0.31 2.18 0.58
cont 0.84 0.59 -0.90 1.56 0.47 -2.67 2.30 0.40 0.29 0.63 -1.41 0.44 -0.33 0.03 -0.47 -1.37 -0.07
take -0.59 -0.79 -1.92 0.90 -1.67 2.10 0.81 -0.63 1.23 -0.13 -3.39 1.74 -0.52 2.55 -0.27 0.80 0.15
educ -2.10 -3.24 -1.30 -1.75 1.75 1.47 -2.59 2.69 3.58 0.41 1.35 1.63 -0.72 1.84 0.74 -3.70 -0.18
elec -1.02 0.40 -0.24 0.38 0.06 0.19 0.99 0.73 -2.69 0.31 0.52 0.66 0.18 0.58 -0.09 -1.94 0.36
food 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.14 -0.07 0.03 0.12 -0.93 -0.07 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.06
hlth 1.22 -0.55 1.85 5.04 -0.71 -1.96 -5.18 0.51 1.01 -0.24 -3.70 0.18 0.66 -0.73 -0.77 3.16 0.59
insur -0.73 -0.06 -0.17 0.49 0.18 0.30 1.33 0.31 0.64 0.12 0.08 -0.30 -0.79 -0.65 -0.14 -0.01 -0.46
othr 1.70 -0.54 -0.20 0.44 0.15 -0.18 -0.32 -0.10 0.19 0.24 0.27 -0.63 0.01 0.01 0.08 -0.38 -0.29
mort -2.21 0.25 0.22 -0.01 -0.66 -0.01 2.13 0.40 0.70 0.07 -0.44 -0.74 -0.05 -1.34 0.03 1.12 0.55
nrg 11.68 -1.29 -5.61 5.58 2.16 -3.24 -2.07 1.38 -0.81 0.65 -3.86 -1.44 0.90 0.26 -0.09 -6.81 2.59
rec 2.49 -0.02 -0.37 -2.12 1.01 -0.62 0.40 -0.45 -1.10 0.02 1.03 0.01 -0.30 0.69 -0.44 0.49 -0.27
trans 0.31 0.08 -0.39 -0.98 0.32 -0.06 0.06 -0.03 0.27 0.15 0.21 -0.38 -0.32 0.42 0.20 -0.38 0.29
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.9: QUAIDS model with regional predictors, uncompensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -1.09 0.16 0.28 0.09 -0.23 0.04 -0.06 -0.28 -0.36 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.32 -0.17 0.12 0.25 -0.12
air 2.02 -1.17 2.16 -0.93 -1.34 0.75 -2.15 -1.89 0.61 -0.41 -0.84 -0.39 -1.32 0.73 0.10 3.49 -0.41
alc 2.21 1.40 -0.15 -0.01 0.57 -0.87 -1.09 -0.71 -0.04 0.40 0.89 0.31 -0.35 0.66 -0.68 -2.56 -0.98
cloth 0.78 -0.65 -0.01 -0.89 0.64 0.67 -0.75 0.92 -0.11 -0.03 2.13 0.01 -0.07 1.03 -0.35 -3.71 -0.60
comm -1.33 -0.62 0.41 0.43 -1.05 0.38 -0.47 0.06 0.49 0.16 -0.85 -0.11 0.14 -0.31 0.27 0.80 0.63
cont 0.20 0.32 -0.58 0.41 0.36 -2.86 0.72 0.59 -0.27 0.26 -0.09 0.70 -0.69 0.40 0.10 -0.35 -0.23
take -0.33 -0.95 -0.74 -0.47 -0.45 0.74 -1.03 -0.32 1.24 -0.07 0.58 0.22 -0.20 0.19 -0.20 1.04 -0.25
educ -5.92 -3.22 -1.86 2.23 0.22 2.30 -1.22 4.25 3.12 -0.49 -0.77 2.23 -0.60 1.05 0.40 -3.67 0.95
elec -1.61 0.22 -0.02 -0.06 0.38 -0.23 1.02 0.66 -1.90 0.19 0.23 -0.01 0.58 -1.05 0.05 0.06 0.49
food 0.03 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.06 -0.91 -0.11 -0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.03
hlth 0.10 -0.56 0.92 2.03 -1.23 -0.14 0.88 -0.30 0.41 -0.62 -5.52 -1.13 0.68 0.75 -0.16 2.21 0.68
insur 0.09 -0.14 0.16 0.01 -0.08 0.56 0.17 0.45 -0.01 -0.11 -0.58 -0.75 -0.52 0.06 -0.05 -0.13 -0.13
othr 1.03 -0.34 -0.14 -0.03 0.08 -0.42 -0.12 -0.09 0.42 -0.20 0.27 -0.39 -0.84 0.17 0.12 -0.11 -0.41
mort -0.52 0.24 0.29 0.47 -0.21 0.25 0.08 0.23 -0.86 -0.08 0.33 0.00 0.11 -0.82 -0.21 -0.25 -0.48
nrg 4.37 0.30 -3.09 -1.46 1.68 0.66 -1.31 0.69 0.37 0.16 -0.71 -0.43 1.30 -1.83 -1.00 -1.82 1.10
rec 0.61 0.69 -0.78 -1.05 0.34 -0.16 0.47 -0.42 0.03 -0.01 0.65 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 -0.12 -1.13 0.11
trans -0.37 -0.10 -0.37 -0.21 0.33 -0.13 -0.14 0.14 0.33 -0.06 0.25 -0.09 -0.38 -0.24 0.09 0.14 -0.19
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.10: QUAIDS model with regional predictors, compensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -0.91 0.18 0.30 0.11 -0.20 0.07 -0.03 -0.27 -0.32 0.13 0.03 0.06 0.38 -0.13 0.13 0.32 -0.07
air 2.48 -1.13 2.22 -0.87 -1.26 0.83 -2.06 -1.87 0.71 -0.11 -0.78 -0.28 -1.18 0.84 0.11 3.68 -0.26
alc 2.47 1.42 -0.12 0.02 0.62 -0.82 -1.04 -0.70 0.01 0.57 0.92 0.37 -0.27 0.72 -0.67 -2.46 -0.89
cloth 1.13 -0.62 0.03 -0.85 0.71 0.74 -0.68 0.93 -0.03 0.20 2.17 0.10 0.04 1.11 -0.34 -3.57 -0.48
comm -1.21 -0.61 0.42 0.44 -1.03 0.40 -0.45 0.07 0.51 0.24 -0.84 -0.08 0.17 -0.29 0.27 0.85 0.67
cont 0.50 0.35 -0.54 0.45 0.41 -2.80 0.78 0.60 -0.20 0.45 -0.05 0.77 -0.60 0.47 0.10 -0.22 -0.13
take -0.01 -0.92 -0.70 -0.43 -0.39 0.80 -0.98 -0.30 1.31 0.13 0.62 0.29 -0.11 0.27 -0.19 1.17 -0.15
educ -5.71 -3.20 -1.83 2.25 0.26 2.34 -1.18 4.26 3.17 -0.36 -0.74 2.28 -0.54 1.10 0.41 -3.58 1.03
elec -1.52 0.23 -0.01 -0.05 0.39 -0.21 1.03 0.67 -1.88 0.24 0.24 0.01 0.61 -1.04 0.05 0.10 0.52
food 0.16 -0.04 0.09 0.01 0.06 0.10 0.00 -0.03 0.09 -0.83 -0.10 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
hlth 0.40 -0.53 0.95 2.06 -1.17 -0.08 0.94 -0.29 0.48 -0.42 -5.49 -1.06 0.78 0.82 -0.15 2.33 0.78
insur 0.35 -0.11 0.20 0.04 -0.04 0.60 0.22 0.46 0.05 0.06 -0.55 -0.69 -0.43 0.12 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
othr 1.36 -0.32 -0.10 0.01 0.13 -0.36 -0.06 -0.08 0.49 0.01 0.30 -0.31 -0.74 0.25 0.12 0.02 -0.30
mort -0.20 0.27 0.33 0.51 -0.16 0.31 0.13 0.25 -0.79 0.13 0.37 0.08 0.21 -0.74 -0.20 -0.12 -0.37
nrg 4.57 0.32 -3.06 -1.44 1.72 0.69 -1.28 0.70 0.42 0.29 -0.69 -0.38 1.37 -1.78 -0.99 -1.74 1.17
rec 0.93 0.71 -0.74 -1.01 0.40 -0.10 0.52 -0.41 0.11 0.20 0.69 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.11 -1.00 0.22
trans -0.20 -0.09 -0.34 -0.19 0.36 -0.09 -0.11 0.14 0.36 0.05 0.27 -0.05 -0.32 -0.20 0.10 0.21 -0.13
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.11: QUAIDS model with household size predictors, uncompensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -0.54 0.18 0.24 -0.19 -0.09 0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.11 -0.20 0.20 0.05 -0.20
air 2.22 -0.88 1.92 -1.27 -1.31 1.59 -1.68 -2.00 -0.08 -0.43 -1.11 -0.25 -1.37 0.68 -0.10 3.17 -0.13
alc 1.91 1.27 0.18 0.36 0.73 -1.12 -0.64 -1.01 -0.34 0.59 2.31 0.03 -0.40 0.67 -1.43 -3.13 -0.98
cloth -1.64 -0.90 0.39 -1.24 0.78 0.30 -0.60 1.29 0.00 0.11 3.31 0.25 0.53 0.68 0.08 -3.45 -0.88
comm -0.51 -0.62 0.53 0.52 -0.92 0.15 -0.90 -0.05 0.87 0.03 -0.69 -0.25 -0.14 -0.36 0.18 0.71 0.46
cont 0.89 0.70 -0.75 0.18 0.14 -2.33 1.20 0.40 -0.98 0.23 -0.82 0.69 -0.57 0.80 -0.32 -0.66 0.19
take -1.08 -0.75 -0.43 -0.38 -0.84 1.21 -1.15 -0.47 1.04 0.07 -0.66 0.20 0.07 0.22 -0.06 1.89 0.11
educ -5.23 -3.41 -2.60 3.09 -0.17 1.56 -1.79 4.96 3.46 -0.20 -2.99 2.61 -0.97 1.44 1.35 -2.91 0.79
elec -0.40 -0.03 -0.21 0.00 0.73 -0.89 0.93 0.81 -1.21 0.16 0.62 -0.11 -0.01 -0.87 0.02 -0.62 0.07
food -0.15 -0.05 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.01 0.05 -0.98 -0.08 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.07 -0.02
hlth -0.88 -0.76 2.38 3.17 -1.00 -1.27 -1.01 -1.20 1.07 -0.44 -3.78 -1.61 1.10 0.10 -0.10 2.72 0.48
insur 0.04 -0.09 0.02 0.12 -0.19 0.56 0.16 0.54 -0.09 0.01 -0.84 -0.68 -0.50 0.21 -0.09 -0.16 -0.03
othr 0.34 -0.36 -0.16 0.20 -0.08 -0.34 0.04 -0.15 -0.01 -0.04 0.43 -0.37 -0.48 0.07 0.07 0.21 -0.36
mort -0.92 0.25 0.32 0.32 -0.29 0.60 0.14 0.30 -0.77 -0.23 0.03 0.17 0.03 -0.65 -0.24 -0.30 -0.38
nrg 6.14 -0.24 -5.36 0.29 0.93 -1.81 -0.35 1.96 0.13 0.05 -0.36 -0.64 0.61 -1.67 -0.11 -0.45 -0.12
rec 0.11 0.64 -0.96 -0.98 0.30 -0.30 0.86 -0.34 -0.31 0.11 0.81 -0.09 0.16 -0.14 -0.04 -0.98 0.16
trans -0.59 -0.03 -0.37 -0.31 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.12 0.04 -0.04 0.18 -0.02 -0.34 -0.19 -0.01 0.19 -0.03
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Table C.12: QUAIDS model with household size predictors, compensated price elasticities
Price:
Quantity: accom air alc cloth comm cont take educ elec food hlth insur othr mort nrg rec trans
accom -0.36 0.20 0.26 -0.17 -0.06 0.20 -0.16 -0.24 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.05 0.16 -0.16 0.21 0.12 -0.14
air 2.68 -0.84 1.98 -1.22 -1.23 1.67 -1.59 -1.98 0.02 -0.13 -1.05 -0.14 -1.23 0.79 -0.08 3.36 0.03
alc 2.13 1.29 0.21 0.39 0.77 -1.08 -0.60 -1.00 -0.30 0.74 2.34 0.08 -0.33 0.72 -1.42 -3.04 -0.91
cloth -1.27 -0.87 0.44 -1.20 0.84 0.37 -0.53 1.31 0.07 0.35 3.35 0.34 0.64 0.77 0.10 -3.31 -0.76
comm -0.39 -0.61 0.54 0.54 -0.90 0.17 -0.88 -0.04 0.90 0.11 -0.68 -0.23 -0.11 -0.33 0.18 0.75 0.50
cont 1.18 0.72 -0.71 0.22 0.19 -2.28 1.25 0.42 -0.92 0.42 -0.79 0.76 -0.48 0.87 -0.31 -0.54 0.29
take -0.78 -0.72 -0.39 -0.34 -0.79 1.26 -1.10 -0.45 1.11 0.27 -0.62 0.27 0.16 0.29 -0.05 2.01 0.21
educ -4.96 -3.39 -2.57 3.12 -0.13 1.61 -1.74 4.98 3.51 -0.02 -2.96 2.67 -0.89 1.50 1.36 -2.80 0.88
elec -0.32 -0.02 -0.20 0.01 0.74 -0.87 0.95 0.81 -1.19 0.21 0.63 -0.09 0.01 -0.85 0.02 -0.59 0.10
food -0.02 -0.04 0.13 0.03 0.03 0.09 0.05 -0.01 0.08 -0.90 -0.06 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.02
hlth -0.59 -0.73 2.42 3.21 -0.95 -1.22 -0.96 -1.18 1.13 -0.25 -3.74 -1.55 1.19 0.16 -0.09 2.84 0.58
insur 0.30 -0.07 0.05 0.15 -0.14 0.61 0.20 0.56 -0.04 0.18 -0.81 -0.62 -0.42 0.27 -0.08 -0.06 0.06
othr 0.67 -0.33 -0.12 0.23 -0.02 -0.28 0.10 -0.13 0.06 0.17 0.46 -0.30 -0.38 0.15 0.08 0.34 -0.26
mort -0.56 0.28 0.36 0.36 -0.23 0.67 0.21 0.32 -0.69 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.15 -0.56 -0.22 -0.15 -0.26
nrg 6.34 -0.22 -5.33 0.32 0.96 -1.77 -0.32 1.97 0.17 0.18 -0.34 -0.59 0.68 -1.62 -0.10 -0.37 -0.05
rec 0.43 0.67 -0.92 -0.94 0.35 -0.24 0.92 -0.33 -0.25 0.31 0.84 -0.02 0.26 -0.06 -0.03 -0.85 0.26
trans -0.44 -0.02 -0.35 -0.29 0.27 0.14 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.06 0.19 0.02 -0.29 -0.15 -0.01 0.25 0.02
accom = Accommodation, air = Air transport, alc = Alcohol and tobacco, cloth = Clothing, comm = Communications, cont = Household contents,
take = Takeaways and eating out, educ = Education, elec = Electricity, food = Groceries, hlth = Health, insur = Insurance, othr = Miscellaneous,
mort = Mortgage interest, nrg = Energy excluding electricity, rec = Recreation, trans = Transport.
Values in bold have p-values less than 0.05.
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Appendix D
Effects of high fixed charges
Table D.1: Baseline Atkinson indices of equivalised real disposable income by year
Year
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Single - no children 0.14 0.13 0.10 0.15 0.15
65+ single 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.08
Single - 1 child 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.07 0.06
Single - 2 children 0.05 0.16 0.07 0.12 0.08
Single - 3+ children 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.12
65+ couple 0.11 0.16 0.10 0.12 0.15
Couple - no children 0.10 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.11
Couple - 1 child 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08
Couple - 2 children 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.09
Couple - 3+ children 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.14
3 adults - no children 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.09
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.09
4+ adults - no children 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.07
Total 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.13
ε = 0.60
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Table D.2: Baseline Atkinson indices of unequivalised real disposable income
Inequality aversion ε
Household 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9
Single - no children 0.04 0.11 0.13 0.20
65+ single 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
Single - 1 child 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.13
Single - 2 children 0.03 0.08 0.09 0.14
Single - 3+ children 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
65+ couple 0.05 0.11 0.13 0.18
Couple - no children 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.15
Couple - 1 child 0.03 0.07 0.09 0.13
Couple - 2 children 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
Couple - 3+ children 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.15
3 adults - no children 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.11
3+ adults - 1+ children 0.03 0.07 0.08 0.12
4+ adults - no children 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.11
Total 0.05 0.12 0.14 0.21
Weighted average for 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019
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Table D.3: Aggregate compensating variation by year, QUAIDS model, 2017 dollar
millions
Year:
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Total
Single - no children 4.8 -0.9 -0.2 -1.5 5.0 7.1
65+ single -3.6 -5.5 -1.5 -4.4 -1.8 -16.8
Single - 1 child -0.3 1.8 -0.1 0.5 1.0 3.0
Single - 2 children 1.5 1.2 -0.3 1.8 0.3 4.4
Single - 3+ children 0.3 2.6 -0.5 0.1 0.9 3.3
65+ couple 9.4 2.8 7.6 8.2 4.5 32.5
Couple - no children 42.3 48.5 21.2 34.4 38.2 184.6
Couple - 1 child 16.6 24.1 9.7 15.3 11.9 77.7
Couple - 2 children 18.5 31.7 29.4 31.3 22.1 133.1
Couple - 3+ children 15.1 12.2 12.9 3.5 10.8 54.4
3 adults - no children 18.3 24.1 15.6 28.7 17.6 104.3
3+ adults - 1+ children 31.0 15.2 24.7 22.3 27.1 120.3
4+ adults - no children 10.4 10.8 12.8 12.5 18.8 65.3
Total 164 169 131 153 156 773.2
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
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Table D.4: Aggregate compensating variation by year, AIDS model, 2017 dollar
millions
Year:
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Total
Single - no children -2.5 -4.6 -4.0 -5.1 -2.3 -18.5
65+ single -4.2 -6.7 -4.8 -5.5 -5.2 -26.3
Single - 1 child -1.8 -0.6 -2.2 -0.5 -0.7 -5.8
Single - 2 children 0.3 0.1 -0.8 0.8 -0.6 -0.2
Single - 3+ children -0.2 0.4 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.4
65+ couple 1.0 -2.5 -0.4 1.6 -2.2 -2.6
Couple - no children 12.7 17.6 2.7 13.7 12.1 58.9
Couple - 1 child 4.9 7.4 2.2 6.3 4.6 25.4
Couple - 2 children 6.8 13.2 12.2 10.8 7.8 50.9
Couple - 3+ children 4.9 4.4 3.6 0.1 2.7 15.7
3 adults - no children 7.0 9.0 3.7 11.7 6.5 38.0
3+ adults - 1+ children 11.1 4.4 10.0 8.3 9.2 43.0
4+ adults - no children 3.7 3.3 4.3 4.4 6.1 21.7
Total 44 46 26 47 38 199.8
Population weighted sum 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
157
Table D.5: Mean compensating variation per household, QUAIDS model, 2017 dollars
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -36 -14 -6 19 86 8
65+ single -45 -33 -27 -33 23 -23
Single - 1 child -2 -11 4 14 83 16
Single - 2 children 15 2 33 17 148 37
Single - 3+ children 19 -12 4 169 49 45
65+ couple -22 -6 13 58 185 43
Couple - no children 18 68 118 140 272 117
Couple - 1 child 41 83 78 122 293 121
Couple - 2 children 74 170 178 215 329 188
Couple - 3+ children 79 141 75 181 308 151
3 adults - no children 85 78 110 305 313 174
3+ adults - 1+ children 96 199 212 178 464 230
4+ adults - no children 122 265 378 108 237 219
Total 27 72 90 117 235 108
Population weighted means 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
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Table D.6: Mean compensating variation per household, AIDS model, 2017 dollars
Disposable income quintile:
Household 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Single - no children -51 -30 -29 -23 25 -23
65+ single -56 -37 -36 -49 -8 -37
Single - 1 child -79 -27 -45 -30 22 -34
Single - 2 children -19 -12 -24 -40 101 -4
Single - 3+ children -26 -55 -18 60 -3 -9
65+ couple -54 -40 -24 3 97 -5
Couple - no children -23 4 35 70 182 49
Couple - 1 child -12 22 33 52 215 60
Couple - 2 children 22 76 86 129 282 114
Couple - 3+ children 0 48 39 97 221 75
3 adults - no children 10 0 52 225 223 98
3+ adults - 1+ children 20 107 109 100 417 152
4+ adults - no children 34 155 259 59 149 129
Total -19 15 31 55 165 49
Population weighted means 2007, 2010, 2013, 2016, 2019.
Income quintile ordered from lowest to highest.
Sign of CV reversed. Positive values represent welfare gains.
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Table D.7: Percentage change in Atkinson index of equivalised income by year,
QUAIDS model
Year
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Single - no children -1.08 0.83 0.30 0.36 -0.06
65+ single 0.78 -10.97 0.51 0.65 -9.01
Single - 1 child -0.12 0.73 0.03 0.39 0.23
Single - 2 children 2.68 -0.13 0.57 0.73 -9.09
Single - 3+ children -0.02 0.02 0.79 0.05 0.03
65+ couple 0.92 0.19 -3.79 0.28 0.36
Couple - no children -0.08 0.30 -0.45 0.16 0.18
Couple - 1 child 0.45 -0.59 -1.91 0.13 0.36
Couple - 2 children 0.51 -0.25 -1.42 0.37 -0.08
Couple - 3+ children -0.29 0.15 -0.40 -0.31 -0.46
3 adults - no children -0.68 -1.16 1.05 -0.02 -0.03
3+ adults - 1+ children -0.35 0.31 0.78 0.31 -0.29
4+ adults - no children -0.19 1.78 -0.58 -0.04 -0.25
Total 0.02 -0.32 -0.33 0.31 -0.44
ε = 0.60
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Table D.8: Percentage change in Atkinson index of equivalised income by year, AIDS
model
Year
Household 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019
Single - no children -0.74 0.83 0.28 0.35 0.33
65+ single 0.72 -10.12 0.47 0.65 -8.91
Single - 1 child 1.03 0.82 0.52 0.55 0.78
Single - 2 children 2.31 0.14 1.49 0.66 -3.54
Single - 3+ children -0.18 0.30 0.82 0.15 0.58
65+ couple 0.66 0.30 -3.67 0.30 0.47
Couple - no children 0.15 0.45 -0.43 0.23 0.23
Couple - 1 child 0.39 -0.28 -1.89 0.21 0.49
Couple - 2 children 0.68 -0.07 -1.35 0.64 -0.03
Couple - 3+ children 0.11 0.33 -0.03 0.00 0.25
3 adults - no children -0.66 -1.04 1.06 0.23 0.13
3+ adults - 1+ children -0.08 0.40 0.91 0.30 -0.08
4+ adults - no children -0.04 1.94 -0.22 -0.09 -0.06
Total 0.15 -0.19 -0.25 0.36 -0.23
ε = 0.60
Table D.9: Percentage change in Atkinson index by year, income measure, and model
Year:
Income: 2007 2010 2013 2016 2019 Average
QUAIDS model
Equivalised 0.020 -0.325 -0.328 0.307 -0.440 -0.167
Unequivalised 0.04 -0.29 -0.17 0.31 -0.34 -0.10
AIDS model
Equivalised 0.15 -0.19 -0.25 0.36 -0.23 -0.04
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